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Abstract 
Although the British dominated events in Egypt (1882-1936), they 
failed to create a genuine political community, wliich can be defined as one that 
commands allegiance as the basic moral authority for the individual. British rule 
succeeded instead in imposing and stabilizing a colonial authority witli the aid of 
indigenous allies. That authority proved capable of maintaining itself, spreading 
its values among part of the population, and earning recognition of its legitimacy 
fi-om other imperial authorities such as the French. In short, despite the heavy 
veils of indirect rule which at times screened British power, one recognizes in 
Egypt's history the process of colonization and its inevitable result: a colonial 
situation that led to the rise of Islamic and nationalist resistance. That recognition 
thus provides orientation for analysts of Egypt's contemporary ideological and 
political trends both in the context of reformist Islam and Liberal Nationalism and 
those are the primary objects of this study. 
It is in the same direction that the political evolution of the post 1952 
Egyptian regimes and their records in both ruling and transforming Egypt are also 
examined. The dynamics of Free Officers rule are characterized by studying the 
interplay of power, ideas and social change under Nasser and Anwar al Sadat 
wh«:e as discussion has been made to understand the growth of state apparatus 
for channeling of political discourse in the context of governance and institution 
building as developed and institutionalized under Husni Mubarak. 
The study also makes an elaborate discussion of social reforms and 
changes in critical areas of industry, agriculture and rural welfare evaluating the 
actual performance of the regime as clearly as available in relation to their 
respective political and ideological objectives. While the primary focuses of this 
study is on domestic development in the context of institution building and 
governance, internal changes are also co-related with important shifts in Egypt's 
global role. 
The literature on contemporary Egypt is rich. But the historians, the 
comparative social scientists, the orientahsts and who have most systematically 
studied Egypt for the most part have had different concerns. The answer to this 
fundamental question requires more than a generalized account of recent 
Egyptian history but a more focussed study with Egypt's traditional Islamic 
culture and tlie tasks of adjusting it to tlie modem world. 
The present study brings a new focus: expHcit analysis of the 
obstacles, both domestic and foreign, that Egyptians have confronted in their 
efforts to create the politics and administration of revolutionary social 
reconstruction. The general argument can be briefly stated: 
(1) Egypt's revolutionary rulers as yet have been unable to generate the 
institutions, systems, and relations which they themselves see as 
essential to the social reconstruction of their country. 
(2) Islamic activists and those who call themselves Islamic Reformers in 
Egypt insist that Islam can be compatible with democracy in terms of 
institution building, but the question of whether there is unanimity in 
their Islamic political agenda on society is open to debate. 
(3) There have been many causes for the failures of Nasser, Sadat and 
Mubarak but most critical has been die absence of institution building 
both in terms of organization and of ideology. 
(4) This lack of institutionalization and ideology has hampered a 
cohCTent, self-generated ^proach to the problems Egypt has faced 
since tfie first quarter of the 20*^  century. Basic decisions on the 
character of Egypt's new pohtical-economic order, and correlative 
regional and international alignmaits, are too long delayed. Despite 
the domestic roots of tiieir core motivations, Egypt's new rulers have 
allowed their regime to be defined to an excessive degree by the 
respcmses made to extemal crisis stimuli and to the counter-responses 
of the environment. The successive political rulers have been unable 
to devise and carry out the basic pubhc policies demanded by their 
own vision of change. 
05) In Egypt a political-economic order has taken form that is 
characterized by sharply limited competence for the tasks of 
modernization. It is an order without secure and sound social 
moorings, an order in which political power is both personalized and 
bureaucratized. Ironically, such a system of social organization itself 
erects new and formidable barriers to the task set by the respective 
political regimes for themselves and their people: the revolutionary 
transformation of Egypt. 
Hence, in this study an attempt has been made to examine and 
explore the compatibility between the Islamic movements and the dominant 
ideological trends generally bowed and controlled by the Egyptian elite with a 
view to examine the genesis of the contemporary state system in the context of 
changing dimoision of state-society relations, weigh the claims and goals of 
opposition forces, and asses the prospects for reform. 
In so doing, this study will concoitrate on describing and analyzing 
five distinct areas, leading to significant conclusion about the overall 
phOTomoKMi of contemporary ideological and poUtical trends in the Arab 
RepubUc of Egypt The areas chosen have been put in a logical order so as to 
lead to the central thesis of study. 
In the first ch^ter, an attempt has been made to investigate the 
intellectual foundations of modem Islamic reformism in Egypt in an attempt to 
grapple with what it perceived to be an intolerable state of Islamic decline in the 
context of growing European influence and culture. The eirea of concern 
addressed is about the nature of Governance in modem Islamic State System. In 
the course of this discussion, two streams emerged as dominant. The first as is 
believed to be revivalist in nature, advocating a return to the path set by the early 
MusUm rulers and the second whereby drawing its inspiration from Europe, and 
attempts to reconcile European and Islamic political philosophy. The overall 
estimation, however, is an attempt to understand a comprehensive background of 
modem Islamic ideologues, their various theories and related issues, as a guiding 
principle for the govemance and state building. 
Chapter two deals about the growth and development of the 
Egyptian society and state system especially in tiie first half of the twentieth 
century. This phase is particularly important as it witnesses the growth and 
emergence of the Muslim arotherhood. This movement, as is rooted in the 
Islamic history, not only posed a challenge to the Westemize state system but 
even paved the way for the establishment of the strong foundation of the Islamic 
society in Egypt. Much of this chapter's readings and discussion is on the 
Muslim Brotherhood embodying the Islamic ideology, its rise, evolution and 
growth in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The third chapter attempts to highlight the philosophy of Gramal 
Abdul Nasser in the context of nation state system. The advent of Nasser in the 
politicaJ horizon of Egypt witnessed a socialist philosophy as a political ideology 
of the government. The ch£q)ter tries to give a description as to how Nasser 
utilized the Islamic adventist to carry out his philosophy in the context of Arab 
nationalism. The chapter also contains summary of the failure of Nasser's policy 
as he could not reconcile the growing demands of Islamists within the broad 
framework of his socialist system. 
The fourth ch^ter focuses on the Egyptian political system, it: 
growth and direction as projected by Anwar al-Sadat, whereby his ideology of 
political liberalizatioii is discussed in terms of E^ptianism (replacing pan-
Arabism) and Islam. However, this chapter also contains the emergence of 
contemporary Islamic activism, namely 'the Islamic Liberation Organization' and 
'the Group of Muslim', vwth a view to delineating its system of thought and 
theoretical frame of refaence as they emerged in Egypt 
Finally the fifth and the last chapter aspires to understand that the 
contemporary Islamic political activism vis-a-vis the characteristics of the nation 
state system in Egypt is a product of socio-economic, socio-political and socio-
cultural conditions. These c(mditi(»is are manifested in the interrelated and 
multifaceted crisis of development, inequality and identity over the century and 
produced conflicts, (^ressioa and depexidesDcy in their wake. It is thus 
concluded that this ruin of religious political activism lies in the failure of 
political system to deal with these problems-indeed, minimally to safeguard the 
internal Egyptian community and exploitation in various fonns. 
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Preface & Acknowledgement 
The purpose of this study on 'Contemporary Ideological and Political 
Trends in The Arab Republic of Egypt' is not to give a modem history and 
contemporary trends of all kinds of thought expressed by the Egyptian scholars 
since the second half of the nineteenth century. The emphasis, however, is on the 
thoughts about politics and society within a certain context : that created by the 
growth of European influence and the Islamic resurgence movements calling for 
radical social reforms and for changes in the form of government. These 
movements are characterized by a strong religious component. Their calls for 
reform are couched in the Muslim idiom - that is, in demands for social justice 
(adala) and the satisfaction of man's basic necessities, and are accompanied by 
demands for a return to an Islamic form of government, one that is ruled by the 
Shari'a. This nomenclature covers a multitude of organizations with different 
principles and slogans, but all have one common denominator - their reformist 
appeals derive from religious belief and are asserted to be founded in Muslim 
principles. 
It is to such ideas that the word 'contemporary' is defined in the title 
- for the ideas which have influenced not only the trends about democratic 
institutions or individual rights, but also about national strength and unity and the 
power of government in the context of the growth of European power and the 
spread of new ideas as a challenge to which Egyptians had to respond by changing 
their own societies, and the systems of beliefs and values which gave them 
legitimacy, in a certain direction, through acceptance of some of the ideas and 
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institutions of modem Europe. This of course raised problems of different kinds. 
What should they accept? If they accept it, could they also remain true to their 
inherited beliefs and values? In what sense, if any, would they still remain 
Muslims and Arabs? 
To write a history of thought demands certain choices. It is possible 
to deal in a general way with schools of thought, but to do so may blur the 
differences between individual thinkers, and impose a false unity upon their work. 
The otiier way is to lay the main emphasis on a number of individuals, chosen 
because they are broadly representative of certain tendencies or generations, and to 
explain as fully as possible the influences, the circumstances, and traits of 
personality which may have led them to think about certain matters in a certain 
way. An attempt, therefore, has been made to follow the second method, because 
it made it possible to relate different thinkers and movements ; such as the Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood), Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami (the 
Islamic Liberation Organization), Jama'at al-Muslimin (the Group of MusHm) and 
aWihad (Holy Struggle), and to give a chronological framework within which they 
could be placed. 
While the many groups that have been examined as part of flie 
contemporary Islamic political activist movement are diverse, there are a number 
of characteristics common to all of them. First, they are all committed to a Salafl 
ideology. The normative characteristics of this are puritanical moralism, 
collectivism and universalism. Second, the goals of these movements are 
politically reactionary in that the groups seek Islamization of political institutions 
as their primary objective. The Muslim Brotiierhood is obviously in the first kind. 
though its character was also tinted by that of the second, for it attempted to 
interpret the principles of Islam in accordance with contemporary political life. 
However, some analysts may differ with an assessment based on this 
approach, having themselves approached the issue through the perspective of 
modem Western social sciences, which lend greater weight to factors such as 
disparity in social origin, variations in the nature of the leadership or modes of 
political performance, or differences in the geographical-social context in which 
the group emerged and developed. Thus social scientists might variously classify 
these groups as 'religious', 'social', 'political', or 'protest' movements, depending 
on the criteria they apply. 
It is. therefore, this study also has an elaborate discussion of the 
political ideas as developed in the context of the institution building in Egypt by 
the respective contemporary political leaders of the state; Nasser, Sadat and 
Mubarak, Under Nasser this ideology was revolutionary nationahsm, but 
thereafter the ideology of the 1952 revolution gradually replaced by a new 
conservative consensus that reflected the interests of an estabUshment with no 
interest in ftirtiier radical change. Sadat pioneered this ideological transformation 
in the October Working Paper, which outlined his view of Egypt's new course 
after the October 1973 War, through a 'de-Nasserization' propaganda campaign; 
and by subsequent efforts to revive the legitimacy of capitalism and to justify his 
Western alignment. Sadat also sougjit to root legitimacy in constitutionalism and 
democracy. 
Under Mubarak, however, democratization became the main 
legitimacy formula. Nevertheless, it was limited. The masses were held not to be 
prepared for full-blown democracy, lacking sufficient responsibility and 
consciousness, they were susceptible to 'alien' (leftist) or 'Islamist' ideas. Strong 
presidential tutelage, the careful channeling of political discourse through regime-
managed institutions, and limits on overt attempts to incite the masses was needed 
for the sake of social peace. By the Mubarak era, this new conservative consensus 
seemed to bind the elite, affecting ideological divisions. 
Hence, in this study an attempt has been made to examine and 
explore the compatibility between the Islamic movements and the dominant 
ideological trends generally bowed and controlled by the Egyptian elite with a 
view to examine the genesis of the contemporary state system in the context of 
changing dimension of state-society relations, weigh the claims and goals of 
(^position forces, and asses the prospects for reform. 
In so doing, this study will concentrate on describing and analyzing 
five distinct areas, leading to significant conclusion about the overall phenomenon 
of contemporary ideological and political trends in Egypt. The areas chosen have 
been put in a logical order so as to lead to the central thesis of study. 
In the first chapter, an attempt has been made to investigate the 
intellectual foundations of modem Islamic reformism in Egypt in an attempt to 
grapple with what it perceived to be an intolerable state of Islamic decline in the 
context of growing European influence and culture. The area of concern 
addressed is about the nature of Governance in modem Islamic State System. In 
&e course of this discussion, two streams emerged as dominant. The first as is 
believed to be revivalist in nature, advocating a return to the path set by the early 
Muslim mlers and the second whereby drawing its inspiration from Europe, and 
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attempts to reconcile European and Islamic political philosophy. The overall 
estimation, however, is an attempt to understand a comprehensive background of 
modem Islamic ideologues, their various theories and related issues, as a guiding 
principle for the governance and state building. 
Chapter two deals about the growth and development of the Egyptian 
society and state system especially in the first half of the twentieth century. This 
phase is particularly important as it witnesses the growth and emergence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This movement, as is rooted in the Islamic history, not only 
posed a challenged to the Westernize state system but even paved the way for the 
establishment of the strong foundation of the Islamic society in Egypt. Much of 
this chapter's readings and discussion is on the Muslim Brotherhood embodying 
the Islamic ideology, its rise, evolution and growth in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The third chapter attempts to highlight the philosophy of Gamal 
Abdul Nasser in the concept of nation state system. The advent of Nasser in the 
political horizon of Egypt witnessed a socialist philosophy as a political ideology' 
of the government. The chapter tries to give a description as to how Nasser 
utilized the Islamic Adventist to carry out his philosophy in the context of Arab 
nationalism. The chapter also contains summary of (he failure of Nasser's policy 
as he could not reconcile the growing demands of Islamists within the broad 
finamework of his socialist system. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the Egyptian political system, its 
growth and direction as projected by Anwar al-Sadat, whereby his ideology of 
political liberalization is discussed in terms of Egyptianism (replacing pan-
Arabism) and Islam. However, this chapter also contains the emergence of 
contemporary Islamic activism, namely 'the Islamic Liberation Organization' and 
'the Group of Muslim', with a view to delineating its system of thought and 
theoretical frame of reference as they emerged in Egypt. 
Finally the fifth and the last chapter aspires to understand that the 
contemporary Islamic political activism vis-a-vis the characteristics of the nation 
state system in Egypt is a product of socio-economic, socio-political and socio-
cultural conditions. These conditions are manifested in the interrelated and 
multifaceted crisis of development, inequality and identity over the century and 
produced conflicts, oppression and dependency in their wake. It is thus concluded 
that this ruin of religious political activism lies in the failure of political system to 
deal with these problems-indeed, minimsilbto safeguard the internal Egyptian 
community and exploitation in various forms. 
The best evidence available to me, ranging from government 
documents to library works to local and international newspapers and journals has 
been synthesized to present as accurate and through an interpretation as possible of 
modem and contemporary issues. But in ^i important sense this study remains 
preliminary. It is an attempt at ah overall understanding of Egypt's contemporary 
ideological and political trends that I hope will prepare the way for a more 
definitive studies. Nevertheless, in presenting my general interpretation of the 
Egyptian political experience, I have tried to ask important questions - questions 
that will yield more or less lasting answers, expressed in words as attemptive as 
possible to broad applicability and to logical relationships. 
My sincere thanks and gratitude are due to my supervisor Dr. 
Muhammad Gulrez for his invaluable help, guiding in every stage in the 
preparation of the manuscript. My sincere thanks are also due to chair person 
Prof. (Mrs.) Tayyaba Hussain for providing necessary help 
During the preparation of this study Prof Mahmudul Haq and Prof 
Imran Maluleem gave beneficial counsel. From them I learned that political 
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matrix in which they are set. Otheiswho taught me a great deal - whether through 
brief exchanges, correspondence, or hours of conversation were Prof Nazim Ali 
Dr. Jaran Maluleem, Dr. Shamir Hussain, Dr. Jawaid Iqbal, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal 
and Dr. Ghulam Mursaleen. 
I am highly obliged to the Vice Rector National University of 
Rwanda for providing me all the logistic support in terms of library and internet 
facilities towards my research work during my stay in Rwanda, Central Africa. 
I also appreciate of the indispensable resources and pleasant 
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where I have been a researcher while completing this study. 
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Chapter One 
Islamic Ideologue and Political Order 
in Modern Egypt 
The colonization of Egypt began with nineteenth-century commercial 
penetration, included direct British occupation, and ended with Egyptian 
nationalization of Suez Canal in 1956. Central throughout was the role of the 
British. For convenience their domination may be dated from 1839, when Britain 
intervened effectively to curtail the power of the parvenu former Albanian officers 
Muhammad Ali (1805-1849), who founded the last of the foreign dynasties to rule 
over Egyptians. Under Muhammad All's dynastic successors,British influence in 
Egypt grew in rivalry with that of the French. Direct British occupation, however, 
did not come until 1882 in the wake of a successful army revolt by Colonel 
Ahmed Urabi, the first hero of Egyptian nationahsm. The year 1919 brought a 
second wave of nationalist revolt. Wartime conditions had contributed to the 
creation of serious food shortage and a staggering rate of inflation. Nationalist 
leaders like Sa'ad Zagfalul gave voice to the popular resentment to foreign rule 
aggravated by these conditions. The rejection of Zaghlul's request for an Egyptian 
delegation totiie Paris Conference sparked a wave ©farmed rebellion and strikes 
that paralyzed the country. Under the pressure of these nationalist disturbances 
1. Sa'ad Zaghlul was the Egyptian nationalist leader, founder of the Wafd party. He suffered both arrest 
(1882) and exile (1919) for his attempts to rad foreign domination in Egypt. Having founded (1919) the 
Wafd party, he became premier in 1924, but the opposition of Great Britain and the Egyptian court soon 
forced him to resign. The last year of his life he served as president of the Egyptian parliament. 
Britain unilaterally ended the protectorate it had established. Egypt was declared 
an independent monarchy in 1922. 
In actuality the 1922 declaration merely veiled the continuance of 
British power, since its political arrangements expressly qualified Egypt's 
independence. Important responsibilities, including security of communications, 
Egyptian defense, and protection of foreign nationals in Egypt and the Sudan, were 
2 
reserved to the British. A later 1936 agreement did officially end the British 
occupation of Egypt and undertake to abolish the special privileges that had been 
guaranteed to foreigners. Nevertheless, Britain still retained the right to station 
troops in the Suez Canal and to fly over Egyptian territory. The agreement also 
provided for British defense of Egypt against aggression, in return for Egyptian 
assistance in a British war. These qualifications meant that one of the four major 
political forces in the country until the Nasserist revolution was the British-along 
with the Egyptian King, the Islamic reformist, and the nationalist party known as 
the Wafd.' 
Although the British dominated events in Egypt, they failed to create 
a genuine political community, which can be defined as one that command 
allegiance as the basic moral authority for the individual. British rule succeeded 
2. An Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 was signed stipulating the withdrawal of the British troops of 
occupation to the Canal Zone, the relinguishing of British responsibility for the life and property of 
foreigners in favour of the Egyptian government and the rendition of reciprocal aid against enemies 
involving the use of ports, aerodromes and means of communication (Hitti, 1970:751) 
3. The Wafd is the Egyptian nationalist political party, which evolved from the nationalist delegation sent 
by the leaders to the British in 1919 to negotiate for Egyptian independence and Anglo Egyptian 
relations. The Wafd, led by Ahmed Sa'ad Zaghiul until his death in 1927 and thereafter by Mustafa 
Nahhas, was considered the principal nationalist party. It was modernistic in internal and social 
matters, bourgeois-democratic in ideology and for many years fought the King and Court circles, 
because of their attempt to reduce pariiamentary power (Shimoni and Levine, 1972). 
instead in imposing and stabilizing a colonial authority with the aid of indigenous 
allies. That authority proved capable of maintaining itself, spreading its values 
among part of the population, and earning recognition of its legitimacy from their 
imperial authorities such as the French. In short, despite the heavy veils of indirect 
rule which at times screened British power, one recognizes in Egypt's history the 
process of colonization and its inevitable result: a colonial situation that led to the 
rise of Islamic and nationalist resistance. 
Of course, the foreign domination of Egypt had some unique 
characteristics. The country was never a colony for large-scale settlement by the 
British, nor was the Egyptian elite ever totally excluded from political activity. To 
be sure, power to make the crucial decisions that determined the course of Egypt's 
history was reserved to the British. Still, the indigenous elite was given just 
enough of a taste of political power to be tantalized and kept off balance in a 
position of calculated inferiority not without racist overtones. 
For the occupied Egyptians an understanding of the origins and 
consequences of British rule was crucial, since they faced a situation for which 
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their religion and traditional culture provided little orientation. Cromer has 
eloquently described the particular colonial world created in Egypt by the British 
presence: 
Egypt may now almost be said to form part of Europe. It is on the 
high road to the Far East It can never cease to be an object of 
interest to all the Powers Europe, and especially to England. A 
numerous and intelligent body of Europeans and of non-Egyptian 
Orientals have made Egypt their home. European capital to a large 
4. Lord Cromer was the powerful British proconsul from 1882 to 1907, best recorded the racist underside 
of British colonial rule. 
extent has been sunk in the country. The rights and privileges of 
Europeans are jealously guarded, and moreover, give rise to 
complicated questions, which it requires no small amount 
of ingenuity and technical knowledge to solve. Exotic institutions 
have sprung up and have taken root in the country (Cromer, 
1908:326). 
However, to understand the Egyptian Islamic ideologues and 
nationalist revolutionaries (and the modem-day heirs of their legacy), one must 
grapple with this colonized Egypt depicted by Cromer. For the Egyptian, such an 
Egypt constituted a new, 'exotic', and profoundly disorienting situation. Behavior 
could no longer reliably be guided by traditional patterns. The Egyptian culture in 
isolation no longer existed; it had been shattered as a coherent whole by the 
process of British colonization. To be sure, fragments of the cultural past survived 
- important fragments such as religious beliefs and patterns of interpersonal 
relations. Egyptians naturally sought reftige in those fragments in their time of 
froubles. Some even sought to piece them together in creative responses to their 
situation, as in new religious movements, for example. 
Equally important was history's confirmation of the colonial 
situation as an objectively verifiable reality characterized not only by the damming 
of nationalist aspirations but also by the destruction of Egypt's past. The Islamic 
belief system was disrupted and was no longer congruent with experienced social 
life. 
In their religious thought and political action, nationalist Egyptians 
atten:q)ted to deal with the shattering impact of the British presence. Egyptian 
intellectuals were concerned even during the period of direct British occupation to 
provide their community with a new basis for legitimate, indigenous political 
authority. Two orientations competed for the loyalties of the intellectuals: 
reformist Islam and liberal nationalism. Both were moderate; that is, both 
compromised with British power. These ideological thought thus can be 
summarized emphasizing the relevancy of their ideas to the society and state's 
aspiration for a better place in the world order. 
Intellectual Influences 
Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) 
Muhammad 'Abduh was an Egyptian who played a fundamental role 
along with Rashid Rida and 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq in formulating an Islamic response 
to the twin problems of domestic development and Western imperialism. 'Abdiih 
was bom in Egypt in 1849 and educated at al-Azhar university, the centre of 
higher Islamic studies in the Muslim world. A close friend and ideological ally of 
al-Afghani, 'Abduh struggled for revolution in Egypt. He was deeply rooted in the 
traditions of his own coimtry, and the nationalist element was important in his 
thought from the beginning. He was always conscious that the common history 
and interests of those who lived in the same country created a deep bond between 
them in spite of different faith. The sense of the importance of the unity, which 
affected his vievs^ o^f Islamic reform, coloured also his view of the nation. Unity, 
he maintained, was necessary in political life, and the strongest type of unity was 
that of those who shared the same country - not only the place they lived in, but 
the locus of their public rights and duties, the object of their affection and pride 
(Hourani, 1983:156). 
'Abduh's thinking has influenced and has given rise to two main 
trends of thought- the speculative modernists who, in their more extreme form, are 
outright secularists, and the conservative orthodox, though he was essentially a 
speculative modernist. His starting point was orthodox, though tinged with his 
Egyptianness. The umma in general, and Egyptian nation in particular, was in a 
state of internal decay ; but although he subscribed in part to the traditional and 
orthodox viewthatthecauseof the decay lay in the failure of Muslims to stick to 
the right path and that the remedy was to return to pure unadulterated Islam, he 
also recognized that 'as circumstances changed, society and its rulers inevitably 
found themselves faced with problems not foreseen in the prophetic message, and 
acting in ways which might even appear to contradict it' (Quoted in Hourani, 
1983:136). In particular, he perceived three major problem areas. First, there was 
the division of Islam into opposing sects, each believing that it alone held the true 
message. Second, he recognized the difficulty of acknowledging the true nature of 
Islam in view of the complexities introduced into it by intellectuals through the 
ages. Third he saw a need to reconcile and re-unite the two main strands in Muslim 
and Egyptian thinking : the traditional, which offered stagnation, slavish imitation 
of Muslim tradition, and resistance to change ; and the modernist/secularist, which 
offered uncritical acceptance of Western ideas and culture almost to the exclusion 
of the indigenous cultural and intellectual enviroimient. The third and last was, in 
5. In fact, persons like Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1964), Taha-Hussein (b.ll89), Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal (1888-1956), Ibrahim al Mazni (1889-1949), and Sa'ad Zaghlul was greatly influenced by 
'Abduh's polemics of Islamic modernism and by no means were secularist, but rather they were looking 
for a more liberalized version of Islamic modernism. It is equally notable that the political behaviour of 
the Wafd, -a liberal, secular, nationalist party by Western account, were not guided by the secular 
considerations as shown by their speeches, debates, and discussions in the Egyptian parliament over the 
issue ofShari'a and theabolition of caliphate by KemalAtaturk (Safran, 1961:108-121). 
his view, the most important. He could see both the positive and negative aspects 
of both approaches and sought to bridge the intervening gulf and in so doing to 
strengthen the moral roots of Muslim and Egyptian society. The way forward, he 
believed, lay not in rigid adherence to either trend, but in recognizing the 
inevitability of changes. It was not, however, a question of change for change's 
own sake, but of changes linked indissolubly to the principles of Islam-changes 
which were 'not only permitted by Islam, but were indeed its necessary 
implications if it was rightly understood (Hourani, 1983:139). 
'Abduh aimed to convince the secularists that Islam was a valid 
guide to life and the conservatives that there was nothing in the trappings, values, 
and institution of Western-inspired modernity and modernization which was 
inherently inconsistent with Islam. This complex may be conveniently reduced to 
a two-fold objective : first, to restate what Islam really is ; and second, to reconcile 
Islam, so defined and developing society. However, to Muhammad 'Abduh, the 
former was considerably more important than the latter. In his fragmentary 
autobiography, he commented that he had striven to rid Muslim intellectualism of 
blind imitation and to promote an understanding of Islam as the early community 
understood it. This involved a return to original sources, recourse to rational 
intellectual thought, and a reconciliation between Islam and the sciences which, 
collectively, would permit the attaiimient of the social order prescribed by God 
(Bannerman, 1988:131). 
However, the primary concerns of 'Abduh were with nation-building 
and British imperialism. To strengthen the national will against foreign 
encroachment, he advocated the adoption of several basic principles as the basis 
for nation-building: 
1. government as a civil rather than religious institution; 
2. sectarianism as a divisive political and social force to be 
suppressed in civil society; 
3. education as a necessity for a civil society. 
' Abduh considered these to be the essential characteristics of the Western nations, 
but not necessarily peculiar to them, for these same characteristics were 
legitimated within Islam (Ismael, Tareq Y. and Ismael, Jacqueline S., 1985:29). 
To forestall the advance of Western in:^ )erialism, 'Abduh advocated 
the reform and renewal of the Khalafah in the framework of the Ottoman empire, 
'Abduh considered Khalafah to be a de facto reality existing in political 
circumstances dominated by European imperial encroachment toward the East, the 
Muslim homeland. He had great hopes that this reality could be exploited to 
hinder imperialist expansion in these lands. 
Muhammad 'Abduh was, at the same time, anxious to introduce 
European notions of Political authority, administration and bureaucracy. These 
notions were supposed to be translated into technical devices that would 
complement the diffusion of knowledge and act as safety valves against regression 
or violation of proper governance. It was therefore thought that once the 
institutions of the state were reformed, society would be set on a course of renewal 
and arrival. These reforms were, moreover, to be accomplished between a ruler 
6. Khalafah is the institution of government legitimized by succession of the Ruler from the Prophet 
Muhammad 
and his subjects, whereby the former would willingly heed the advice of 
enlightened religious leaders and state officials. Islamic decline became in tiiis 
context the ineluctable result of oriental despotism'. The dichotomy of an 
advancing West confronting a declining East entered the field of ideological 
argumentation, revealing despotism as the main culprit responsible for the neglect 
of science or the requisites of true education. ' Abduh expressed this trend in the 
following way: 
I look upon myself to plead the cause of two great issues. The first 
was the liberation of thought from the shackles of blind imitation, 
and the comprehension of religion according to the rulers laid down, 
before the emergenceof conflict, by the ancestors of the community, 
and the return, in acquiring religious knowledge, to the original 
sources, considering them in the light of human reason. The second 
issue was the reform of the Arabic language.... The other issue that 
I espoused...and is the pillar of social life was the differentiation 
between the entitlement of government to obedience from the people, 
and the people's right to justice from their government. Yes, I was 
one of those who called upon the Egyptian nation to recognized its 
right over its ruler - a suggestion that had not occurred to it 
obedience is obligatory, is only a human being, liable to err and be 
overwhelmed by his whims, and that nothing can dissuade him from 
his error and check the preponderance of his whims except the 
advice that the nation proffers him by word and deed (Quoted in 
Choueiri, 1990:38). 
Thus there was for him a balance between the ruler's right to obedience and his 
obligation to provide justice to his people. 
Muhammad 'Abduh's views on political institutions and forms of 
government however are less clear, partly because he found politics distasteful. 
His concept of the ideal government was similar to the classical jurists' concepts : 
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there should be a just ruler who rule in accordance with the law and in consultation 
with the people. However, he not only accepted temporal plurality but was also 
deeply influenced by his sense of being Egyptian, both matters which had to be 
7 
reconciled with the universal umma (The Islamic community). Accordingly, he 
defined the unity of the umma as a moral unity within which political plurality was 
accepted; but there should also be a restored Khalafah, though he seems 
ambivalent about its proper functions. On the one hand, he has argued that it 
should have spiritual fimctions and spiritual authority only, even suggesting that 
there should be 'a chief of our Egyptian nation, acting under the religious 
sovereignty of the Caliphate' (Hourani,I983:156). On the other hand, he argues 
that 'the traditional constitution theory of the Caliphate in Islam, in its positive 
manifestations as distinct from its religious, is as much a system of civil law as the 
Western secular type' and that 'the Caliph was simply the political head of the 
community, he was not its Pope. He did not have the power or the position of the 
chief priest nor did he have the exclusive right of interpreting the will of God' 
(Kerr, 1966:48 ; Badawi, 1978:48). 
He rarely concerned himself with structures, although he did suggest, 
in response to a question posed in 1904, that some form of limited constitutional 
monarchy in which legislative authority rested with a representative assembly 
7. umma is the religio-politicai community of all Muslims, which during the Apostolic Age and the period 
of the Four orthodox caliphs embraced the political empire of Islam as well as the total body of 
believers. Membership in such a religious community, as in the parallel case of medieval European 
"Christianitas", was the equivalent of "nationality", since from the ecumenical religious standpoint, 
ethnic descent and geographical origin were accidents of history and had nothing to do with one's place 
in the hierarchy of Creation. During the later centuries of Islam, when the Islamic world was divided 
into numerous, often mutually hostile, politicai divisions, the "Umma Muhammadiyya" - the "Umma of 
Muhammad" - remained the constant factor, while the frequent change of boundaries and dynasties were 
regarded as passing ephemera (Wendell, 1978:170). 
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would be appropriate. This was clearly a long-term objective, however, the 
achievement of which could only come after suitable training. There is no doubt 
that he had a clearly defined ideal: 'a Muslim community bound together by a 
fraternal spirit and a sense of common fortunes, interests, and goals'. However, he 
developed no detailed scheme for achieving it and considered it could only be 
achieved after major social and educational reforms had been instituted. For him, 
the structure for an Islamic government 'did exist in the Golden Age of early 
Islam, and can exist again when Muslim society is again transformed, but it is this 
transformation and not the political system it will facilitate that is his real 
concerned (Kerr, 1966:152). 
'Abduh's Islamic modernist model increasingly came to be identified 
with the Western notions of nationalism, liberalism, constitutionalism, and later 
on, socialism but its ideological justification was found in the Islamic doctrine. In 
fact, the whole ideological expression of this model vis-a-vis the Western model of 
liberal democracy and socialism was marked by its 'apologetically' character a 
tendency to demonstrate that Islam possesses all those 'best elements' which have 
made the European states so progressive and dominant. 
Writing in 1881, Muhammad 'Abduh thought that, in so far as 
political life was concerned, the Egyptian, were still in their infancy. This was 
premised on his division of human development into three stages: natural, social 
and political. The first was essentially instinctive, having as its main purpose the 
basic needs of human beings such as food and shelter. The second involved the 
struggle for self-preservation and the survival of the species, two activities 
necessitating co-operation and congregation. While the first two tendencies were 
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Strictly inborn abilities, the third became viable only as a result of hard learning 
and long experience. It was for this reason that Muslims longing for freedom 
needed 'a wise guide and educator', and whom 'Abduh identified as none other 
than the Khedive of Egypt, Tawfiq. Political science was thus an artificial skill, 
and a talent acquired after diligent practice applied by a selected number of people. 
Egypt could not adopt a full-fledged constitutional government for generations to 
come. It was imperative that a political elite should first be formed. This elite, 
before entertaining the ambition of leading the nation, ought to formulate a clear 
objective and achieve an indissoluble national unity. The determination of a 
specific end had to precede all the required means for its achievement. Such a 
condition obtained in the developed European nations. In other words, loyalty to 
the fatherland took precedence over all differences of opinion and competing the 
ideologies. 
' Abduh's line of reasoning was based on the premises of speculative 
and dialectic theology ('ilm al-kalam), particularly the rationalist school of 
Mu'tazilism that flourished in Baghdad under the 'Abbasids. According to the 
Mu'tazilites, there were two types of knowledge: necessary ('ilm daruri) and 
acquired ('ilm muktasab). However, 'Abduh departed jfrom classical Islamic 
philosophy and political theorization by stressing the characteristics of the body 
politic as a process of humanly-devised institutions and concepts. 
Having posited national affiliation as the focus of political activities, 
and the fatherland as the location of individual rights and duties, 'Abduh 
differentiated between tyranny, on the one hand, and autocracy, on the other. To 
him, the first was forbidden by the religious law (Shari'a), while the second was 
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not, since the execution of law by one person was permitted by both reUgion and 
human reason. However, he beUeved that rebeUion against unjust rulers was 
legitimate so long as it does not bring greater disasters in its wake. In other words, 
the potential rebel must weigh carefully his chances of success before embarking 
on the act of rebellion. He must do so not merely to save his neck but also to save 
his soul. For it seems as a logical consequence of this view that failure in a noble 
endeavor is more sinful than not endeavoring at all. Perhaps 'Abduh was not 
thinking on these lines. He may have had in mind to express the importance of 
careful weighing of the consequences of rebellion so that legitimate rebellion may 
not become a license. Otherwise the whole fabric of political life would 
disintegrate and anarchy prevail. 
For the issue concerning the separation between religion and state, 
'Abduh believed that this separation of the West was simply a separation between 
institution. It was not intended for the abandonment of their religion (Christianity). 
Thus the suggestion of separating Islam from politics would be tantamount to 
abandoning Islam itself, as there is no separate institution equivalent to the Church 
for the Muslim religion. To deprive the Muslim community of the support of the 
political aim of their society to the tenets of their religion is to abolish the religion 
itself (Badawi, 1978:49). As noted earlier, 'Abduh was willing to incorporate 
Western institutions into the body politic of Islam. In so doing, he opened the way 
for political development within the Muslim community without the need for 
heart-searching. Political reform, he contended, is in accordance with the true 
spirit of Islam. The early Muslims employed institutions suitable to their time and 
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conditions; but Islam as a timeless religion must permit of various forms to fulfil 
the aims of its principles. 
Muhammad Rashid Rida 
(1895-1935) 
In the troubled conditions ajfter the First World War, there was a 
sharp debate in Egypt on the political system best suited for the country. The crux 
of the debate was whether the classical pervasive character of Islam was to be 
accepted to allow its supremacy in all spheres of social life, or to moderate its 
mfluence. In this debate between Islamism and secularism, pristine Islam 
provided the principal source of inspiration to the former, and the nineteenth 
century secular ideology of the West to the latter, which however did not renounce 
Islam as a religion. The foremost proponent of this line of Islamic thinking was 
however Muhammad Rashid Rida. Bom in Tripoli in 1865, he pursued religious 
studies and journalism in Syria until 1897, when he moved to Cairo. There he 
established a periodical, al-Manar. through which he disseminated, interpreted and 
elaborated on the ideas of Muhammad 'Abduh and others. Rida's main 
contribution to Islamic political thought was his dissemination of the ideas of al-
8. For the life and thought of Rashid Rida, see especially Arslan Shakib (1937), Rashid Rida aw ikha' 
arbain Sana : Cairo ; Adams, Charles (1933) Islam and Modernism in Egypt. London ; Hourani, Albert 
(1962) Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. Oxford University press ; Kerr, Malcolm H. (1966) Islamic 
Reform : The Political and legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida .Berkeley and Los 
Angeles : University of California Press ; ash-Sharabasi, Ahmad (1970) Rashid Rida sahib al-Manar. 
Cairo ; Matabi al-Ahram al-Tijariyyah. 
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Afghani and 'Abduh, the two foremost modernization reformers. He also 
championed the cause of the Wahhabi doctrine in his journal. 
Unlike Muhammad 'Abduh, Rida and his followers restricted the 
term al-slaf al-salih (the pious elders of forefathers) to the first generation who had 
known the prophet personally. Rida's starting point was a modification of the by 
now familiar attribution of the backwardness and weakness of the Muslim world to 
deviation and corrupt practices. He also rejected the argument of the 'secularists' 
that the main obstacle to progress was Islam itself. He commented: 
The Muslim say that it is religion that was the cause of their 
sovereignty and well being and that turning away from it was what 
landed them in misery and caused misery to descend upon them.... 
But most of them say this without understanding, imagining that 
there is an irrational secret in religion which enables believers to 
attain victory and power and gives them success by miracles and 
special blessing (Quoted in Kerr, 1966:155). 
He then outlined the contrary argument which concluded that 'the 
greatest obstacle in the path of Muslim progress is the Islamic religion itself and 
that if they (the Muslim) abandon it they can hope to follow in the footsteps of 
Europe and progress as she did' (Kerr, 1966:156). This was to him arrant 
nonsense, if not dangerous heresy, since 'the teaching and moral precepts of Islam 
are such that, if they are properly understood and fiilly obeyed, they will lead to 
success in this world as well as the next-and to success in all the forms in which 
9. For al-Afghani's Islamic political thought see Appendix P.2I3 
10. Wahhabi movement (1703-1878) appeared in the Arabian peninsula under the banner of Muhammad 
Ibn'Abd al-Wahhab. 'Abd al-Wahhab denounced the Ottoman Empire (1300-1918) and, after many 
efforts, saw his exegesis - based on Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya - become all-powerful. Like them, 
'Abd al-Wahhab called for a return to the original sources of Islam and an uprooting of the undesirable 
innovations. 
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the world understands it, strength, respect, civihzation and happiness. If they are 
not understood and obeyed, weakness, decay, barbarism are the results'. This is 
true not only of individuals but of communities. According to Rashid Rida: 
Today reason for this backwardness is that the Muslim have lost the 
truth of their religion, and this has been encouraged by bad political 
rulers, for the true Islam involves two things, acceptance of the unity 
of God and consultation in matters of State, and despotic rulers have 
tried to make Muslims foi^et the second by encouraging them to 
abandon the first. But what happened in the past can happen again: 
Islamic civilization was created out of nothing by the Qur'an and the 
moral precepts enshrined in it, and can be re-created if Muslims 
return to the Qur'an. It is irrelevant to say that modern civilization 
rests on technical advance, and that Islamic civilization cannot be 
revived so long as the Muslims are technically backward; technical 
skill is potentially universal, and its acquisition depends on certain 
moral habits and intellectual principles. If Muslims had these, they 
would easily obtain technical skill ; and such habits and principles 
are in fact contained in Islam (Quoted in Hourani, 1983:228). 
The real problem, he believed, lay in ignorance and neglect on the part of rulers 
and religious leaders, as a result of which corrupt practices and accretions had 
become the norm. The solution was simple, since basic beliefs, moral and ethical 
teachings, correct religious practice, and the general principles governing social 
and other relationships had been established during Muhammad's lifetime, as had 
the moral principles of legal and governmental practices and regulations. All that 
was needed, therefore, was a return to the practice 'of the early days of the first 
four Caliphs, whose Sunnah, together with his own Sunnah, the prophet 
commanded Muslims to hold fast to and they should lay aside everything that has 
been introduced into Islam that is contrary to that Practice'. 
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Throughout his thinking both in relation to Islamic belief system and 
to state craft, Rida remained traditional and orthodox in many respects. In his 
opinion. Jihad (the duty to wage war against non-Muslims) is always lawful in 
defence of Islam but is only lawful as a means of spreading Islam when the 
peaceful dissemination of Islam through missionary activity is forbidden or when 
Muslims are prevented from living in accordance with Muslim law. To use force 
to compel the 'people of the book' to become Muslims would infringe this same 
principle of freedom in the faith. 
Rida's legal thinking was his perception that a system of law could 
be both appropriate to the age and yet still truly Muslim. However, since a system 
of law implies the existence of an authority to enforce its provisions, he also 
turned his attention to political stRicture. His views were set out comprehensively 
in a long freatise originally published in serial form in Al-Manar and later issued 
as al-khilafa aw al imama al udhma (The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate). The 
freaties was in part a reaction to the Turkish reduction of the Ottoman Caliphate to 
a purely ceremonial and spiritual office with no political authority; but Rida's 
concern was to discuss 'the place of the Caliphate as a system of government 
among other systems and its history and what should be done in this day and age' 
(Badawi, 1978:120). Rida was a staunch supporter of the classical doctrine, 
though with some adjustments to meet changing circumstances. It is important to 
bear in mind, however, that he was not a 'reformer' or a 'modernist' as those terms 
11. Ever since Ataturk dissolved the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 in his drive for secularization. Islamists 
have viewed the re%'ival of the Caliphate - the di\'inely appointed succession to the Pro|Aet and the ideal 
form of state leadership - as essential to the revival and political resurgence of Islam. 
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are generally constructed: his aim was purification and he believed firmly in the 
necessity for the re-establishment of the Khalafah. However, it had to be a 
different form of Khalafah in as much as he recognized the practical impossibility 
of re-uniting the disparate and divided elements of the umma into a single polity. 
The function of the Khalafah had to be redefined, therefore, and this 
he proceeded to do, although he fails to deal adequately and consistently with the 
relationship between temporal and spiritual power and authority. On the one hand, 
he defines the powers of 'those who loose and bind' and 'those in authority' as 
comprising the powers of election and deposition of the Khalafah, representation 
of the umma and its rights, participation through consultation in political decisions 
and administration, and authoritative determination of the law. The Khalafah, in 
effect, their nominee, with responsibility for directing the affairs of the community 
and for acting as chief interpreter of the law. Thus, he sought to stress the 
tenqwral aspects of the Khalafah's role, arguing that his function is: 
to protect the Faith and its adherents and to enforce the ordinances 
of the Shari'a. He is not empowered over the people in religious 
matters nor has he independent authority to determine the Shari'a 
ordinances for them. His task is only to maintain order and enforce 
the law. Thus his power is civil and subject to consultation, not 
absolute or exclusive (Quoted in Kirr, 1966:177). 
On the other hand, in discussing the direction of religious and cultural matters in 
his revive Kalafeh, spiritual authority has a positive role, and he clearly sees it as 
the ultimate controller of temporal authority. His argument seems to rest on the 
traditional position that the Prophet had no spiritual successor in the sense of one 
who enjoys infallibility in the interpretation of doctrine, who is absolute, and who 
can make new doctrine. Nevertheless, the Khalafah does m fact have spiritual 
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authority in the sense of being the leader of the community, while his temporal 
authority is a prerequisite for a truly Muslim polity, having been 'established by 
God in the general interest in order to assure the application of the 
Shari'a'CRosenthal, 1965:122). 
Thus according to Adams, it is clear that Rida's political thought is, in 
essence, theoretical and idealist. He pays little attention to the practical structures 
of government. To some extent he seems to regard the institutional identity of 
'those who bind and loose' and 'those in authority' as tantamount to the 
establishment of a form of representative power and authority, but he does not 
suggest in any way that they might be elected or might be in any way responsive to 
the general public only to the public interest, which is a very different thing. Nor 
does he address the political structure in existing Muslim polities. Notwithstanding 
these and criticisms, he was and remains an important figure in Egyptian 
conservative intellectuaiism despite the fact that he and his followers, the 
'Moderate Party', as he like to call them, were small in number, no more than 'a 
little group of the first reformers and a few of the later generation'. 
A Survey of Religion and The Transformation of The 
State 
A plausible generalization is the observation that by the middle of 
eighteenth century religion was in retreat in Egypt. However, it was at the same 
time that Muhammad Ali, and his grandson, Khedive Isma'il, pursued a massive 
process of modemization. The transformation and expansion of governmental 
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functions to the advantage of central power occurred at the expense of traditional 
social and economic institutions, including those under the guidance, supervision, 
or control of the various religious institutions and their establishment. Thus, by 
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century such 
areas of national life as education, the legal and judicial system (legislation and the 
courts), religious endowments and charitable trusts (waqfs) had been brought 
under the control of central government, that is, under secular authority. 
Traditional religious education in the Azhar and its institutions as well as village 
schools (Kuttabs), though still conducted by religious teachers, was itself subjected 
to greater governmental control. State primary, secondary, and higher education 
grew with curricula modeled along European lines, until it overlook and, in the 
main, superseded the traditional institutions of learning. Secular state legislation, 
comprising decrees, ordinances, and legal codes proliferated for the regulation of 
all aspects of national life: commercial civil, penal, and eventually constitutional. 
It gave rise to system of secular national courts. The jurisdiction of the Shari'a 
courts, operating on the basis of the religious law, was systematically whittled 
down until it encompassed matters of personal states only. This corrosive process 
led naturally to the relegation of religion in the affairs of state (Vatikiotis P.J., 
1983:57). 
According to Nadave Safran (1961:8) these overall socio-economic 
political, legal and educational changes during the nineteenth century led to a 
complete transformation of the basic character of the life and organization of 
Egyptian society. Indeed the nineteenth century state sponsored reforms and its 
attempt to dominate over religious establishment though reduced the political 
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influence of religious establishment, still did not eliminate the influence of religion 
over the psyche of common masses. Islam remained a basic organizing unit of 
social life in the Egyptian society. Its capacity of mass mobilization was used by 
all shades of politicians-religious, semi-secular and secular, during the anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist struggle. 
The Islamic reform movements of the late nineteenth century 
appeared unable to arrest this retreat of religion, first, because they were 
apologetic and therefore intellectually feeble, second, because they failed to appeal 
to any powerful group in society who could challenge the actions of the state or 
ruler, and third, because of foreign power, Britam, was in ultimate control by 
virtue of its occupation of the country. The new native political elite, the ruling 
class, who emerged at the turn of the century was attracted by, and seemed 
committed to, a borrowed secularism. And though the religious reformers failed, 
on the one hand, to defeat this secularism or at least arrest it by offering their own 
viable alternative, the secularists simply did not bother with the eventually 
problematic contradiction between their newly adopted secularism and the native 
religious tradition, on the other. In this weakness of both traditionalists and 
secularists lay the seeds of future difficulties. 
In the absence of a secular formula or consensus, a succession of 
rulers and regimes moreover continued to use religion for political purposes, either 
in order to legitimize their actions and policies or to compete for power 
symbolically or apologetically in the face of adversity. Any serious attero^t either 
to remove religion completely from the affairs of state, or to use religion as a basis 
of political identity, or as a regulating principle for the political community 
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generated serious political crisis and/or social and political turmoil. The fierce 
debates in parliament and the press about the sources of legislation for the state in 
the mid-twenties was one example. The further reform of the Waqf was another. 
Two institutions, one actual, the other theoretical, became issues of great political 
controversy in the matter of religion and state. Thus the further reform of the 
Azhar and its institutions became an explosive political issue in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. Control over these institutions was contested by the monarch and his 
courtiers against the inroads of party politicians (Vatikiotis, 1983:59). After 
opting for a secular state, but without actually resolving the role of religion in the 
political order, Egyptians were confronted with the fearsome experience of 
religious politics. 
This transition was accompanied by a change in the nature of local 
nationalism, led by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and the Umma Party, from a 
movement of intellectuals associated mainly with the large landlord families to a 
populist movement. The new brand of nationalism under the guidance of Saad 
Zaghlul was manifested in the revolt he led against the British in 1919 in 
conjunction with the Wafd, which was viewed as a revolution by all Egyptians, 
especially by the intellectuals. The 1919 revolt played a key role in promoting the 
notion of Egyptian territorial nationalism, which had been enhanced by 100 years 
of autonomy from Istanbul. Two other landmarks on the road to independence 
were the unilateral British declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922, and the 
establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1923. 
The issue of religion and state, however, remained unresolved in 
Egypt. Despite the internationalization of national liberal values on the part of the 
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political elite, the role of religion and its institutions was not confronted by them, 
as it was by Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. On the contrary, traditional education in 
the Kuttab (Islamic elementary school) or al-A2Jiar, as was the case for Zaghlul, 
supported the continued prevalence of Islamic principles as the guiding moral code 
of society. Egyptian society and culture, therefore, developed in a state of 
contrasting co-existence, that is, change alongside tradition, as articulated in the 
1923 constitution (Hatina, 2000:36). 
Clauses 3 and 12 of the constitution established full equality and 
freedom of religion. Yet, according to Islam, no equality can exist between 
Muslims and Dhimmis (protected minorities), while freedom of belief is also 
denied, smce the Shari'a mandates a death sentence for any Muslim who converts 
to another faith. Clause 23 and 24 defined the people as the source of authority and 
give parliament full power of legislation ; while Clause 149 designated Islam as 
the official religion of the state without clarification. As befits a Shari'a-
controUed state, Allah, and not the people or their representatives, is the source of 
12 
authority and legislation. 
Although Clause 149 appeared toward the end of the text of the 
constitution, this should not be interpreted as signifying a marginal position for 
Islam in Egypt's new parliamentary government for several reasons. First, the 
lower-profile position of Clause 149 did not put an end to the public debate over 
the status of religion in the state which flared up in the early 1920s. On the 
contrary, Clause 149 was frequently quoted by al-Azhar in support of opposition 
12. For the complete text of the constitution of 1923, see Devis, H. Miller (1953) Constitutions. Electoral 
Laws. Treaties of States in the near and Middle East. 2*^  ed. Durham : NC 
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to the disparagement of religion and its institutions. Second, a written constitution 
is only as effective as its implementation, which is subject to legislators and 
jurists. In the Egyptian context these governmental branches tended to display 
caution and pragmatism on all issues concerning laws, especially in the 1920s and 
1930s, out of an awareness of Islam's entrenched position in society. Third 
inasmuch as the King was invested with the authority to supervise religious 
institutions and appoint their administrators (Clause 153), thereby enhancing his 
political power, al-Azhar mounted a campaign to elevate the King's status to 
CaUph (Hatina, 2000:37). 
The inherent ambiguity in the clauses pertaining to religion derived, 
to a considerable degree, from the participation of figures with conservative world 
views in the preliminary constitutional committee (Kedourie, 1968:350-352). The 
most prominent committee member was Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit, the former 
mufti (ReUgious leader)of Egypt, who led the implacable opposition to the 
constitutional recognition of freedom of religious belief, claiming that it would 
elicit the emergence of deviant views in society which would compromise the 
status of the monotheistic religions. Instead, he proposed the terminology absolute 
freedom of belief (hurriyyat al-I'tiqad mutlaqa). When asked by a member of the 
committee if this included freedom of religious belief, Bakhit answered: 'Belief is 
one thing and religion is another. Muslims are divided into 73 different groups. 
Each group has a specific belief despite the fact that they all belong to the same 
religion'. His proposal was supported by the Coptic Patriarch Johannes and was 
subsequently adopted unanimously by the committee (Hatma 2000:37). 
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The varied legal contradictions in the constitution concerning the 
status of Islam vis-^-vis the state, the monarchy and the newly emerging 
parliamentarian government revealed the constitution to be the product of 
government decree rather than evolutionary process. This was plain to various 
Egyptian commentators at the time, such as Muhammad Husayn Haykal, who, in a 
conversation with a British official in 1926, observed that the constitution had 
come at too early a stage in Egypt's political development (Vatikiotis, 1987:3; 
Hatina, 2000:37). Indeed, the popularity of liberal nationalism in Egypt was 
primarily a political phenomenon rather than a widespread ideology. It was 
associated with the struggle for independence, but failed to enlist the commitment 
of society to its essence. This had the profound effect of limiting intellectual 
discourse in Egypt between the two World Wars on matters of faith. 
The key figures to conduct this discourse, while coming fi-om varied 
educational and social backgrounds, belonged to the same generation, witnesses to 
the socio-political changes tiiat took place in Egypt in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. They included such writers as Taha Husayn, 'Abd al-Gadir al-
Mazini, Ahmad Amin, Muhammad Husayn Hajical and Tawfiq al-Hakim. Their 
thinking was rooted in loyalty to the concept of an independent Egyptian entity 
and in the belief in rationalism, national sovereignty and civil liberty. Much of 
their writing focused on a new projection of Egyptian history with emphasis on its 
Pharaonic heritage rattier than its Islamic heritage. They aimed to portray Egypt in 
terms of a new collective image based on territoriality along with openness to 
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modernity (Gershoni&Jankowski, 1986:89-95). Yet, they never actually 
dissociated themselves politically from their Islamic heritage, which suggested that 
complete secularization (in terms of excluding religion from public affairs rather 
than atheism) was neitha* possible nor desirable, especially in the context of 
national coalescence and state building. 
Nevertheless, among the representative thinkers of the time, Ali 
'Abd al-Raziq had a significant impact on contemporary Islamic thought by 
serving to stimulate new approaches to the problems of government in Islam. 
'Ali *Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966) 
'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq , who came from a land-owning family, was the 
son of the first president of the Umma Party, the forerunner of the Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party. Educated in al-Azhar and briefly at Oxford University, 
where he studied economics and political science (1912-1913), he returai(to Egypt 
and was appointed as a judge in the Shari'a Court of Mansura. In 1925 he 
published the book al-Islam wa Usui al-Hukm ('Islam and the Sources of political 
Authority'), which dealt with the question of the normative political order in the 
Muslim world and held that Islam was purely a religion, with no application to 
temporal governance. This aroused sharp criticism in al-Azhar, citadel of religious 
conservatism, which soon revoked 'Abd al-Raziq's certificate of Alim (religious 
13. On the role of tradition in modem nationalist movement see Hobsbawn, Eric (1983) 'Intixiduction: 
Inventing Traditions', in Hobsbawn and Ranger, To-ence (eds). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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scholar) and forced his resignation from his post as judge (Hatina, 2000:38). 
Al-Islam wa Usui al-Hukm was written against the background of 
two major issues involving the relationship between religion and state: The 
ongoing efforts by Egyptian nationalist thinkers from the end of the nineteenth 
century to entrench politics as a secular autonomous area of activity free from 
theological considerations, and capable of nurturing an Egyptian nation-state; and 
the specific issue of the Caliphate and the alleged necessity for Muslims to revive 
it, which became the focus of public debate both within and outside Egypt 
following Ataturk's abolition of the institution in 1924. Political elements in 
Egypt led by the King and vigorously supported by al-Azhar advocated its 
renewal. 
'Abd al-Raziq's book was concentrated on two fold: first, the 
prophet was a spiritual rather than a political leader, and his role consisted of 
transmitting the divine message and effecting religious unification; second, the 
Caliphate was dispensable for Muslims, since it is not part of Islamic doctrine. On 
the contrary, the historical record of the Caliphate proves that it had been 
superfluous to the preservation of the faith, and had only caused damage to the 
Muslims. This allowed Muslims to express political allegiance to separate state 
unite and define their worldly affairs according to the customs prevailing in the 
modem world namely the adoption of liberal democracy (Hatina, 2000:39). 
'Al-Raziq maintained that Islam never decided a particular form of 
government, and that the Muslims were never required to follow a particular 
system. The Khalafah was never a religious system, and the Qur'an did not alluded 
to it or order it. In fact, the Khalafah had paralysed development in the form of 
28 
government among Muslims. He ever maintain that the Prophet did not have the 
intention of forming a government or establishing a state. The Khalafah in Islam, 
Abd al-Raziq contended, was 'base on nothing but brutal force' (al-
Raziq, 1972:129). The virtue of Muslims does not depend on the Khalafah which 
was 'a catastrophe that hit Islam and the Muslims and is a source of evil and 
corruption'(al-Raziq, 1972:136). 
At the time he published his book, the Sultan of Egypt was attempting 
to bestow on himself the title of Khalife - a position which was then vacant due to 
the abolition of the Ottoman Khalafah - in order to protect and legitimize his rule. 
Being unable to explicitly state that the characteristics necessary for a Khalife did 
not apply to the Sultan, Abd al-Raziq opposed the move indirectly by attacking the 
institution of the Khalafah and the tradition of Islamic scholarship which 
supported it, rather than the Sultan himself. Thus, al-Islam wa Usui al-Hukm met 
with strong opposition from leading al-Azhar Ulama, and was ultimately rejected 
by Egypt's political elite (Hourani, 1983:188-192). 'Abd al-Raziq's supporters 
(primarily, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, whose ministers even resigned from 
the government in protest against 'Abd al-Raziq's dismissal), based theu- stand on 
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and not on religious 
arguments. They focused their charges against the Wafd Party, whose leader, 
Sa'ad ZaghluU had questioned 'Abd al-Raziq's religious qualifications and 
justified the sanction against him by pointing to al-Azhar's authority to denounce 
anyone in its ranks who renounced the 'principles of religion'. Later, however the 
fear of damaging the foundations of the constitutional system and playing into the 
hands of the palace prompted the Wafd press, too, to advocate protection of 
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freedom of thought in Egypt (Gershoni and Jankowski, 1986:66). Al-Azhar, 
gratified by its demonstration of power, confirmed the linkage of Islam to the 
Egyptian state in the letter of thanks to the King for his protection of the faith and 
the honor of its spokesmen. Ultimately, however, al-Azhar's efforts to restore the 
Caliphate and install it in Egypt failed in light of the poor results achieved by the 
Islamic Congress in 1926 (Kramer, 1986:100-101). 'Abd al-Raziq himself, the 
hero of the Caliphate episode, continued to write publicist material defending 
democratic values such as openness, tolerance and freedom, and served as the 
editor of al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya ('The Eastern Bond'), which urged Egypt to 
fortify its relations with the Arab world and the East. He even took part in 
political life with energetic backing of his party, the Liberal Constitutionalists, one 
of whose leaders was his brother Mahmud. Apart from being a member of the 
party's executive committee, 'Abd al-Raziq was a member of parliament 
representing the Cairo district of 'Abdin, and played an active role in protecting 
the constitutional regime from harmful acts by the King or the government 
(Hatina, 2000:39-40). 
'Abd al-Raziq posited tiie notion of a firm government (hukuma 
hazimah), that would restrain the religious establishment but guarantee Islam a 
role in a democratic civil regime-a coo^romise between two extremes: the strict 
approach, which views religion as a moral code only. This kind of coexistence is 
possible, he pointed out, given both the existence of democratic values in the 
religion itself, such as equality before God, social justice, and the sovereignty of 
the people (the Shura in the case of Islam); and a history that shows that religion 
did not always serve as an obstacle, but rather as a supportive base, for 
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establishing democratic regimes such as in Britain and the United States. In 
formulating this compromise and by calling to absorb the Islamic Arab heritage 
into Egypt's modem culture. Abd al-Raziq retreated to the mainstream of Egyptian 
intellectual discourse, which continued to be preoccupied with the issue of 
tradition versus change as he was reluctant to exclude religion from the public 
arena (Gershoni, 1999: 293-294). Later on among many thinkers the idea of the 
Khalifa was dropped in favour of a democratic Islamic government. This attitude 
was represented by several legal and political thinkers, such as Abd al-Hamid Ibn 
Badis of Algeria, Hasan al-Banna and Abd al-Gadir Auduh of Egypt. 
Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis (1889-1940), the founder of the Algerian 
Society of Muslim Ulamas in 1931, was among the first to criticize the Ottoman 
Khalafah and the call on behalf of some al-Azhar scholars to bestow the title on 
the Sultan of Egypt. He maintained that the Khalafah had become 'a superficial 
symbol that had nothing to do with Islam'. Responding to the Sultan's attempts to 
become Khalafah, Ibn Badis wrote 'enougji conceit and trickery! The Islamic 
nations today-even the enslaved ones-are no longer fooled by such illusions', and 
concluded that 'the illusion of the Khalafah shall never be achieved and the 
Muslim someday by God's will-shall arrive to this opinion' (Quoted in Ismael, 
Tareq & Ismael, Jacqueline. 1985:40-41). 
Ibn Badis, however, never thought that the backwardness of the 
Muslims was due to any inherent weakness in the Khalafah system but to their 
abandonment of the cause of progress. The causes of life, civilization and 
progress are provided to all of mankind alike. He who follows a cause-with God's 
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will-shall reach his goal whether he is benevolent or sinister, a believer or a non-
believer. 
Thus the temporary secular consensus imposed by the new political 
elite in the special circumstances of the national independence movement of the 
period from 1919 to 1923 began to collapse in the face of a mounting vociferous 
and violent reassertion of populist religious opposition, which was sedulously 
encouraged, aided and abetted by the palace with the aim of imposing a more 
native and traditional popular autocracy in the country. This wave of religio-
political revival also manifested itself in the religious overtones of its vehement 
xenophobic opposition to the British connection, foreign Christian missionaries, 
and European culture in general. The fact remains that the problem of religion and 
state, expressed in the 1930s and 1940s as a struggle between traditional populism 
and secular pluralism, emerged at the later period on tiie forefront of political 
affairs in Egypt. Economic difficulties, demographic change, a deteriorating 
relation with a foreign Christian power, new regional political issues-Palestine, 
inter-Arab politics as well as the declining fortunes of the old political groups and 
their leadership, undermined the legitimacy of the whole, at least theoretically 
secular edifice. It was in opposition to the secular state system that the new radical 
youth religious movements emerged (Largest of these was the Muslim 
Brotherhood) and directed much of their energy through out the 1940s for the 
restoration of the Islamic doctrine concerning the statecraft and the welfare of the 
Egyptian society as a whole. 
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Chapter 2 
Modern Islamic Reform Movement: 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
By the end of World War I, many Egyptians hoped that Great Britain 
would grant Egypt its independence. A group of prominent secular nationalists led 
by Sa'ad Zaghlul formed a 'delegation (Wafd) to present the case for Egyptian 
independence at the Paris Peace Conference. In 1919, the British arrested Zaghlul 
and two other leading nationalists and exiled them to Malta in the hope that this 
would put an end to the widespread demonstrations in support of their delegation. 
But the exile of Zaghlul, who was coming to embody Egyptian nationalism much 
as Nasser would in the fifties and sixties, triggered a series of demonstration, 
strikes, and riots, in which virtually all segments of Egyptian society participated, 
14 
Christian Copts as well as Muslims. This national upheaval finally induced 
Great Britain to grant Egypt nominal independence in 1922, but real power 
remained in British hands. 
It was in an atmosphere of political and intellectual ferment about 
the freedom of Egypt fi-om the British control that Hasan al-Banna the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood was bom (1906-1949). Al-Banna's father was a minor 
14. The Christian Copts constitute about 10 percent of Egypt's population. 
15. The literature on the Brotherhood, its origins, its evolution and its growth, is extensive; this study has 
drawn mainly four major books in English; Mitchell, R.P. 1969. The Society of the Muslim Brothers. 
London: Oxford University Press; Husaini, Ishak Musa (1956) The Moslem Brethren: The Greatest of 
Modem Islamic Movements (Eng,trans) Beirut, L^anon: Khayat's college book cooperative; and 
Harris, C.P. (1964), Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt. Hague; Heyworth-Dunne, J. Religious and 
Political trends in modem Egypt Washington : published by author. 
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religious scholar and watch repairer who served as Imam, Muezzin, and Qur'anic 
teacher in a little town of the Nile Delta (Mitchell, 1969:1). Due to the 
intellectual/religious orientation of his family, to the most 'traditional' of Islamic 
legal doctrines (the HanbaU), al-Banna nevertheless became acquamted with 
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several alternative orientations toward Islam, including the Sufi and the more 
modem views of several contemporaries. After completing his education, he 
gravitated toward Cairo, where he first came into direct contact with the 
cosmopolitan influences which were prevalent in all the urban centers of West 
Asia at (he time. Here he encountered the intellectual, political, and social 
problems and conflicts which the process of 'Westernization' seems to engender : 
an emphasis upon materialism, the often ostentatious display of wealth, the new 
standards of prestige and status (which emulated Western criteria), the laxity of 
adherence to Muslim principles, the moral decay, and the like, to which so many 
other Muslims leaders have alluded (Aly and Wenner, 1982:337). 
In the 1920s, when Banna started his movement. Islamic political 
thought was divided among three schools: (1) the traditionalists, or the 
conservative elements of al-Azhar, who theoretically refiised any compromise with 
modernization and secularization, but who, pragmatically, dealt and compromised 
with the Egyptian crown and the British authorities; (2) the modemizers, or the 
students of Muhammad Abduh, who tried to modify the tenets of Islam to the 
16. Sufi : almost certainly from the Arabic "suf meaning "wool", hence a "woolly" or "wool-clad" 
individual, because of the early adoption by Muslim ascetics and pietists of the white garments of 
Christian monks. A member of one of the Sufi Orders, the devotees of a mystical "path" or discipline 
\ ^ c h consists of carefiilly graded esoteric teachings leading through a series of initiations to the status 
of adept. The goal of the "path" (tariqa) is to achieve direct communion with God through personal 
devotion and a mastery of the techniques taught by the Shaykh (Wendell, 1978:169). 
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requirements of Western 'modernizing' norm, and their logical and, the 
secularization of Islamic society; and, (3) the conservative reformers (the students 
of Rashid Rida), who agreed with the second 'school' on the necessity of purifying 
Islam from innovations (bid'a) which made Muslims depart from the 'true' Islam, 
on opposition to TaqUd (accepting previous scholarly opinion as binding), and on 
following the path of Ijtihad (personal interpretation of the basic elements of the 
faith). However, they disagreed completely on the value of Western political 
ideas, and argued the necessity of returning to the ideas and practices of the first 
generation of Islamic rulers for inspiration. For them, the Islamic Caliphate was 
the ideal government and the great age of early Islam served as a model of what 
the world should be (Hourani, 1983:7-8). 
Hasan al-Banna was attracted to this latter school; his vision was a 
response to the failure of the liberal institutions (which emerged from the Egyptian 
Constitution of 1923) to free the country from the British. Probably it was no 
coincidence that Banna's call started in Isma'illiyya, where all the signs of 
Western civilization, oppression and colonization were most clearly visible. 
Banna himself recognized the importance of Isma'illiyya to his organization, 
because the Suez Canal Zone and the extensive British facilities and influence 
there had created a sense of alienation in the Egyptians in his own country : for 
him and others the Zone had become a symbol of the sickness of the country 
(Agwani, 1974:379). In general terms, Egypt lost confidence in the Western ideas 
of modernization and liberalism ; it was a time for rising militancy among many 
elements of the population, as indicated by such organizations as Shubban al-
Muslimun (Muslim Youth), Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), and, eventually, the 
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Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood) - all seeking major changes in 
Egypt. 
It was also the time when even the most liberal of Egyptians-Taha 
Husayn, Abbas al-Aqqad, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, and Tawfiq al-Hakim -
expressed their disappointment in liberal institutions and their inspiration and 
possible answers. 
Although al-Banna was intellectually a combination of Muhammad 
Abduh's reformism, Rashid Rida's conservatism, and al-Afghani's political 
activism, he conceived his mission as a more comprehensive vision of Islam. 
Sa'id, the follower of al-Banna, summarized his view of al-Afghani as 'merely a 
cry of warning against problems', of Abduh as 'merely a teacher and philosopher', 
and of Rashid Rida as 'merely a historian and a recorder'. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, on the contrary, 'means Jihad, struggle and work, it is not merely a 
philosophical message' (Quoted in Aly and Wenner, 1982:339). 
For al-Banna, the Islamic ideal was represented by the first 
generation of MusUms, when Qur'anic principles were adhered to and Islam was 
the principal 'nationality'. For him, the distance between current Islamic societies 
and the true Islamic path was the cause of the decadence in the Muslim umma 
(community). His basic questions were; do Muslims carry out the C^ir'anic 
commandments? Do they have faith and belief m the divine doctrines contained in 
the Qur'an? Does any sphere of their life accord with the social laws prescribed in 
it? Having answered all these questions in the negative, the mission of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, therefore, was to 'lead mankind towards truth, call humanity to the 
path of God and illuminate the entire world with the light of Islam' (al-Banna, 
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1968:10). To him, the revival of Islam, then, is not only a defensive mission to 
rescue Muslim societies from the West; it is also an offer to bring humanity, 
'which has gone astray, to the right course'. 'It is the culture and civilization of 
Islam which deserve to be adopted and not the materialistic philosophy of Europe' 
(al-Banna, 1968:3). 
The Muslim Brotheiiiood worked on six principles. The first was 
scientific: to provide a precise explanation of the Qur'an, and defend it against 
misinterpretation. The second was pragmatic: to unify Egypt and the Islamic 
nations around these Qur'anic principles, and to renew their noble and profound 
influence. The third was economic: the growth and protection of the national 
wealth, raising the standard of living, the realization of social justice for 
individuals and classes, social security for all citizens, and a guarantee of equal 
opportunity for all. The fourth was socio-philanthropic: the struggle against 
ignorance, decease and povaty. The fifth was patriotic and nationalistic: tiie 
liberation of the Nile Valley, all Arab countries, and all parts of the Islamic 
fatherland fi'om foreigners. The sixth and the final was humanitarian and 
universal: the promotion of universal peace and a humanitarian civilization on a 
new basis, botii materially and spiritually, through the medium of the principles of 
Islam (Husayni, 1956:41-42). 
To achieve these principles, Banna en^hasized the political nature of 
Islam. He stated, in his message to the Fifth Conference of the Brotherhood: 
We believe the rulers to the teaching of Islam to be comprehensive, 
to inclnde the people's affairs in this world and hereafter. Those 
who believe that these teaching deal only with the spiritual side of life 
are mistaken. Islam is an ideology and a worship, a home and a 
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nationality, a religion and a state, a spirit and work, and a book and 
sword (Quoted in Aly and Wenner, 1982:340). 
In other words, governing is in the very nature and origins of Islam. 
For he believed that the role of the Muslim reformer is to act as legislator, 
educator, judge, and executive: he cannot be only a missionary, but must seek 
power and authority in order to apply the tenets and laws of Islam. If he does not 
seek power to that end, he commits an 'Islamic crime' (Quoted in Aly and 
Wenner, 1982:340). 
He further emphasized that the method to achieve these goals is to 
spread the call of Jihad. As one of the fundamental duties of the true Muslim, 
Jihad has two aspects: power and argument. Banna stated explicitly 'Allah 
Alniighty commanded the Muslim to do Jihad for His sake.... Only if the people 
refiise to listen to His call and resort to defiance, oppression and revolt, then, as a 
last resort, recourse should be had to the word to disseminate the call (al-Banna, 
1968:14). 
In general, Banna's strategy can be summarized as follows: 
(I) avoid the battleground of theological disputes; (2) avoid domination by 
notables and important men; (3) avoid divisive political organizations such as 
parties; (4) emphasize graduahiess because every movement must pass through 
several stages before arriving at its goal; (5) seek power in order to realize goals, 
mcluding if necessary armed force; (6) set up a religious government, because 
government is one of Islam's cornerstones, and includes education, legislation, 
adjudication, and implementation and action- all of which are inseparable from 
one another; (7) belief in Arab and Islamic unity; (8) reVival of the Caliphate, 
because the Caliph is the symbol of Islamic unity; and (9) consider and treat every 
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country which aggresses against the Islamic homeland as a tyrannical state which 
must be resisted in every way (Husaini, 1956:42-43). Al-Banna placed great 
emphasis upon action in his call to the faithful, because he firmly believed that 
political action was absolutely necessary if the weakness of the Islamic community 
were to be overcome. 
As a means of spreading his movement he used pamphlets, letters, 
newspaper, speeches, public lectures, personal visits and epistles. His possession 
of a strong insight aided him in the selection of supporters and members. From 
these he formed the nucleus of a society which took over an unpretentious house 
as a meeting place. The house of the Brotherhood in Ismailia became the 
headquarters of the movement and the respective branches were tied to it by a 
bond of ftatemity without any branch working through another or the work of one 
attractmg the attention of another. The establishment of the headquarters was 
followed by the creation of some projects, including among these were: (1) the 
building of neighborhood mosques; (2) creating small educational institutions, 
which offered courses in religion and literacy; (3) small hospitals and dispensaries 
for the public; (4) small industrial and commercial enterprises, designed to 
provide employment as well as income for the organization; and (5) social clubs 
and organizations - a brilliant stroke, since Banna apparently recognized that 
people join organizations with public goals for reasons other than the achievement 
of these public goals, i.e., to satisfy private needs as well. Perhaps of no less 
importance, the Brothahood undertook a large scale publishing Program-books, 
magazines, pamphlets, etc. and finally, after World War II, a mass-circulation 
newspaper (Aly and Wener, 1982:338). 
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Later, the Brotherhood began to take up other causes; among these in 
the 1930s was that of the Palestinians, which resulted in a spread of its influence 
into Syria, Transjordan, and to a lesser degree, Lebanon. While the Brotherhood 
continued its educational, social, economic and religious activities, it became 
increasingly concerned with, and an influential factor in, the political life of Egypt. 
About five years after the foundation al-Banna was transferred, at his own request, 
from Ismailia to a teaching pose in Cairo, where he resumed his activities. He soon 
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presided over a merger between his group and the Society for Islamic Culture, 
After which The Cairo branch became the new headquarters of the rapidly 
expanding the Brothers. However, the movement continued along with its former 
way- in secrecy and concealment, going to the mosques and preaching, selecting 
supporters and establishing branches quietly and cautiously. 
The expansion of the branches and the necessity of facing new 
circumstances in Cairo demanded that al- Banna double his efforts, reorganize his 
activities, renovate his methods and broaden his program. It was at this stage that 
al- Baima made a plan for the basic organizational set up as the former was not 
appropriate to meet the growing demands of the operation. In that new set up the 
executive was appointed by the supreme Guide. This method of appointment in 
itself was a reflection of the nature of the commanding and decisive leadership of 
al- Banna. This practice however prevented rivals and enemies to occupy in 
disguise any key position. This method later on proved a vital factor in the success 
of the movement. Al- Banna also provided the body of the Supreme board of 
17. This latter organization of Society for Islamic Culture was led by a younger brother of Hassan al-
Banna, Abd al-Rahman al-Banna. 
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guidance which comprised of chief executive and members of various committees. 
AI- Banna very skillfully combined the old revolutionary Muslim 
sects with deeply religious minded to achieve his aims and objectives. It was his 
sharp mind and experience with which he distinguished between an ordinary 
member and a member with a special purpose and motive. He also created a 
section for woman and boy scout groups. Similarly he arranged armed training and 
formed para-military squads. Further he also laid foundation for clinics, schools 
and welfare centres besides holding impressive mass, and the publication of party 
newspapers (Issawi,1954: 267). 
The structure of the organization was a hierarchy that means the 
higher grade of officials would appoint officers of lower grade. The foremost 
position in the Society was that of the G«ieral Guide (al-murshid al-'amm), who 
was both head of the Society and chairman of its two major governing bodies, the 
Gaieral Guidance Council (maktab al-irshad al-'amm) and the Consultative 
Assemble (al-hay'at al-ta'sisiyya; literally, the Founding Assemble). The 
Guidance Council was stated to be 'the highest administrative unit' of the Society 
'governing policy and administration'. The Consultative Assemble was described 
as 'the general consultative council' (majlis al-shura al-'amm) of the Society and 
'the general assemble' (al-jam'iyat al-'umumiyya) of the Guidance Council. This 
Structure of the organization can be summarized in the following table: 
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General Guide 
Consultative Assemble 
Technical Operation 
(Vice-Guide) 
Deputy 
Secretariat 
Secretarv-General 
"General Hisadquartersr 
General Secretariat 
I 
Sections Committee 
Propagation of the message Financial 
Labour 
Peasant 
Family 
Students 
Policy 
Legal 
Statistics 
Services 
Guidance Council 
Field Apparatus 
Administrative Office 
District 
Branch 
Family 
Liaison with the Islamic world Legal opinions 
Bodily training 
Professions 
Press and translation 
Figure I. General Table of Organization 
Base on Mitchell, Richard P. (1969:164) The Society of the Muslim Brothers. 
London : Oxford University Press. 
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The organization's activities consisted in holding evening classes 
for instruction in religious principles and in reading and writing. It also took up 
economic activities with a view to train people and to make them understand about 
their right of living and purpose of existence. At the same time, the people 
were reminded on what cost of life adopting through the growing Western 
mentality. This was the only method before al-Banna by which the oppressed 
people and their almost dead consciousness could be brought back to hfeby 
slowly injecting the true spirit of Islam (Zeltzer, 1962: 218). 
Al- Banna used to tell stories of heroism and bravery of the past 
Muslims to this audiences. Similarly he used to unveil some of atrocities done 
during the British occupation. The damages which were caused to the religion and 
culture by imposing the Western ways on them were also revealed to general 
public. This simple way of preaching was enough to awaken the sleeping 
consciousness of the masses though it took considerable time to boil their blood in 
their veins, but al- Banna was sure of the ultimate success. 
The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood grew, by the outbreak of the 
second World War, into one of the most important political contestants on the 
Egyptian scene. Further more, its membership become so diversified as to be 
virtually representative of evoy group in Egyptian society. More important, it 
made effective inroads into the most sought - after of these groups - the civil 
servants and fhe studait - and the most neglected but potentially powerful, the 
urban labourers and the peasants, 
A series of moves brought the society's headquarters out of the alleys 
of the popular quarters to main streets of Cairo, from little room to buildings and 
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land with full-time paid secretarial and clerical staffs, in keeping with its growing 
membership, strength, and internal and external activity (Heyworth-Dunne, 
1950:17). Another measure of the growth of the society was the size and scope of 
'general conferences' called periodically to discuss and plan action, or merely (and 
more usually) to ratify what had already been done or decided. The proceeding of 
the conferences provide a general picture of the activity of the years 1932-1939. 
The first general conference, in May 1933, it was called to consider the problem of 
Christian missionary activities in the country. In the same conference it was 
decided to send a latter to King Fu'ad on behalf of the Society to inform him about 
the aims and objects of the society as well as the urgency to bring about control 
over missionary activities (al-Banna, 1946:162-163). 
The second general conference, held later that year, dealt with 
advertising and instructional propaganda, and authorized 'a small company for the 
establishment of a press for the Muslim Brothers'. This was followed in due 
course by the founding of the first official journalistic voices of the Society: first, a 
weekly magazine called Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin: and later, another called 
Majallat al-Nadhir. The press also printed what came to be the most important 
indoctrination texts for members - and until 1948 the chief sources for the study of 
the ideas of the movement-the 'messages' (vasa'il) (Mitchell, 1969:13). 
The third general conference was held in March, 1935. This 
conference is notable from the point that the formation of 'rover' (Jawwalah) was 
initiated and its development was planned out on the basis of the athletic training 
started in the very earliest days at Isma'illiya. These rovers were later on turned to 
be a battalions (Mitchell, 1969:14). 
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The fourth general conference was held in 1937 to celebrate the 
coronation of King Farouk. That conference also took up the criteria - question of 
membership and also discussed the article structures of the society. 
With its fifth general conference, Muslim Brotherhood celebrated the 
first ten years of its existence. During these years, and in the ten years of his life 
which followed them, al-Banna provided his followers with a coherent and explicit 
analysis of the ills of contemporary society, and with an Islamic path of spiritual, 
social, economic and political reforms through which such ills might be confronted 
and overcome. Indeed, al-Banna's well-developed and well-explicated ideology 
proved to have a substantial impact on Egypt and tiie West Asia in general. 
In treating the ideas of Hasan al-Banna, one must assume that his 
thoughts, far from arising in a vacuum, crystallized in the contact of the debates 
arising in the inter war period OVCT religious, economic, political, social, and 
intellectual conditions and matters. The thought structure of the Dchwan, as 
molded by al-Banna, was based on a world-view of Islam understood as a religion, 
a civilization, a way of life, an ideology and a state. Some tend to believe however 
that this world-view, espoused in totality by al-Banna, was essentialist, 
unchanging, and beyond the rules of history, Al-Banna's Islamist discourse, was 
bom against the tumultuous events of the inter war period and, to a CCTtain extent, 
al-Banna had to compromise his ideological Islamist stands in order to deal with 
the dominant system. While it is correct to argue (hat the Ikhwan, theoretically 
speaking, can not be regarded as a more-or-less deviant type of offshoot from 
Islam, it is nonetheless a new phenomenon which emerged in response to certain 
conditions on the ground (Wendell, 1978:2). Al-Banna's philosophy, therefore, 
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was that of an intellectual leader and organizer who had a large stake in the world 
of events in Egyptian society at the time. 
al-Banna saw around him an Islamic world beset by poverty, 
corruption and weakness : Politically, the Islamic countries were assailed by 
'imperialist aggression on the part of their enemies, and by factionalism rivalry, 
division, and disunity on the part of their sons. Economically, they were subject to 
the propagation of usurious practices throughout all their social classes, and the 
exploitation of their resources and natural treasures by foreign companies'. 
Intellectually and sociologically, they suffered from anarchy, licentiousness, and a 
loss of faith, hope and humanity (Wendell, 1978:61-62). 
According to Isma'il, to all these miserable conditions al-Banna 
offered a solution: the path of Islam. This path was not conceived as simply being 
a narrow, spiritual one; rather, Islam was seen as representing an all-encompassing 
system of guidance in social, economic, and political conduct: 
We believe that the principles and teachings of Islam are 
comprehensive, governing the affairs of men in this world and in the 
next, and those who think that these teaching deal only with spiritual 
and ritualistic aspects are mistaken in this assumption, for Islam is : 
doctrine, worship, homeland, nationality, religion, spirituality and a 
state, spirituality and action, scripture and sword. The Holy Qur'an 
speaks of this and considers it the essence of Islam (extract of the 
speech of al-Banna as quoted in Ismael & Ismael, 1985:62). 
Thus, put simply, the Muslim Brotherhood saw itself as the vanguard 
of Islam. According to the Brotherhood's view of history, the neglect of Islam had 
began in the Ummayad period when, following the rule of the first four rightly-
guided Khalifes, Islam was increasingly corrupted and neglected, replaced by the 
imperatives and decadence of dynastic rule. In turn, this failure to follow the true 
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path of Islam weakened Islamic civilization : religious schisms and political 
factionalism became more acute, while a resurgent Europe extended its power. 
This process of Islamic decline came to a climax in the aftermath of the First 
World War, with colonial domination of the Middle East, the onslaught of Zionism 
in Palestine, and the spread of Western secularism and materialism as symbolized 
by Ataturk's abolition of the Khalifah and the adoption of Western political-legal 
systems in Turkey, Egypt and elsewhere in Islamic world. 
It was in opposition to Western colonialism and imperialism that the 
Brotherhood directed much of its energy. Al-Banna outlined the two 'fundamental 
goals' of the Muslim Brethren as follows: 
(1) That the Islamic fatherland be freed from all foreign domination, 
for this is a natural right belonging to every human being which only the unjust 
oppressor or the conquering exploiter will deny. 
(2) That a free Islamic state may arise in this free fatherland, acting 
according to the precepts of Islam, applying its social regulations, proclaiming its 
sound principles, and its sage mission to all mankind For, as long as this state 
does not emerge, the Muslims in their totality are committing sin, and are 
responsible before God the Lofty, the Great, for their failure to establish it and 
their slackness in creating it (Wendell, 1978:31-32). 
Thus, the important political aim of the Muslim Brothers was to 
liberate Egypt and the entire Nile Valley from external unperialism. The 
organization's goals were the liberation of the Nile Valley and all of the Arab 
countries and all parts of the Islamic fatherland from all foreigners; to assist 
Islamic minorities every where for securing their ri^ts; the unqualified support of 
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Arab unity ; steady progress towards an Islamic league ; the sincere furtherance of 
world co-operation based on high and worthy ideals which would safeguard 
freedom and human rights, whereby the strong would lend a helping hand to the 
weak ; and the institution of a sound state which would put the rules and 
injunctions of Islam into practice, preserving them at home and transmitting them 
abroad (Maluleem, 1979:335). 
The Muslim Brothers' political thought for liberation from foreign 
rule was similar to those of various political movements opposing imperialism. 
The only difference was that the Muslim brothers did it on religious grounds, and 
not exclusively only on civil grounds. The Muslim Brothers coloured their 
nationalism with a religious hue. They held that the fight for freedom was one of 
the religious duties imposed upon every Muslim. 
Islam, according to them, considered nationalism (al-qawmiyya) or 
patriotism (al-wataniyya) in a different secure away from the westem sense of the 
term, which was defined by secular and material interests. Islamic patriotism 
served a nobler purpose, it led to freedom from narrow partisanship and 
factionalism and led to the unity of men under the single banner of God (al-
Ghazali, 1953:35-37). Thus, Islam considered the result of nationalism to be only 
the country's material well-being, but the spread of the word of God all over the 
world. 
The Muslim Brothers felt that the true Islamic renaissance was not 
only the liberation of each Muslim country by the practice of Nationalism and 
patriotism, but it depended on the unification of all Arab nations. Their attitude 
towards Arab unity was also tinged by religious favour, though it was rather 
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secularistic in nature. They declared and supported the measures of facilitating 
economic unity among the Arabs, such as the establishment of a company invested 
by purely Arab money to support commercial, industrial, and financial endeavours 
in the Arab world. 
Al-Banna wished that Arab nationalism would posses no trace of 
racism and the Arab States should be separated from each other by no racial 
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barriers. He attempted to solve this loyalty problem by coining about a dozen 
Arabic terms to describe loyalty or devotion to the world of Islam, to the Islamic 
code of conduct, to resolute propagation of Islamic principles over the whole earth, 
to one's country, to one's people, to one's ancestral heritage, to one's special 
group in the community, to the aims and ideals of one's group, and so on (Harris, 
1964:164). 
Eastemism (al-Sharqiyya) was a concept recognized by al-Banna on 
which to find the block of Asian nations and seek for their unity. The Muslim 
Brothers held that since they were both the Muslims and Asians, they had to strive 
for the restoration of the honor and dignity of the Asian nations in every possible 
way. 
Eastemism, however, lacking common long term mterest, was only 
temporary and transitional. The Muslim brothers then realized that a more 
18. In support of this view of nationalism, al-Banna quoted from the Prophet : 'God has removed from you 
the arrogance of paganism and the vaunting of your ancestry : mankind springs from Adam, and Adam 
springs from dust. The Arab has no superiority "over the non-Arab except by virtue of his piety' (Al-
Banna, 1966:54). 
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realistic expression of the unity among Asians was to be in the 'Muslim bloc'. He 
ended however by declaring that it was the duty of all Egyptian Muslim to be loyal 
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to Egypt, loyal to the ideal of pan-Arabism, and loyal to the ideals of Islamic 
internationalism in the hope, presumably, that no conflict would ever arise 
between these three ideals' (Quoted in Maluleem, 1979:435). 
The idea of Islamic state seemed to be the greatest of Muslim 
Brotherhood's political ambitions. The religious government was at the head of 
their political programme. All their books and publications contained writings 
which indicated clearly their views of this matter. The Muslim Brothers suggested 
that the principles of Islam should be introduced into the government and the 
ruling of the country, a government which was not based on Islam was not for 
Muslims. Islam had made government one of its cornerstones, and is itself rule 
and execution, legislation and education, law and judicature and each is 
inseparable from the other (Husayni, 1956:43). Al-Banna said on one occasion 
tiiat; 
The Isiam is which the Mo»lim Brethren believe makes government 
one of its pillars, and relies upon execution as it relies upon 
guidance..^  The prophet made government one of the bonds of 
Islam.... In our books of jurisprudence, administration is 
considered as one of the doctrines and tenets and not as casuistry 
and a consequence of tenets; for Islam is a system of laws and 
execution, as it is le^Iation and teaching, law and judicature, one 
inseparable from the other. If the Islamic reformer satisfies himself 
with being a jurist-guide^  taking decisions, chanting instructions, and 
19. Pan-Arabism emerged as a widely held sqtaradst ideology before and after the 1914-1918 war. The 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 meant that Arabs no longer had a protective union against the 
Western European powers, and this change gave a decisive boost to Pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabism sedcs a 
unified state embracing all Arabic speaking people. The Pan-Arabic movement was divided between 
proponents of inter-govemmental economic and political co-operation between sovereign Arab states, 
and advocates of the merger of existing Arab states into a sio^t state. 
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quoting the principles and consequences of actions, and leaves to the 
executives the making of national laws, which are not permitted by 
God, and is led to the breaking of His commandments by the force of 
the imposition (of these laws) then the natural consequence is that 
the reformer's voice will be a cry in the wilderness (Quoted in 
Husayni, 1956:63). 
He did not agree with the existing condition of separation between 
Religion and state (of Din from the dawla). He considered that Islam did not truly 
means only religion, in fact it included politics, economics, society, etc. Al-Banna 
thus argued that: 
Politics is a part of religion, that encompasses the ruler and the rule. 
Thus there is not contained in its teachings a rendering to Caesar 
that which is CaesarN and to God that which is God's rather.... 
Caesar and what belongs to Caesar is for God Almighty alone. 
In another occasion he said; 
There is no authority in Islam except the authority of the state which 
protects the teachings of Islam and guides the nations to the fruits of 
both religion and the world.... Islam does not recognize the conflict 
which occurred in Europe between the spiritual and temporal 
(powers)...between the church and the state... (Quoted in Mitchell, 
1969:244). 
His belief came to the conclusion that Islam could command a 'unity 
of life' and led to a stronger conclusion that, Rule is in the nature of Islam. If 
()ur'an gave a law, it also required a body to enforce the law, and a state was what 
is required. The state was necessary because it could facilitate many duties 
incumbent on Muslims which they could not do individually. Besides this duty, 
the state has a greater duty, that was to protect Islam. This purpose had been 
mraitioned by one of the famous ideologue of the Brothers, al-Ghazali: 
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Faith should not be left without a political stronghold to give it 
protection and to champion the cause of believers everywhere. 
Seldom, if ever, has Islam needed the state more than today, not 
merely because Islam itself is threatened with extinction in a world 
where only the strong can survive (AI-Ghazaii/el-Faruqi, 1953:14-
15-26). 
In creating the Islamic state, three broad principles should inform the 
political structure and institutions. 
1. The Qur'an should be regarded as the basic constitutional 
document; 
2. There must be consultation (Shura); 
3. The ruler is bound by the teachings of Islam and the will of the 
people from whom he receives his authority to rule and to whom he is responsible. 
As far as the Shari'a was concerned, al- Banna believed that its two 
sources were the Qur,an and Sunna, but the former requu e^d a fresh and clearer 
interpretation, while the latter needed a careftil re-examination in order to 
distinguish the true Sunna from false report. In addition, the relationship between 
the two sources was, in his eyes, different to the orthodox view. As one member of 
the Brotherhood put it, 'the Sunna is a kind of supplement to the legal injunction 
of the Qur'an, but mostly it is a spiritual inspiration and guide to the whole islamic 
system' (Mitchell, 1969:238). 
Because of Islam's status on an all-embracing system of social 
knowledge, al-Banna saw within it guidance on matters of strategy as well as on 
matters of diagnosis and cure. His descriptions of the tasks confronting the 
Brotherhood were thus always amply supported by Qur'anic citations and the 
saying of the prophet. Within the organization, strong emphasis was placed on the 
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overriding importance of deep faith, precise organization, uninterrupted work, 
obedience and determined leadership. Because of the multi-faceted nature of 
Islam, al-Banna constantly stressed that the Ikhwan was not a narrow political or 
religious-grouping. Instead, he asserted that it was all of these and more: 
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1. It's a Salafi movement : it pursues the return of Islam to the 
purity of its source in the Qur'an and the Tradition of the Prophet. 
2. It's a Sunni order: it is modeled on the Sunna in everything, 
particularly in matters of belief and worship.... 
3. It's a Sufi reality: it operates on the principle that virtue is in the 
purity of the soul, iimocence of the heart, hard work.... 
4. It's a political organization: it demands reform in internal politics, 
changes in the relationship between Islamic nation and the outside world, and the 
education of the people for integrity, self-respect and national consciousness. 
5. It's an athletic club: it promotes good health...since the duties of 
Islam cannot be fulfilled without good health.... 
6. It's a scientific and cultural society: because Islam makes the 
search for knowledge an imperative of every Muslim and the Brotherhood in 
reality is a school for education, an institute (dedicated) to caring for body, mind 
spirit. 
7. It's an economic enterprise because Islam deals with 
20. The salafiyya movement was launched by Rashid Rida (1865-1935, disciple of the great Egyptian 
Muslim reformer Muhammad Abduh (]849-1905).Its goal was the revival of Islam not so much by 
harmonizing it vwth modem times as advocated by the reformers, but by a return to the pristine Islam 
the pious forbears (salaf). Salafism was to some extent an amalgamation of reformist with 
fimdamentalist Wahabi trends. 
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the acquisition and management of wealth.... 
8. It's a social idea : its deals with the problem of Islamic society 
and attempts to find solutions...(Quoted in Ismael & Ismael, 1985:64). 
Al-Banna's letter to King Fu'ad in 1933 concerning missionary 
activity was the forerunner of many such communications to Egyptian heads of 
government seeking reform in the name, and within the spirit and letter of Islam. 
The most notable of these, letter addressed in 1936 to King Faruq, his prime 
minister Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, and the heads of all Arab governments, was a 
basic statement of the early propositions held by Banna; it appeared as the letter 
(risala) called Nahwa al-Nur (Towards the Light). The address was not made for 
the benefit of any particular section or community or nation but it was a religious 
appeal to every Muslim, to follow the principles of Islam, its rules, its laws and its 
civilization, in the true sense. It also objected to warn every body in general that 
the love for Westernization not only would spoil the heritage of their forefathers, 
but at the same time it would be disastrous for the generation and also to the 
coming generations. Al-Banna argued that the Islamic world had reached a 
crossroads at which it must choose between two competing paths of development: 
the Western path, and the path of Islam. Western civilization, he noted, had 
achieved much. But those achievements were now crumbling and tyranny, 
economic crises, and exploitation due to the inherently blind and misguided nature 
of the WestCTn path. Thus revealed, the way of Western civilization had little to 
commend it (Ismael & Ismael, 1985:65). 
The way of Islam, on the other hand, promised to solve all the 
problems of the West. It, more than any other ideology, belief in system of social 
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organization, provided the basis for national resurgence. According to him, 'there 
is no regime in this world which will supply the renascent nation with what it 
requires in the way of institutions, principles, objectives, and sensibilities to the 
same extent as does Islam to every one of its renascent nations.... No nation 
adheres to (Islam) without succeeding in its aspirations' (Al- Banna , 1936:107-
108). 
Islam provides hope for the weak. Islam brings national greatness 
through divine sanctification. It concerns itself with the strengthening of just 
armed forces, with the quality of public health, with the provision of a superior 
morality, with the fostering of a sound economy and with the creation of 
appropriate public institutions. Contrary to what some may think, adherence to the 
Islamic path does not imply intolerance of non-Muslim religious minorities. Nor 
need an Islamic resurgence necessarily lead to increased friction with the West. 
Of particular interest in Nahwa al-Nur are al-Banna*s proposals for 
practical reforms which would characterize adherence to the Islamic path. No less 
then fifty such reforms are elucidate, with al-Banna offering the assistance of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to any government or organization which wishes to 
implement them. 
Under the heading political, judicial, and administrative reforms, al-
Banna called for changes in the judicial system so as to bring it into accordance 
with the Shari'a; the infusion of Islamic principles and morality into the 
bureaucracy and government institutions; and the evaluation of all government 
action by reference to Islamic teachings. The operation of the civil service should 
facilitate the performance of religious duty, and the private and public behaviour 
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of all government employees should be subject'tb govemmettf scrutiny. Bribery 
and favouritism must be ended. Party rivalry must also ended, with all political 
forces within the nation channeled into a single common front. The armed forces 
should be strengthened. The government should pursue a pan-Islamic foreign 
policy by strengthening its ties with other Islamic countries, and by giving 'serious 
consideration to the matter of the departed Khalafah (Al-Barma, 1936:126). 
The second set of reforms proposed by al-Banna in Nahwa al-Nur 
was categorized as 'social and educational'. Many of these concerned public 
morality: al-Banna called for an end to prostitution, gambling, dancing, 
ostentatious dress, and Western customs; support for traditional family life and the 
treatment of women in accordance with Islamic principles; and the enforcement of 
an Islamic moral code through the censorship of speeches, books, plays, radio 
broadcasts and the cinema. Public health care should be expanded, and attention 
be given to hygiene and a clean water supply within the village. Education should 
be reformed by increasing its religious content, and by affiliating village primary 
schools with the mosques. Increased emphasis should be placed on the teaching of 
Arabic, and Islamic history. Male and Female students should be segregated, with 
each learning a distinct and appropriate curriculum, A literacy programme should 
be oriented towards training the general level of education, bringing diff^ent 
cultures together, and 'inculcating a virtuous, patriotic spirit and an unwavering 
moral code' (Al-Banna,1936:127-129). 
Third, al-Banna proposed a number of economic'reforms. First, 
among these was the reorganization of the Zakat (alms tax), and the use of funds 
so raised for benevolent projects and the strengthening of the armed forces. Usury 
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should be prohibited, and the masses protected from exploitation by monopolies. 
Productivity, income and employment should be increased; natural resources 
exploited; and foreign projects nationalized. Civil service salaries should be 
adjusted so as to increase the pay of junior civil servants and decrease that of 
senior civil servants, with the total number of government posts to be reduced. 
The specific reform proposals put forward by Hasan al-Banna and 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Nahwa al-Nur obviously do not represent the totality 
of the Brotherhood's social, political and economic agenda. Elsewhere, for 
example, one finds al-Banna calling for land reform, labour organization, social 
security and the redistribution of wealth (Mitchell, 1969:272-293). Nevertheless, 
Nahwa al-Nur does illustrate well the emphasis that the Muslim Brotherhood 
placed on the imiprovement of society through a fundamental 'Islamification' of 
people's beliefs and moral codes, as well as of formal government institutions. 
Further to emphasis this politic places forcefully articulated the 
various issues on which sensitive Egyptian public was greatly agitated ttiese were: 
the wide disparity in income distribution, the Palestinian question, the Presence of 
British soldiers of Egyptian soil and the consequent mushrooming of cultural 
declined. 
The Brotherhood and Political Action 
The late 1930s saw the full-fledged entrance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood onto the political stage, in Egypt and in other Islamic countries. It 
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was, more than any other issue, circumstances in Palestine which facilitated 
this entrance and geographic expansion. When the Palestinian Arab 
21 
revolted against British colonial rule and Zionist immigration broke out in 1936, 
the Brotherhood seized upon the occasion to carry out active anti-British 
propaganda throughout Egypt. During the three years of the revolt (1936-1939), 
the organization came into contact with the Mufti of Jerusalem, and raised fimds 
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for the Palestinian cause. They also came into close contact with a number of 
Egyptian political leaders, notably (Prime Minister) 'Ali Maher and 'Abd al-
Rahman Azzam, both of whom were trying to formulate an Egyptian pan-Arab 
policy (Heyworth-Dunne, 1950:23-28). 
The Palestine issue further stimulated the growth of the Brotherhood 
: the total number of Brotherhood branches grew from roughly 15 in 1932 to 300 
in 1938, to 500 in 1940 (Mitchell, 1%9:328). These included, after 1937, a 
branch in Syria, based in Aleppo and covering Syria and Lebanon; and agents in a 
numbCT of other Arab countries (Heyworth-Dunne, 1950:17 ; Mitchell, 1969:75-
76). The Brotherhood membership was drawn from most social classes, and was 
21. Zionism is a colonial movement based on racist, supremacist and distant religious notions perceived and 
launched as a political project within the imperialist fiamewoik of late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century Europe. Both the antagonistic Western attitude towards the Arabs and the Zionist colonial 
ideology are now clearly anachronistic and actually threaten the into-est and well-being of the West, the 
Jews and humanity. That these Western attitudes and Zionist ideas are presently at variance with the 
spirit of our times, is borne out by the liquidation of colonialism and racist entities in Afiica and 
elsewhere and by the United Nations Resolution 3379 of 10 NovembCT 1975 which determined that 
Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrinunation (Kayyali, 1979:5). 
22. The Muslim Brothers had first become directly involved in Palestinian affairs when Banna's Brother 
'Abd al-Rahman visited Palestine in 1935 and met Haj Amin al-Husayni, mufti of Jerusalem and 
chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council of that time. The visit reflected the predictable concern of the 
Muslim Brothers - as Egyptians, as Arabs, and as Muslims - for the cause of Palestine. ' Abd al-Rahman 
had been the chief of most articulate spokesman of that concern from the earliest days of the movement 
in Cairo (Mitchell, 1969:55). 
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predominantly rural or urban working class in composition. Despite this, however, 
the leadership and the most active cadres of the organization were dominated by 
Egyptians from urban middle-class backgrounds. 
The Muslim Brotherhood's very success soon sparked off challenges 
to the government, and ushered in a period of tribulation for the movement. This 
was not unforeseen, for even as the Brotherhood had embariced on the path of 
active politics, al-Banna had warned his followers of the challenges ahead : 
I would like to avow to you frankly that your mission is still 
unknown to many people, and that on the day they find out about it 
and grasp its import and its aims, you will encounter violent 
antagonism and sharp hostility. You will find many hardships ahead 
of you, and many obstacles will rise up before yott...you will find 
among the clerical classes and the religious establishment those who 
will regard your understanding of Islam as outlandish, and censure 
your campaign on that account Chiefs, leaders and men of rank and 
authority will hate you, all governments will rise as one against you, 
and every government will try to set limits to your activities and to 
put impediments in your way.... Without a doubt, yon will then 
experience trials and tribulations, you will be imprisoned, arrested, 
transported, and persecuted, and your goods will be confiscated, 
your employments suspended, and your homes searched (Quoted in 
Wendell, 1980:34-35). 
With the approach and outbreak of the Second World War, the 
Brotherhood continued its anti-British, pan-Islamic propaganda, officially calling 
for Egyptian non-belligerency in the conflict and the limitation of assistance to 
Britain to the minimum stipulated in the 1936 Anglo Egyptian Treaty (i.e. a British 
garrison in the Canal Zone, a naval base at Alexandria, and wartime use of 
Egyptian communication facilities). Furthermore, al-Banna was secretly in 
contact with anti-British elements within the Egyptian armed forces, notably 
(former) Egyptian Commander-in-Chief 'Aziz al-Misri, and a junior army officer 
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named Anwar al-Sadat. This stance led to increasing British pressure on 
successive Egyptian governments to deal with the Brotherhood and other anti-
British movements. Eventually, in October 1941, the government of Prime 
Minister Sirri Pasha moved against the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting al-Banna 
and a few other prominent members of the organization, and suppressing the 
weekly magazines al-Ta'aruf and al-Shua' and the monthly al-Manar. Meetings 
of, and press references to, the Brotherhood were also banned (Mitchell, 1969:22-
26). 
Al-Banna and his colleagues were released in less than a month due 
to palace intervention on the Brotherhood's behalf. As a result of his 
imprisonment by the British authorities, Banna founded a more scout "sub-group" 
within the organization as the 'Secret Apparatus'. However, it was not until 
February 1942 that the Brotherfiood were allowed to resume some of their 
activities. 
As tiie Muslim Brotherfiood emerged as a socio-religious 
organization as well as a political guide of the masses, it decided in its sixth 
general conference held in January 1941, that the society would run candidates m 
national elections. Theannouncementof the elections by the new government of 
the Wafd was considered appropriate for the first test of the Muslim Brother's 
electoral strength. Banna declared himself a candidate for the district of 
Isma'iliyya, the birthplace of his movement, but no sooner had he done so, the 
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then Prime minister Nahhas summoned him and called upon him to withdraw. 
23. Nahhas Pasha was convinced that leader of the Muslim Brotheihood would win this election in Ismailia 
against the Wafdist contestant. He, therefore, sent for the Brotherhood leader and forced him to 
withdraw his candidature. 
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Without much debate, he consented, but 'at a price' which included : (1) freedom 
for the movement to resume full-scale operations; and (2) a promise of 
government action against the sale of alcoholic drink and against prostitution. 
Nahhas agreed, and very shortly ordered restrictions on the sale of liquor at certain 
times of every day, during Ramadan, and on religious holidays. Similarly, he took 
steps to make prostitution Ulegal and immediately closed down some of the 
brothels. He also permitted the resumption of some of the activities of the 
Brotherhood, including the issue of some of its publications and the holdmg of 
meetings (Heyworth-Dunne, 1950:40). 
However, relations between the Brotherhood and the Wafd remained 
unstable. At the end of 1942, Nahhas again ordered for the closure of all branches 
of Brothaiiood, excepting only the headquarters. In early 1943 the situation 
however was reversed, with the visit to the headquarters of a group of Wafdist 
dignitaries - mostly ministers - who, afler a speech by Banna, declared their 
loyalty to the idea represented by the Brothers. During the remainder of the life of 
the ministry relations alternated between the friendly and the hostile: surveillance 
and censorship, followed by p»iods of relative freedom (Mitchell, 1969:27), 
The inconsistency of the Wafd reflected in part the recognition of the 
growing powo" of the Muslim Brothers, and what, from that time on, would be an 
ambivalent or many-sided approach to it. For the 'liberal' wing of the Wafd, the 
Muslim Brothers were always anathema. For the 'right' wing, headed from that 
time by Fu'ad Siraj al-Din, the organization was as a useful instrument against the 
dangerous social pressures being generated m Egypt -communism especially had 
flourished during the war (Kaplinsky, 1954:380), 
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The Wafdist government remained in power almost to the end of the 
War, completely fulfilling the expectations of the British as to its ability and will 
to maintain the order and security necessary to the successful pursuance of the 
war. However its own internal corruption (which led to a split in its ranks) and, as 
the war danger receded from the Nile Valley, the emergence of old and new 
political tensions (especially between the palace and the Wafd) set the stage in 
October 1944 for a royal dismissal of the Nahhas cabinet. 
With the dismissal of the Wafd in October 1944, the palace selected 
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Ahmar Mahir Pasha, the leader of the Sa'dist Party, to form a new government. 
This was the first of a succession of what the Brothers and the Wafd called 
'minority governments'. From this time until the elections of January 1950 Egypt 
was ruled by independents and Sa'dists, reflecting the active return of the palace to 
the field of domestic pohtics and its success at excluding the Wafd from power. 
The situation also promised that pose-war Egypt, facing critical internal and 
external problems and ruled by men without a semblance of popular support, was 
destined to pass through a lively period in its history. 
Mahir immediately made preparations for a new general election 
which the Brothers again prepared to contest. Banna again opted for Isma'illiyya, 
and five of his chief colleagues chose other areas in Egypt intending to campaign 
oa the basis of an 'Islamic programme'. In January 1945 the elections - believed 
to have been among the more obviously dishonest held in Egypt - took place, and 
24. Egyptian party founded in 1937 by a faction of younger leaders seceding from the Wafd. They were led 
by Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi and Dr. Ahmad Mahir and represented themselves as the true heirs of the 
Wafd leader, Sa'ad Zaghlul, from whom they took their party's name. The Sadist Party became one of 
the anti-Wafd groups reUed upon by the King and his court. They formed coalition governments with 
the Liberal Constitutional Party. The two parties won the 1938 and 1945 election . 
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Banna and all the other Brothers were defeated in constituencies where they had 
been certain of victory (Kirk, 1954:263). Besides the obvious interest of the 
government in winning seats for its partisans, Mahir had already shown his 
attitude to the Brothers by seeking, but not getting, a fatwa from the rector of the 
Azhar, Shaykh Maraghi, declaring that there were too many Islamic societies in 
Egypt- a move felt to be aimed at the Muslim Brothers. 
When Mahir made known his intention to declare war on the Axis, 
the Muslim Brothers, together with the great majority of nationalists, including the 
Wafd, protested; but, determined to secure a place for Egypt in the peace-making, 
Mahir persisted. On 24 February 1945, as he read the declaration of war in the 
chamber of deputies, he was assassinated. The murder of Ahmad Mahh^ , however 
was not the act of Muslim Brotherhood, but the ruling party somehow or other 
dragged their name over the issue. Banna, Sukkari, and 'Abidin were arrested but 
almost immediately released, foUowmg the investigation and the assassin's 
confession that he was a member of the National Party (Kirk, 1954:266). 
Following the assassination of Mahir, Muhammad Fahmi al-
Nuqrashi Pasha (1888-1948), a close friend of Mahir succeeded as Prime Minister 
and as head of the Sa'dist Party. Al-Banna visited the new Prime Minister to 
convey his condolences and to explain the mission of the society. However 
Nuqrashi Pasha, as was suspicious of the Brotherhood's mission, ordered for a 
strict surveillance of the activities of the members and the organization, a policy 
which was applied with varying degrees of severity while he remained in office 
from 25 February 1945 to 14 February 1946. 
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Post-war Egypt however was a country racked by political turmoil, and 
full of inner contradiction as regards to political order and legitimacy. It was iii 
this situation that the Muslim Brotherhood found itself in competition with the 
Wafd for the leadership of the nationalist movement in Egypt, and in this, they 
also found some encouragement from King Faniq, and from Prime Minister 
Isma'il Sidqi Pasha, leader of People Party. The Sidqi government (February-
December 1946) permitted the Ikhwan to publish its newspaper, to purchase 
newsprint at the official rate, and extended training and uniform privileges to the 
Ikhwan scout corps (Firaq al-Rihalal). Such encouragement did not, however, lead 
to any diminution of Ikhwan criticism of government policy as al-Banna and his 
movement were still constantly critical of Egyptian-British dealings regarding 
British withdrawal from Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal Zone, and fiiture Anglo-
Egyptian defence arrangement: 'The government of Sidqi Pasha, in its insistence 
on negotiation, does not represent the will of the nation; any treaty or alliance 
concluded by it with Britain, before the evacuation of her forces, is void and does 
not bincjrthe nation' (Quoted in Mitchell, 1969:49). 
At the same time, the Wafd launched a nation wide programme to 
extend its area of activities. They combined the students of the Nile valley bitterly 
criticized the terms of the treaty and sent letters of protest to members of 
parliament and authorities. On account of this daily riots started in various regions 
and this lead to the major riot on 25 November in which stores, bookshops and 
trams were burnt. Finally rioting spread out to seven major places in the country. 
The security and British forces in all the major cenfres were also being attacked. 
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At the same time the Brotherhood also started a campaign for social boycott of the 
Britishers. 
Under these circumstances the government dealt with the situation in 
a very severe way and ordered to close down these newspaper, which indulged in 
anti-government propaganda. Many activists were arrested from among the 
communists. Socialists, Wafdists, and Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna's deputy 
Ahmad al-Sukkari, was arrested on account of his speeches in support of the riot. 
These arrests were followed by continuous rioting, more prominent among which 
were the attacks on British establishments and personnels and on the Egyptian 
police. By 8 December, the rioting had served its purpose. Having failed in his 
mission to sell the treaty to Egypt, Sidqi Pasha resigned from government. As 
soon as he resigned King Farouk once again called Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi 
Pasha (Sa'dist Party) to form a cabinet on 9 December 1946. 
Formal resistance to the idea of the treaty however was continued 
through the so-called 'Liaison Committee' composed of the groups in opposition 
to it; the Muslim Brothers reftised to join, arguing that the committee lacked 
'sincerity'. The Wafd, of course, revived the charge that Banna was obstructing 
the national movement by allying himself with the government, a charge given 
surface substance by what was to follow. Meanwhile, on 25 January 1947, when 
Nuqrashi broke off negotiations with the Britisher and declared his intention of 
bringing Egypt's case before the Security Coimcil of the United Nations. The line 
adopted by Nuqrashi was the same as was recommended sometime back by 
Muslim Brotherhood. They, therefore, decided to send their representative along 
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with Nuqrashi Pasha to the United Nation. Their representative, Mustafa Mu 'min 
(leader of Cairo University), left Cairo on 26 July (Mitchell, 1969: 50-51). 
On 22° August, while a resolution recommending a resumption of 
negotiations was being discussed, Mustafa Mu'min delivered an impassioned 
speech from the spectators' gallery and produced a document, signed with students 
blood, which repudiated negotiations and demanded the complete evacuation of 
Britisher and immediate reunification of the Nile Valley. On this outburst of 
protest, he was expelled from the Security Council. Mu'min returned to Egypt 
before the end of the Security Council session and with the aid of a New York 
maritime Union, which included some former Eg>ptians, produced a 
'demonstration' outside the United Nations building (Mitchell, 1969:51). 
Finally Security Council adjourned its session on 10 September 
with the Egyptian question unsolved. The movements of Egypt had produced a 
sense of deep distrust in the Western countries. This distrust and frustration 
became worse, when on 29 November 1947 the Security Council decreed the 
partition of Palestine. This started a new phase in the history of Egyptian politics. 
In the wake of these events Hasan al-Banna seemed to have felt, 
more urgently than ever, that true Muslims could wait to no longer to destroy the 
forces of secularism, to purify Egypt and establish Islamic government in the 
country. Egyptian politicians who opposed principles and programmes of Muslim 
Brotherfiood, as well as Egyptians or foreigners who showed any - pro-British 
learnings became the targets of Brotherhood's terrorist attacks. These 
developments fiirther brought deterioration into the political life of the country and 
led to a state of lawlessness. 
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The rapid growth of militant anti-British sentiment was 
complemented by a growing crisis in Palestine. As during the 1936-1939 
Palestine revolt, the Muslim Brotherhood was vociferous in its support for the 
Palestinian Arab cause. Arms were acquired; paramilitary training missions 
dispatched to Palestine; and Brethren were trained and mobilized for future 
military service in the country, with the first Ikhwan 'battalion' ready for action by 
October 1947. Several weeks before the 'official' outbreak of the Palestine war 
and the formal intervention of Egyptian and other Arab armies on 15 May 1948, 
Muslim Brotherhood irregulars began infiltrating into Palestine and fighting 
alongside with Palestinian forces. 
Muslim Brothers 'anti-British activities and their clear commitment 
to the Palestinian cause, as well as their social ideology, were well received by the 
Egyptian masses. Furthermore, they managed to avoid the stigmas attached to 
their major political competitors. Unlike the Wafd, the Brotherhood were not 
tainted by wartime co-operation with the British, corruption, and identification 
with vested interests. In contrast to the communists and their alien doctrines of 
proletarian struggle, the Ikhwan's Islam was understandable and attractive to the 
traditional population. As a result of these and other factors, the Brotherhood's 
support reached new heists during this period, with some estimates putting the 
figure at 300,000-600,000 members (and many sympathizers), organized into 
some two thousand branches (Heyworth- Dunne4950:68). Formal or informal 
Muslim Brotherhood branches existed outside Egypt in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, 
Transjordan, Iraq, Sudan, Eritrea, Morocco, Tunisia and other Islamic countries 
inside and outside the West Asia. 
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The failure of Arab military intervention to crush the nascent state of 
Israel and prevent the partition of Palestine, further intensified civil unrest in 
Egypt in the second half of 1948. The Muslim Brotherhood's political success -
coupled with their militancy and increasing use of violent measures - ultimately 
compelled the EgjAptian government to take harsh action against the brotherhood. 
Thus, on 8 December 1948, citing the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in acts 
of violence and conspiracy, the al-Nuqrashi government issued a military order 
calling for disbanding of the Muslim Brethren and their branches wherever they 
may be, the closing of their centres, and the seizure of their papers, doamients, 
magazine, publications, monies and properties, and all other assets of the 
Association (Husayni, 1956:21). Thereafter, and despite al-Banna's best efforts, 
relations between the Ikhwan and the government deteriorated still further. On 28 
December 1948, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's 'secret apparatus' shot 
and killed Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi as he entered the Ministry of the Interior. 
As a result, al-Nuqrashi's successor. Prime Minister Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi Pasha 
(Saadist Party), instituted a ruthless campaign of arrests and property seizure 
against the outlawed organization. 
Al-Banna deeply regretted the assassination and the government 
reaction to it. He had second thoughts as to the wisdom of the Brotherhood's 
entrance into formal politics, and wrote that future Muslim Brotherhood activities 
might best be confined to education and advocation within the framework of 
existing political parties: 
The thought which I have conceived is that our organization should 
take upon itself the raising of the standards of the country, 
religiously, socially and economically neglecting the political aspects 
- and to permit outstanding members of the association to present 
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themselves for the elections under the auspices of whatever parties 
they see fit to join ; provided that they do not join any one party and 
provided they undertake the spreading of the mission of the 
association within these parties.... I believe the time is not far 
distant when these parties will have faith in what we advocate 
(Quoted in Husayni, 1956:21). 
It was, however, too late. On 12 February 1949 Hasan al-Banna -
founder, Director-General, and guiding force of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun - was 
assassinated outside the headquarters of the Young Men's Muslim Association by 
members of the Egyptian secret police. 
Al-Banna's death was a severe blow to the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
were the seven months of continued suppression under al-Hadi government which 
followed it. Eventually, however, the Society's oppression was lessened with the 
accession to power of a Wafdist government under Nahas (The Wafd gained a 
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considerable support from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950 election). 
Gradually under the Wafd government, the arrested members of the Brothers were 
released, regained its property, started publication of its newspapers, and became 
openly active in politics once more. Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, a former judge, 
was elected the new Director General of the movement. His open condemnation 
of past Ikhwan violence, his dislike of the 'secret apparatus', and his apparent 
25. It was believed that Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi, who succeeded Nuqrashi as Prime Minister, had with the 
connivance of the King, instigated the assassination of al-Banna because he was afraid of arresting him. 
'Abd al-Hadi was eventually tried for the crime, in 1953, when the new Revolution Government came to 
power (Harris, 1964:188). 
26. The Wafd surprised everyone in January 1950 by winning the election with a sweeping majority. It is 
not inconceivable that the outlawed Brethren, leftist groups, and the Communist Party threw their 
support to the Wafd primarily to avenge Sa'adists who had presecuted them so severely from 1946 to 
1949. But since the government under which elections were held was independent or politically neutral, 
it strengthened the Wafd's chances of success. The latter's electoral organization in the provinces as 
well as its vast financial resources worked successfiilly. It captured 228 of the 319 seats in the 
Parliament (Vatikiotis, 1961.36-37). 
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accommodation with the palace, stimulated initial opposition to his leadership, 
which presaged the internecine feuding that would plague the society throughout 
the 1950s (Ismael & Ismael, 1985:73-74). 
In the early 1950s, However, the future of the Muslim Brothers was 
doubtful because there was no conviction as to whedier the organization could 
revive or in what shape it would be : It is notable that, during this period of its 
crisis, an aiding hand was stretched out to help them ; it was the hand of a political 
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party called the Socialist Party, which had programmes similar to those of 
Muslim Brotherhood's on both national and reformative matters. The Party acted 
as if it was the successor of the Muslim Brothers itself. It openly defended the 
Muslim Brothers and gave its cooperation to some of the former leaders of the 
Muslim Brothers. It had also called for the reestablishment of the organization by 
giving the reason that, if the government continued to persecute the Brothers, they 
would only be forced into being further extremists. It also supported the religious 
ideology of the Muslim Brothers stating that 'if an association of Egyptians wish 
to form a purely Islamic party calling for the total adjustment of laws to the 
Qur'an, that is their right' (Quoted in Jankowski, 1975:97). 
27. The Socialist Party was founded in the year 1933 by Ahmad Husayn, the socialist party was named 
"Misr al-Fatat" or "Young Egypt" also known as "Green Shirt". In 1940 it somewhat broadened its 
religious activities and propaganda and changed its name, becoming the Nationalist Islamic Party 
(Hizb al-Watan al-Islami). Like the Muslim Brotherhood, it was a reaction to the growing 
disillusionment with the Wafd. But its extremism todc the form of chauvinistic slogans and a Nazi 
patterned organizations. With the defeat of the European Fascists in the Second World War, the 
party suffered a heavy setback. In 1949, in an attempt to ride the revolutionary tide, the party 
changed its name into the "Socialist Party" through its organs al-Ishtirakiyya (Socialism) and Misr-el 
Fatat it was able to spread its influence with a dramatic spread due to the scathir^ attacks they made 
on the regime and the King himself They organized arson and bloodshed of Cairo's "Black 
Saturday" January 26, 19S2), is most often laid at the door of Ahmad Husayn and his organization. 
Yovmg Egypt eventually changed its name a second time, before the Revolution of 1952, it became 
the "Socialist Party" (Wahby, 1966:36-37). 
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Despite involvement in guerrilla warfare against the British in the 
Canal Zone, the Brotherhood maintained a relatively low political profile until 
1952 Egyptian revolution. Prior to the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood had 
contacted with the Free Officers' movement. In fact, several prominent members 
of the Free Officers' movement maintain that the Muslim Brotherhood leadership 
had prior knowledge of the date of the revolution and played a role in it by 
providing guards for important public buildings and mosques. 
The relationship, though formal, between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the "Free Officer" can be traced back to the year 1940. At that time, 
nationalists seriously considered taking advantage of the situation to drive out the 
British. The notion appealed to both the army officers and Hasan al-Banna, but 
neither party had sufficient trust in the other to divulge its aspirations. It was 
Anwar al-Sadat, one of the officers, who however believed to have acted a 
prominent role as die middleman between the army and Hasan al-Banna during the 
40's, and encouraged Banna to cooperate in the secret revolution. 
Several meetings took place between Sadat and al-Banna that led to 
mutual respect and confidence. And in fact, aU officers who contacted Banna or 
knew him could not conceal their admiration for the strength of his personality and 
the sincerity of his nationalism. During this time the Brethren were collecting 
arms for their militant activities. The army officers were also in preparation to 
face the situation. The Brethren, therefore, were given some assistance from the 
army in hoarding arms. The army, in turn, sough the help of the Brethren as they 
planned to destroy die British armies which were retreating from Alamein. 
However, Banna declined to give such assistance feeling uncertain of his material 
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power and simply expressed his sympathy for the army's move (Husayni, 
1956:126). 
However in 1945, when World War II ended, Nasser came in contact 
with the Muslim Brethren through Muhammad Libib, an officer, and Abd al-
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Mun'im 'Abd al-Ra'uf, a young liaison man.'Abd al-Ra'uf seemed to be one of 
the first and most active members of the group which came to be called the "Free 
Officers"; in its highest councils, he remained the chief propagandist and 
protagonist ofthe Muslim Brothers (Mitchell, 1969:96-97). 
Muhammad Labib was an officer who retired from the army in 1936 
and come to work with Banna in 1941 as his unofficial adviser on scouting 
activities until 1947. Thereafler, he was appointed as a deputy for military affairs 
in the organization. He was sent to Palestine in order to recruit and train 
volunteers and was appointed both the technical head of the volunteer divisions 
and as Banna's personal representative on matters relating to the war. He was 
involved in the most important relations with the Free Officers in 1944. 
The meeting between Labib and Nasser took place in the summer of 
1944 at Cairo zoo. Labib spoke ofthe need for the army to take an active part in 
the Liberation of the country. He discussed the problems of Egypt and stressed the 
need of faith and the importance of the Muslim Brothers. He suggested that the 
practical way was to 'begin to organize groups in the army, which have faith in 
what we believe, so that when the time comes, we will be organized in one rank, 
making it impossible for our enemies to crash us'. It was as a result of this 
28. Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Ra'uf^  the friend of Sadat who was arrested with Misri in his abortive attempt to 
escape from Egypt in 1941 and who replaced Sadat as liaison man between the officers of the army and 
the Muslim Brothers when Sadat was arrested in 1942 (Mitchell, 1969:96). 
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meeting that encouraged Nasser to design his plan for the great revolution 
(Mitchell, 1969:97). Beside Nasser there were other officers who made common 
cause with the Brotherhood, such as Sadat, Husayn al-Shafi'i, Kamal al-Din 
Husa3ni, and Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Ra'uf. 
The role of the Brotherhood in the Palestine war in 1948 had 
strengthened the trust of the army in the activities of the organization. The two 
parties fought side by side in several battles; sometimes the Brethren did well in 
protecting the army from the enemies attacks when the army had been forced to 
retreat. The officers, for instance, Fuad Sadiq, were very impressed by the 
Brethren's moral. Their admiration for the Brethren was evidenced in the 
'Palestine Cemetery, a monument built by the junta afterwards in which the name 
of the Brethren fighting in the Palestine war were inscribed. During the battle the 
news of Nuqrashi's decision to dissolve the Brotherhood came to the army officers 
in Palestine. They strongly opposed the government's will, while the Brethren 
continued helping the army to fight at Negeb. Brethren sources state that when 
news of Banna's death reached them, they 'were visited secretly by a large number 
of officers of varying ranks bearing on their faces the sorrow they so deeply felt' 
(Husayni, 1956:127). 
The parties co-operated with each other once again in the battle at the 
Suez Canal. The Brotherhood representatives of each regional branch conferred 
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with army officers and the officers supplied the arms to the movement. The 
services of the free officers in Palestine led to the arrest of their leader, Abd al-
29. In one well-known trial a Brother named Abd al-Qadir stated that Abd al-Nasscr himself supplied the 
arms and that Anwar al-Sadat and SMah Salim knew of it. 
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Nasser, by the government of Ibrahim ' Abd al-Hadi, as Nasser was coming back 
from the Faluja pocket in Palestine. He was charged with training the Brotherhood 
in the use of arms before and during the Palestine War. Nasser denied these 
charges. Along with him, the Free Officers, including Fu'ad Sadiq, were arrested. 
Although there was evidence that a close link existed between the Free 
officers and the Brotherhood, it would be a mistake to assume that the Revolution 
was the work of the Brotherhood and that all the Free Officers were the member of 
the organization. In fact, the real Free Officers, Abd al-Nasser, was never a 
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member of the Brotherhood. However, a number of their soldiers and officers, 
including Muhammad Nagib, were, in one way or the other, members of the 
organization. As a matter of fact, the Brotherhood and the Free Officers would 
never combined into one movement due to their different approach to build the 
Egyptian Nation. 
30. One of the member of the Organization went as far as to admit that Nasser was a former member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and he had even sworn the pledge of obedience (Husayni, 1956:128). 
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Chapter three 
Religion and State under Nasser 
Subjective signs that Egypt was approaching a revolutionary moment 
in its history were seen in the late forties and early fifties in the growing appeal of 
radical thought and movements of the left and right. The perceived relevance of 
the several varieties of Marxism that took root in Egypt derived from Marxism's 
acceptance of aspects of the Western achievement while at the same time it called 
for revolt against it. Marxism sounded the call for industrialization, but for an 
industrialization cleansed by social revolution of the Western capitalist contagion. 
Further more to the people it provided a persuasive demonology to explain the 
disruptions and disorientations experienced in the colonial situation. And Marxism 
gave repression to the instinctive anarchist feeling of a society that had been 
profoundly dislocated in its fimdamental socioeconomic structures. 
Marxism was not the only ideology that served to canalize the sense of social 
disintegration bom during the colonial confrontation and its after math. The 
history of revolutionary politics in Egypt often reveals congeries of revolutionaries 
who had held Islamist as well as Marxist views. There have even been individuals 
who fluctuated between the two ideologies. This apparent anomaly disappears 
when it is realized that in Egypt the evocative power of Islamic theoretical 
formulations was used by the Brotherhood to appeal to the same discounted groups 
that might have been attracted to Marxism. Nevertheless, the socialist 
revolutionary success in July 1952 undoubtedly owed much to the conspiratorial 
skills of Nasser and his fellow Free Officers. 
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However, the official mythology of the revolution would have it that 
the Free Officers never intended to rule. Nasser in his Philosophy of the 
Revolution conceptualized their purported role as that of a vanguard which, once 
having swept away the ancient regime, would step aside as the Egyptian people 
took command of their destiny. With flair he described his 'disappointment' when 
reality did not follow this hope and the Free Officers were 'compelled' by 
circvmistances to retain the reins of power : 
For a long time it (the vanguard of Free Officers) waited. Crowds 
did eventually come, and they came in endless droves - but how 
different is the reality from the dream! The masses that came were 
disunited, divided groups of stragglers. The sacred advance toward 
the great objective was stalled, and the picture that emerged on that 
day looked dark and ominous; it boded danger. At this moment I 
felt with sorrow and bitterness, that task of the vanguard, far from 
being completed, had only begun (Nasser,19S5:38). 
Thus from the wide array of contenders for the nationalist mantle, it 
was a movement of military conspirators - the Free Officers led by Gamal Abdel 
Nasser that resulted in the monarchy being dismantled and a republic being 
established. The leader. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, was typical of the secular 
Muslim impressed by the ideologies of the West. When they took power, the Free 
Officers had little ideology apart from some principles formulated at the 
Liberation Rally in January 1953. These six principles as were incorporated in the 
Preamble of (he Constitution of 1956 are as follow : 
31. Not long after the Revolutionary Command Council came to power in Egypt, Nasser, probably with the 
collaboration of his friend and adviser, the prominent Cairo journalist, Muhammad Hassanain Heikal, 
put together three short articles under the title, The Philosophy of the Revolution. The articles, which 
were quickly translated into English and published in book form, attracted much interest, particularly on 
the part of those who hope to find a simple definition of the aims of the Egyptian Revolution. 
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The eradication of all aspects of imperialism ; the extinction of 
feudalism ; the eradication of monopolist and the control of 
capitalistic influence over the system of government ; the 
establishment of a strong national army ; the establishment of social 
justice ; and the establishment of a sound democratic society 
(Quoted in Sayegh, 1965:13). 
Nasserism thus rested on the creation of a strong praetorian state and on the 
mixture of the ideologies of Arab nationalism and socialism. 
In fact, Nasser's regime (1952-1970) was the most significant 
attempt at the modernization and secularization of Egypt since Muhammad Ali 
Pasha. At the heart of the Nasserist vision of Egypt's destiny was a grasp of the 
necessary linkage between domestic and international politics. Such an 
understanding was natural to one who viewed Egypt's history from a nationalist 
perspective, for the country's fate had so often been decided by outside forces. 
Nasser now sought to exploit this link to the outside world to supplement Egypt's 
meager resources, while at the same time preserving his own monopoly on power. 
The outlines of a strategy aimed at both the necessity for 
development and the maintenance of Free Officer rule can be seen in Nasser's 
earliest writings. If Egypt's resources in themselves offered little, Nasser 
reasoned, Egypt's role in relation to its Arab neighbors promised a great deal. 
Nasser insisted that collectively the Arabs were strong as a result of several factors 
:the moral and material ties that bound the Arab countries into a homogeneous 
whole, the strategic position of the Arab countries, and Arab oil. Moreover, in a 
much quoted passage of Philosophy of the Revolution, written not long after the 
Free Officers seized power, Nasser had spoken of destiny's beckoning Egypt to 
play a role in the three circles of the Arab world, the Muslim world, and Africa 
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(Baker, 1978:44-45). Further more, Nasser was not simply satisfied with merely 
creating new institutions parallel with the traditional ones; his aim was to 
modernize the bases of legitimacy using Western and nationalist concepts, in 
addition to modernizing the panoply of other traditional institutions. 
Nasser, therefore, ideologically rejected the theocratic formula based 
on Egyptian nationaUsm, Islamic principles, Arabism and Marxism. His major 
theme was to raise the level of mass Egyptian consciousness through the 
propagation of Arab unity and nationaUsm (Pan-Arabism) (Dekmejian, 1980:5). 
His social and economic policies were designed to place Islam at the service of the 
state. Although he frequently used to attack 'reactionary Muslims', and at the 
same time tried to subordinate Islam to socialism by alternatively emphasizing 
'Arab Socialism' and 'Islamic Socialism' (Wilber, 1969:74). 
However, the main important ideological direction of Nasser was of 
Arab nationalism, the plank on which state was guarded by the military. In his 
book. Philosophy of Revolution. Nasser placed Arab nationalism within the 
context of the West Asia : 
It is not without significance that our country is situated West of 
Asia, in contiguity with the Arab states with whose existence our own 
is interwoven. It is not without significance, too, that our country lies 
in northeast Africa, overlooking the Dark Continent, wherein rages a 
most tumultuous struggle between white colonizers and black 
inhabitants for control of its unlimited resources. Nor is it without 
significance that, when the Mongols swept away the ancient capitals 
of Islam, Islamic civilization and the Islamic heritage fell back on 
Egypt and took shelter there. Egypt protected them and saved them, 
while checking the onslaught of the Mongols at Ain Jalut (Nasser, 
1955:113). 
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Thus as visionary, Nasser was merely using Islam to underpin his secular form of 
Arab nationalism. The strategy was to mobilize the masses for the Liberation 
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Rally, while the secular elite and intellectual forces could be mobilized through 
Arab nationalism. In order to justify Arab nationalism he said that it was not 
opposed to Islam as Marxian socialism was and that 'Islam had successfully 
applied the first socialist experiment in the world' (Quoted in Lewy, 1974:271). 
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In order to remforce Egyptian socialism through Islamic 
justification, a Mufti (canon lawyer^) was asked to issue a fatwa (religious edict) 
on the socialist laws enacted in 1961; he stated that 'private ownership is 
legitimate in the eyes of Islamic jurisprudence as long as the owner observes the 
ordinances of Allah concerning his wealth. But if he does not abide by them, the 
ruler is entitled to devise the laws and regulation which force him to adhere to the 
commandments of God (Lewy, 1974:271). The fatwa of Mufti (to reinforce 
Egyptian socialism through Islamic justification) was simply to empower Nasser's 
hand in socialist law-making. 
Immediately after the revolution, it was therefore a sheer necessity 
for the new regime to look for support, first to the political parties which seemed 
to have ideological proximity with it and which seemed most eager to co-operate. 
32. Nasser's regime created a series of national rallies or unions to mobilize popular support - the Liberation 
Rally, the National Union and finally the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). All were conceived as mass 
organizations with a monopoly of legitimate political activity. The choice of name was also significant; 
in each case the word 'party' was deliberately avoided, for this had powerful connotations of division 
and lack of national purpose (Owen, 1992:266). 
33. Nasser adopted the programme of socialism, announced in the Charter of May 1962. The document 
explained that socialism 'is the way to social freedom; social freedom means equal opportunity to every 
citizen to obtain a fair share of the national weaUh'. Socialism could be instrumental in eradicating 
feudalism, in destroying the dictatorship of capital, and in establishing social justice, entirely by peacefiil 
means (Sharabi, 1966:129-130). For the detail of Nasser socialism See Appendix P.203. 
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From the beginning the free officers reahzed very well that the co-operation of the 
Muslim Brothers, who had become very powerful among the Egyptians and 
outside of Egypt, was necessary to the well being of the new government. For this 
reason the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) tried to please the Muslim 
Brothers in several ways. First of all, the RCC turned its attention to the case of 
Hasan al-Banna's murder and declared that the murderer and his accomplices 
would be punished. Besides, the RCC ordered the release of eleven Muslim 
Brothers who had been imprisoned for their terrorist activities under the royalist 
regime, including the two men who were punished by life sentences as the 
murderers of Nuqrashi Pasha in December, 1948. 
The RCC also decided to invite members of the Muslim Brothers into 
the cabinet. However, what happened escapes precise detection, but it appears to 
be true that Hudaybi was notified of the RCC's decision to ask three Brothers to 
join Neguib's cabinet, one of whom would be Shaykh Hasan al-Baquri. Hudaybi 
agreed, and without consultation with the Guidance Council recommended the 
names of Hasan al-"Ashmawi and Munir al-Dilla, both of whom were rejected by 
the RCC. Hudaybi then informed the Guidance Council of the government offer 
but not that names had already been put forward and rejected; the Council decided 
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unanimously not to enter the government. Baquri, who had already been 
appointed, since Hudaybi had raised no objections to him in the first place, 
conveniently absented himself from the meeting, but was dismissed from the 
34. At a later date the deputy of the Society, explaining the Council's decision not to participate in the 
goverrunent, made two points: 1. The fear that the Society would lose its 'popular' quaUty, i.e. sully 
itself with power, 2. The fear, hinted at by Neguib in his resistance to the idea of Brothers in the cabinet, 
of bringing down the wrath of foreigners and minorities on the regime and thus complicating its problem 
(Mitdidl, 1969:108). 
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Society the day his appointment was made public. The appointment of Buquri and 
his dismissal from the Society were the only aspects of the matter which were 
public knowledge at the time. Immediately it appeared as though the Muslim 
Brothers were withdrawing their support from the regime (Mitchell, 1969:107). 
Since then the attitude of the Brotherhood toward the government remained 
passive. Some Brotherhood branches even received the order that from then on 
they should adopt a negative attitude to the government. At the same time the 
Brothers divided among themselves into two different groups, one supported the 
govenmient and one, led by Hudaybi, opposed it. 
The Muslim Brothers had hoped that when the former regime 
collapsed, it would take at least a leading role in the new government. But the 
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hope was barred by the weakness of its own internal divisions. Hudaybi was not 
as decisive .about the politics .as Banna ^  moreover he had powerfiil opponents 
within Ihfi Organization (Manfield, 1965:75). 
In the wake of indifferent attitude of the Brethren towards the 
government the main proposals of the Muslim Brothers were turned down flatly by 
the RCC. Hudaybi tried to persuade Naguib (President) to promise to establish a 
new Eg>ptian constitution based on Islamic principles; which he firmly refused to 
do when he tried another way by telling Naguib that all the proposed laws should 
be sent to a Brethren committee to be considered and approved before they 
were publicly proclaimed if the government wanted fiill co-operation from the 
35 The internal conflict within the Muslim Biotheiiiood organization appeared since 1948 when al-
Hudaybi was the General Guide. The loyalty expressed by Hudaybi to King Farouk created 
condonnation of one faction among the members of the Brotherhood who considered this as a de\'iation 
from ^ feith and disregard for the martyr's biood. TTius the internal conflict between al-Hudaybi and 
other leading members led to weakness, to some extent, of the Brethren and it barred the Brethren from 
the h ( ^ of taking a leading role in the new government (Maluleem, 1979:150-151). 
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Muslim Brothers, this was strongly opposed by Nasser. Moreover, the 
government turned down the Brotherhood's demands for the prohibition of 
gambling and alcohol and merely issued laws limiting their dangers to society 
(Naguib, 1955:156).Henceforth, the gap between the Muslim Brothers and the 
government widened and sometimes the former worked secretly against the latter. 
In asking for such a major say in government policies, the Muslim Brothers might 
have overestimated their power. They tried to control the Revolutionary 
movement and were disappointed. 
The old constitution was, however, annulled in December 1952. An 
assembly of 100 members including three Brothers, was appointed in order to 
consider the issuing of the new constitution. The Muslim Brothers magazine ali 
Da'wa called for a new constitution which was based on Islamic principles and 
Hudaybi requested the government to ask for the public opinion whether the 
people preferred the Islamic law or the western code, but his request was rejected. 
The idea of Islamic state was also rejected by the RCC. Nasser saw no 
compromise possible on the question of retreating the country from the harsh 
realities into a self sufficient but poor and isolated land. His ideal was to 
industrialize Egypt and to increase her power as the leader of the Arab World 
(Joesten, 1960:98). 
Rashad Muhanna was one among the strong supporters of the 
Muslim Brothers in the idea of the establishment of Islamic state. He was the 
leader of the unsuccessful revolt of 1947, who refused to join the Free Officers at 
the critical stage of the July Revolution. He was dismissed from the Regency, 
because he had a close relation with the Muslim Brothers and had attacked the 
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RCC's agrarian reforms. As a result he was arrested, released, and again arrested 
after waging a campaign for the abolition of the 1923 and for an Islamic 
constitution. This time he was sentenced to life imprisonment (Naguib, 19:175-
178). The unfair treatment imposed on him created more hostile feelings among 
the anti-government groups, with Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Ra'uf and Ma'aruf al-
Hadari as their leaders. The RCC was, in turn, displeased with the intervening of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, because they contradicted the government's plans and at 
the same time it seemed that they were showing their distrust of the government's 
competence. 
In the wake of its opposition from the political parties the 
government issued a law regulating the political parties, mainly to control the 
Wafd Party and partially the Muslim Brothers. Under this new law the rights, 
powers, limitations and obligations of all political parties were defined in 
seventeen articles. The parties were to be required to make public their objectives 
and statutes, the names of their founders or presidents and their financial recourses 
and their funds were to be deposited in a publicly recognized bank. Parties were, 
furthermore, forbidden to own real estate; they were not to be allowed to support 
any military or semi-military formation, and they were to operate under the joint 
jurisdiction of the Ministers of Interior, Social Affairs, and justice (Kerr, 1963:43). 
In January 1953 the government ordered the abolition of all existing 
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parties and groups except the Society of the Muslim Brothers. In a related move 
36. Hamroosh reported that 'Nasser told the Minister of the Interior, Sulaiman Hafidh, that 'the Ikhwan was 
one of the greatest supportCTS of the movement...contributed greatly to it, and still offers continuous 
support' in view of this, he asked the Minister to find a way to exempt the Ikhwan from the ban on 
political parties and activities (IsmaeL, Tareq Y. and Ismael, Jacqueline S., 1985:302). 
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it announced the creation of the Liberation Rally (hay'at al-tahrir). A government 
supported 'people's movement' to implement the slogan of 'unity' in the nation, 
the Rally was also to become the nucleus of a political organization to replace the 
abolished parties. As it turned out - perhaps not merely by accident - it also 
became the nucleus, along with other more obviously military organizations later 
created, of the regime's civil security forces. This was much that the Muslim 
Brothers had feared at the time, for obviously the creation of the Liberation Rally 
challenged its role as 'civil protector' of the regime. It also proposed to challenge 
the Society's position as popular voice on the ideological level, for the government 
intended to make the Rally its instrument to win over the hesitant and doubtful 
nation to the cause of the revolution (Mitchell, 1969:109-110). 
Thus it was obvious that the government concentrated on setting up 
this new body, probably as a great rival to the Muslim Brotherhood. Within a 
year, some 1200 Liberation Rally centres existed inside the country. The Muslim 
Brotherhood charged that the Rally centres constituted superfluous - supported 
'people's movement' to implement the slogan of 'unity' in the nation, the Rally 
was also to become the nucleus of a political organization to replace the abolished 
parties. As it turned out - perhaps not merely by accident - it also became the 
nucleus, along with other more obviously military organizations later and 
undesirable duplications of their own branches. Presumably the Brethren felt that 
the government was challenging them on their own ground by offering a rival 
social welfare, and educational Programme to the masses. At a meeting of the 
Brotherhood Secretariat in February 1953, individual Muslim Brothers were 
authorized to join the Liberation Rally; but it was decided that the Muslim 
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Brotherhood would maintain its independence as an organization vis-a-vis the 
Liberation movement (Harris, 1964:214). 
After the government had dissolved all the political parties, the 
Muslim Brothers again asked to have their representatives in the Cabinet. On 
receiving the refusal from the government in this case, the Muslim Brotherhood 
launched its attack against the government in the press. The government also 
gripped this opportunity to put down the Muslim Brothers. In June 1953, the 
government's Intelligence Office found out secret contacts between the Muslim 
Brothers and the three subversive movements: one in the army, one in the police 
office and one among the army's non-commissioned officers. The government 
was reported that these groups had planned to discredit the government and create 
hatred against it. The RCC sent a warning of the Guidance Office; but the 
Brothers did not take heed of this warning. 
During the spring of that year the Muslim Brothers seized every 
chance they could to increase the number of their members, but with great care. 
They further concentrated on the concepts of dedication to Islam, purification of 
the spirit, and Brothers loyalty. But when the government proclaimed Egypt to be 
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a Republic on June 19, 1953, it disturbed the Muslim Brotherhood very much for 
they wanted Egypt to be an Islamic state instead of such a secular one. 
For almost the whole year of 1953 despite their mutual differences, 
explicitly the relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the govenmient was 
37. The establishment of the Republic formalized direct military rule as four leading RCC members took 
over key ministries in the government: Nasser, Deputy Premier, and Interior Minister ; 'Abd al-Latif al-
Baghdadi, War Minister ; Abdul-Hakim Amir, Commander in Chief ; and Salah Salim, Minister of 
National Guidance and Sudanese Affairs, while Neguib became president and Prime Minister (Dekejian, 
1972:25). 
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on the whole cordial. The feelings of the regime towards the Muslim Brothers 
remained positive but their basis shifted from friendship to the need. Policy 
makers in the Brothers apparently saw it this way. The Muslim Brothers had sent 
a small delegation to visit Nasser in order to congratulate the government on its 
move and to discuss the future situation in the country; the terms of the discussion 
suggested to the government a demand by the Muslim Brothers for a commanding 
voice in affairs of state. It was immediately cleared that the exemption of the 
Brothers from the decree (the abolition of all the existing parties) had both 
objectively and subjectively created a new power situation in Egypt. The fact that 
the government was unprepared to accept the implications of its move became 
another crucial factor in the privately disintegrating relations between the two 
groups (Mitchell, 1969:111). 
When the goverrmient established the National Guard, a large 
number of the members of the Brotherhood participated in it. But implicity, there 
was a hint of disorder behind the friendly disguise. The government in trying to 
clear the misimderstanding among the people that it was influenced by the Muslim 
Brothers, launched an official campaign 'to unify the nation' with a new slogan : 
'Religion for God and the country for all' (al-din li'llah wa'l watan U'l-Jami'). 
But in fact, the difficulty the government faced in dealing with the Muslim 
Brothers made it believe that it was necessary to launch a religious movement of 
its ovra to vie with that of the Muslim Brothers because the people still had their 
strong traditional and emotional adherence to Islam. The government wanted to 
win the people to its side, this was the reason why the RCC wisely wanted to 
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attach its movement with the Islamic ideals and to show that it was itself dedicated 
to the principles of Islam. 
The rift between the Brotherhood and the revolutionary government 
started widen. According to Abd al-Adhim Ramadhan, there were four 
interrelated reasons for the rift. First, the Muslim Brotherhood was negotiating 
with the British on the evacuation from the Canal Zone. While these negotiations 
were not official, they were not clandestine either. They seem to have had the tacit 
approval of the RCC. The rift developed when the positions of the government 
and the Ikhwan on British evacuation came into conflict. 
Second, the Ikhwan was proselytizing for membership in the army 
and the police, in effect creating a potential fifth column in the armed forces. 
Third, the well-armed paramilitary force of the Ikhwan continued to fimction, 
posing a serious challenge to the new regime. Finally, all of the above were 
brought to the fore when the Ikhwan initiated contact with General Muhammad 
Najuib, the then leader of the RCC, to form an alliance against Abd al-Nasser. As 
a result, in January 1954 the Revolutionary Command Council declared the 
Ikhwan to be a political party and ordered its disbandment. Al-Hudaybi and 449 
other Brethren were arrested (Ismael & Ismael, 1985:75-76). 
The arrest of the Muslim Brotherhood's members evoked country-
wide criticism and Naguib was also critical about it. Nasser, thereafter kept up the 
pressure. He had Najuib stripped of all his responsibilities, made him fmally 
ousted and imprisoned (Bari, 1995:48). Naguib's removal evoked a nationwide 
protest. Large scale demonstrations took place demanding his reinstatement and 
the release of political prisoners. The opposition of all shades - The Muslim 
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Brothers, the socialists, and the Wafdists got united to demand the immediate 
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'restoration of democracy' with Naguib as president and arrest of Nasser. 
Commenting on the poUtical motive behind Mushm Brother's call for 'restoration 
of democracy' Warburg remarked : 
They (Muslim Brothers) had allied themselves previously, first with 
King Farouk, and later vtith the Free Officers, since they regarded 
democracy, secular constitutions, liberal political parties and 
communism as anathema to Islam. The Brother's leadership was 
thus not really fighting to restore democracy but rather attempting 
to curb the RCC's exaggerated powers (Quoted in Alam, 1998:78-
79). 
Sensing the popular mood of the country, tiie military junta released all political 
prisoners and announced its decision to restore democratic rights, to allow the 
establishment of political parties and to hold free elections and to dissolve itself 
and transfer power to the people's representatives. 
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However, the 'Manshiya incident' of October, 1954, presented a 
golden opportunity to the RCC to deal severely with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
That incident also marked the emergence of Nasser as the strongman within the 
RCC and provided an occasion to finally do away with General Naguib. Nasser 
exploited the incident to tiie fullest extent and dealt a severe blow to the existence 
of Muslim Brotherhood. Along with the dissolution of the society, several of its 
leaders and active members were executed and many condemned to long terms of 
38. On the Power struggle between RCC, Naguib and the Muslim BrothCThood, See Gordon, Joel (1992) 
Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution, Oxford University Press. 
39. Manshiya inciden was called after the site in Alexandra - in which one Mahumud 'Abd al-Latif, a 
Brother and member of the 'secret organization' attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was 
addressing some 10,000 workers in Alexandria. 
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imprisonment. While dismantling the Brothers' armed threat the regime also 
moved to undermine its grass-root support. On 10 December, 1954 the day after 
the six Brothers were hanged, the Social Affairs Ministry assumed administrative 
control of the Brotherhood welfare centres on the pretext that they were a front of 
clandestine activity (Gordon, 1992:184). 
Thus, a combination of factors brought successive victories to the 
Free Officers in their war against the Brotherhood. While a quick implementation 
of some policies related to social justice and land reforms further isolated the 
Brotherhood, the Nationalization of the Suez Canal and his defiant anti-imperialist 
posture made Nasser the 'hero' of the whole Arab world. If the Manshiya incident 
strengthened and consolidated his position, the Suez crisis endowed him with 
'Charisma'. Ban has rightly observed that; 
So decidedly had the social bases of the Brotherhood slipped towards 
the side of the Free Officers in the course of two years, that when 
Nasser finally struck at the Brotherhood, no demonstration of public 
support in their favour took place in a marked departure from the 
experience through most of the 1940s and early 1950s (Bari, 
1995:48). 
Nasser's success in suppressing the Muslim Brothers without 
encountering any resistance from the Egyptian masses can be attributed to many 
factors. First of all, most of his aims were consistent with a broad national 
consensus. Indeed, Nasser was able to gain popular support because he embranced 
a policy that embodied two feelings that were widespread throughout Egypt. The 
first of these was a concern for the welfare of the peasant class from which most of 
the military officers had come. In conjunction with this, Nasser's plans for the 
improvement of social conditions in the countryside and his industrialization and 
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urbanization schemes bolstered his popularity among the masses (Hourani, 
1970:35813). For these people, positioned below the upper echelon and deprived 
by the corrupt landowning classes of participation in the social and political life of 
the time, Nasser was an inspired hero. 
In almost every walk of life he instigated a revolution: in land 
reform, in industrialization, and in the countryside expansion of social services. 
He had inaugurated the nationalization process in 1961; by 1964 almost all big 
companies of any kind had been nationalized. In agriculture, however, Nasser did 
not envisage public ownership of land, but rather an increase in the number of 
farmers and an extension of the cooperative system. By 1965, successive agrarian 
reform laws and other government measures had made some 1,250,000 acres 
(about twenty percent of the cultivable area in 1950) available for redistribution 
(Stphens, 1971:365ff). Thus, large sections of the rural population profited to 
some ext«it from the expansion of social services in the countryside. 
Nasser's energies were also visible in his poUcies on education. As 
new schools were built at the rate of one a day, the nimiber of children attending 
primary school increased from 1,300,000 in 1952 to 3,400,000 (1,300,000 of them 
girls) in 1966 (Stephens, 1971:375,377). The successful and rapid expansion of 
education must be cited as one of Nasser's most positive achievements. 
The second national longing which Nasser embodied lay in the field 
of foreign policy. Here he eloquently expressed the sentiments of the majority of 
Egyptians (and other Arabs as well) through his insistence on decolonization and 
neutrality. During the 1950s and 1960s Nasser was able to gain popular support 
due to his determined struggle against Egypt's historical masters. His stand. 
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against British and French coloniahsm (as seen in the Suez War of 1956 and the 
Algerian revolution) and his embrace of pan-Arabism were expressions of the 
demands of the rising intelligensia, the new "middle class", and the masses. Each 
had an interest in shaking off colonial control; all of them were seized by the spirit 
of Afro-Asian independence and wished to increase Egypt's strength in the world 
by heightening its influence in the Arab countries, where Britain in the Arab East 
and France in the Maghrib would be its chief rivals. 
Nasser's pan-Arabism was therefore dictated by the Egyptian raison 
d'etat, its vibrant energies were marshaled by a consideration of Egypt's strategic 
interests, and by the needs of the rising intellectual elites, including those of the 
Muslim Brothers who deepened Egypt's involvement in pan-Arab issues, 
particularly the Palestine question. In other words, Nasser created a broad national 
consensus in support of his economic and foreign policy by broadening the 
regime's social base domestically while capitalizing on his image as the 
preeminent leader of the larger Arab world in its common struggle for 
independence. Notwithstanding this broad Arab consensus, however, the defeat of 
the Muslim Brothers in the 1950s can also attributed to Nasser's total domination 
of the efficient apparatus of the state. Although the regime was drawn from or 
acted in the interests of the petite bourgeoise and the rural middle class, it prove 
fiilly capable of sidestepping their concerns when expedient by exerting state 
control in order to achieve its more immediate ends. Suppression of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is one prominent example of the regime's successfiil domination of 
the body politic. 
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With the newly found charisma, Nasser turned towards the 'reform' 
of reUgious estabhshments and to utiHze them to serve as the ideological-pohtical 
instrument of the state's regime to propagate and justify the latter's socio-
economic and religious poUcies. UnUke the past, now it was the modem Islam of 
the rulers that was to be propagated and enforced, not the mere traditional Islam of 
the Ulama. 
Thus, al-Azhar gained its importance especially after the clash with 
the Muslim Brethren in October 1954. In crushing the 1,700 cells which the 
Brethren claimed to have had in the Egyptian countryside, Nasser and his 
colleagues needed the blessings of the ulama and their cooperation both at the 
center of government and in helping to mobilize the local imams and kuttab 
(teachers) to the support of their regime. Indeed the 'Free Officers' soon learned, 
with the help of al-Azhar , to copy the techniques so successfully used by the 
Brethren, of having their Friday sermons preached in the village mosques 
throughout Egypt (Mayfield, 1971:53-54). 
The importance of the Azharite establishment was also demonstrated 
in the frequent visits of members of the Revolutionary Command Council, 
including NassCT, to the shaykhs of al-Azhar, and their not less frequent attendance 
at the al-Azhar Friday prayers (Crecellius, 1966:34). The result of this 
dependence was the delay in reforms aimed at curtailing the independent status of 
the ulama. A brief look at some of these reforms indicates that the gradual 
undermining of the ulama's independence started with the abolition of the family 
Waqfs, as early as 1952. But the next blow came only in January 1956, when the 
officers felt secure enough to abolish the shari'a courts, and in 1957 to nationalize 
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the waqf Khayri (public endowments), thus undermining the economic basis of 
the Islamic establishment, and hence curtailing its influence even further. The 
abolition of the shari'a courts was blessed by shaykh Abd al-Rahman Taj of al-
Azhar as a 'liberating step'. Even more humiliating, as far as the Islamic 
establishment was concerned, was the reform of al-Azhar itself in 1961, turning it 
into a government controlled university. This act, bitterly opposed by many of the 
helpless ulama, received the official blessings of Shaykh al-Azhar himself, 
Mahmud Shaltut, who denounced the opposition for using Islam as a profession 
while '...the new law includes a solution for every field....It wants Islam to be 
revived, ulama to be of strong faith, living for its sake and not by means of it...' 
(Quoted in Rejwan, 1974:38, 46-47). 
In placing al-Azhar under the overall supervision of the President's 
office, one of its prime roles was both enhanced and facilitated. It enforced al-
Azhar's role as a major channel of communication between Egypt and the Arab 
and Muslim world and as the leading Muslim interpreter of Nasser's revolution. 
While, through the close supervision of al-Azhar's affairs, the president's office 
could rely on the Azharite hierarchy to preach the gospel of Arabism and socialism 
as synonymous with the aims and principles of the Islamic revolution. 
Conservative Muslim scholars such as Muhammad al-Bahi, one time chancellor of 
al-Azhar, came out in support of Nasser's Arab Socialism stating that it was a 
reiteration of Islamic values. Others like Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, editor of 
Majallat al-Azhar, claimed that Nasser, like the Mahdi, had come to stamp out 
corruption and tyranny and to establish social justice based on Islam. Thus, it was 
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a clear indication that Nasser had succeeded in harnessing this important body of 
opinion in the service of his revolution (Vatikiotis, 1965:138-145). 
The growing subordination of the ulama was, in the first few years, 
entrusted to the Ministry of Waqfs under a leading Muslim Brother, Shaykh 
Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, who had jumped on the 'Free Officers' band wagon 
when the rupture with the Brethren occurred in 1953-1954. Later, while Nasser 
was still in power, even this symbolic political position was entrusted to a retired 
army officer. The ministry of Waqfs supervised most of the religious institutions, 
including all mosques, both public and private, which, since the waqfs were 
abolished, relied on the government for their upkeep. One might have assumed 
that under a regime which declared Arab socialism as its ideology, the mosques 
would at best have maintained their pre-revolutionary standing. Surprisingl>' 
enougji the number of mosques and their personnel increased considerably in the 
first ten years after the revolution. In the years 1954-1963 the total number of 
employees and officials in all government mosques, increased from 6,919 to 
12,357 (Berger, 1970:43-44 ; Borthwick, 1967:299-313). This is of special 
significance if one take into account that the biggest increase was in the number of 
imams (preachers) one of whose tasks was to spread the messianic gospel of 
Nasserism throughout Egypt. 
The military regime's political interference in Sufi orders began in 
1955 with the realization that the administrative organization of the Sufi orders 
could be used to combat the opposition of the Brotherhood as well as to strengthen 
and widen its own base of support by stimulating and favouring the adherents of 
conceptions of Islam that were rooted in and partly identical with some of the 
94 
central conceptions in popular Islam (Jong, 1983:196). Thus the Sufi orders 
known for their affiliation with members of the Brotherhood or the Royal Palace 
faced Nasser's wrath, while Sufi orders having a pro-regime outlook were 
promoted and benefited due to their proximity to the government authority. 
Muhammad Mahmud Ilwan, the head of al-Ilwaniyya al-khalwatiyy Sufi order and 
a close Mend of Abd al-Hakim Amir, and RCC member charged with the 
supervision and reform of Sufi orders, become the head of the Supreme Sufi 
Council (S.S.C.) in 1957. It was the highest body of all Sufi orders which 
regulated the activities of Sufi orders and its decisions were binding over them. 
Ilwan's becoming of head of S.S.C. marked the revival of organized Islamic 
mysticism in Egypt. This could be seen in the appearance of an official Sufi 
periodical, al Islam wal tasawwuf. an official recognition of several Sufi orders, an 
increase in their membership and an increase in the nimiber of mawalid (saint 
birthday) celebrations (Jong, 1983:196). The Guide to Sufism published in 1958 
by the S.S.C. thus hailed the 'blessed revolution' of 1952 as the greatest hope for 
the nation and claimed that Sufism continued to flourish in Egypt due to God's 
blessing and support and due to the encouragement and help of the Revolution and 
its great leader (Berger, 1970:70-71). 
In the wake of the regime's opposition, a clear indication of the total 
submissiveness of the Islamic hierarchy under Nasser, was their acquiescence with 
the 'National Charter' of 1962. While Islam, as in the 1956 constitution, 
continued to be decreed the religion of the state, its general treatment in the 
Charter was rather ambivalent. Thus, the Ottoman Caliphate was defined as 
'coloniaUst' and 'reactionary', clearly giving no compliment for the last universal 
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Muslim Empire. The humiliation of Islam was even further emphasized when, in 
the chapter dealing with foreign relations, Islam and the United Nations were 
treated as equals, once again hardly a compliment (Rejwan, 1974:35-37). 
National Charter probably was a turning point in the relationship between Nasser 
and the Islamic establishment. Indeed, the Syrian Muslim scholar, Salah al-Din al-
Munajjid in his book entitled The Socialist Deception, denounced the attempts 
made by Egyptian scholars and by the Islamic leadership to defend Arab Socialism 
and Nasser's National Charter as synonymous with orthodox Islam (Quoted in 
Rejwan, 1974:41). 
Thus Nasser's Egypt was definitely moving in an opposite direction. 
Indeed, two years after the National Charter was endorsed, the new provisional 
constitution of Egypt was promulgated in March 1964 and did not even contain a 
mention of the Shari'a (Altman, 1980:6). 
To such a degree, it would seem that the Islamic establishment, 
having already endorsed the regime's policies curtailing their own status, were in 
the 1960s giving Islamic sanction to the secularization of Egyptian society. Such 
Muslim leaders as Shaykh al-Azhar Mahmud Shaltut provided in effect the Islamic 
legitimization for every Nasserist policy. However, while it was easy enough to 
force the Cairo - centered religious leadership to coopCTate with the government, 
the same did not apply to the thousands of the rank and file urban and rural 
religious functionaries. These lived too close to the people and hence were not 
willing to change their traditional attitudes or belief system, which in many cases 
clashed with government policies. 
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In 1965, S.S.C. attacked the Muslim Brotherhood and accused it of a 
terrorist conspiracy against the regime. In fact, the S.S.C. under the leadership of 
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Ilwan, was increasingly used by the Arab Socialist Union(A.S.U) to distribute its 
ideological propaganda throughout Egypt. Since its inception in 1961, the A.S.U. 
was involved in organizing the mawalid, which were used for propaganda of the 
regime by means of pamphlets, banners, and public speeches (Jong, 1983:196). 
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Moreover, the staging of hadras in the mosques was made subject to permission 
from the Ministry of Awqaf (Jong, 1983:197). 
Nasser also clearly visualized the political role of Islam in Egypt's 
foreign policy. He stated as early 1954, 'as I stood before the Kaaba...I fully 
recognize the need for a radical change of our conception of the pilgrimate...the 
pilgrimage should have a potential political power' (Quoted in Dessouki, 
1983:86). He envisioned an 'Islamic Circle', which came third after Arab and 
Africa, to be composed of 'those hundreds of millions of Muslims, all wedded into 
a homogenous whole by the same faith and whose cooperatitm would ensure for 
them and their Brethren in Islam unlimited power. Thus as early as 1955, Nasser 
along with King Saud and Ghulam Muhammad, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
created an Islamic Congress with its headquarters at Cairo and whose 
objective according to Sadat (who served as the first Secretary General 
of the Ccaigress) was 'to work for closer links between Arab and Muslim countries 
as well as for certain foreign policy objectives of Egypt such as frustrating the 
40. For the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), See Baker, R.W. (1978) Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under 
Nasser and Sadat Cambridge ; Havaid Univ. Press 
41. Presence used broadly by mystics as synonym of being in the presence of Allah. Derwishes call their 
regular Friday service "hadra". 
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Baghdad Pact' (al-Sadat, 1978:136). Another Islamic body, created within the 
Ministry of Awqaf in I960, was Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs whose aim 
was to 'extend Islam's brilliant rays of light from the United Arab Republic to all 
quarters of the World, East and West equally, regardless of race and colour 
(Berger, 1970:48). The council published numerous books and pamphlets on 
Islamic themes and distributed them throughout the Muslim and Arab World. 
These and many other Islamic organizations were created with the aim of securing 
the support of the ulama to enhance the regime's legitimacy and to isolate the 
Muslim Brotherhood politically and to project Nasser's Egypt as 'the model of 
regenerated Islam and the harbinger of another Islamic Age' (Vatikiotis, 
1965:122,128). 
Al-Azhar's role in Egypt's foreign policy was clearly recognized by 
the Nasser regime, especially during the Arab Cold War of the sixties. Article 2 of 
a 1961 law stated 'Al-Azhar carries the burden of Islamic mission to all nation' 
(Dessouki, 1983:87). In March 1964 Al-Azhar sponsored the first Afro-Asian 
Islamic Conference which was attended by 44 countries. It discussed the religious 
aspects of the struggle against imperialism (Warburg, 1985:206). The budget for 
scholarships to foreign students to enable them to attend al-Azhar increased from 
15,000 to 375,000 in 1963, and in 1964, al-Azhar had more than 200 ulama all 
over the world (Dessouki, 1983:88). Al-Azhar also established a daily 13-hour 
radio programme, 'The voice of Islam', for reciting the verses from the Qur'an. A 
42. Baghdad Pact was mutual-security pact between Iraq and Turkey signed in February 1955. The alliance 
created by the pact was joined by the United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan later that year, creating the 
Nfiddle East Treaty Organization, which later became the Central Treaty Organization 
fhttp.//encarta.com/find/Concise.asp?z=2&ti=761586829) 
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year later the programme was expanded throughout Africa and included broadcasts 
in many indigenous languages. Islamic cultural centres sponsored by Egypt were 
established in many of the African Muslim countries. 
The heightened Islamic political propaganda in the early 60s on the 
part of Nasser should also be seen in the context of the Yemen Civil War (1964-
65) where the Nasserite forces were waging war against the Saudi-backed Yemini 
monarchy. Islam during the phase of the Arab cold war was identified with anti-
imperialism and served as a political instrument in Nasser's struggle for hegemony 
and leadership in the Muslim Arab countries. 
At the political plane to bridge the widening gap between the regime 
and Islamic activists, Nasser attempted to reconcile with the Islamists. Thus in 
September, 1956 the Egyptian goveniment attempted to make negotiations with 
the Muslim Brotherhood who were in the prison with a view to change their mind 
and turn them to support the government. They were also persuaded to keep the 
Brotherhood as a pure religious organization and permanently disbanded their 
secret military organ. But the attempt of the government appeared to be fruitless 
since the prominent leaders of Uie Muslim Brothers had never ignored its 
ambitions. Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd al-Ra'uf, one of Nasser's close associates, 
who had escaped the execution in 1954, became an important opponent of the 
43 
Egyptian government. Since 1959 there was an attempt to regroup the movement 
once again. 
In 1960 some of the Muslim Brothers' prisoners were released. 
43. Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd al-Ra'uf, one of Nasser's early associate, had disappeared and become a 
dangerous opponent. He was well-versed in terrorist tactics, there was also an active group of Brothers 
in Damascus under the leadership of the Association's General Secretary, 'Abd al-Hakim 'Abidin. 
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They had completed five-year of imprisonment and were called the 'group of 
five'. In 1961 and 1963 more members of the Brothers were again released by the 
amnesty issued before the general election. However, among these Brothers the 
idea of terrorist action began to form once again. Matters came to a head whi^ the 
three important motivators of the Muslim Brothers, Sayyid Qutb, Isma'il al-Sharif, 
and Said Ramadan, were released in 1964. 
Immediately after their release the three of them moved to Jordan and 
met at the headquarters of the Islamic Conference in Jerusalem. At that time 
Sa'id Ramadan acted as the Chairman of the Executive Bureau of the Conference 
and Isma'il al-Sharif was its Secretary. There they started plotting together. 
When Sayyid Qutb returned to Egypt, the other two were still in Jerusalem, and 
secret contacts took place between them in two ways by letters with implicit codes 
and through messengers that traveled between Cairo and Jerusalem. The two 
brothers, Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Qutb hence emerged as the new leaders of 
the Muslim Brothers tarorist wing (Arab Observe, December 1965:8-9). They 
contacted with the leaders of the erstwhile Baghdad Pact and were patronized by it 
for the necessary funds: Sa'id Ramadan granted an aid to Qutb worth about 4,000 
pounds (Arab Observe, September 1965:10). These funds were given to the 
Muslim Brothers in Egypt for the expenses for their secret activities, among them 
were the plan of carrying out sabotage actions upon the general public 
organization and some government headquarters, the plan to urge the people to 
take part in Coup to change the government and the plan of assassination of Nasser 
(Arab Observer. December 1965:9). 
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For the last mentioned plan, a plot was broadly laid out by Qutb, to 
explode the train which would carry Nasser from Cairo to Alexandria to deliver 
his speech on the Revolution Day. Qutb took active steps to materialize the plan 
(an underground organization was formed by him). He himself was expecting to 
do the work, along with his two assistants, Muhammad Fuad Ibrahim and Ahmad 
Hasan Abul Ela. The plan however failed and the 96 detonators found in Qutb's 
possession. Thus he was charged to be one among the three main persons 
responsible for this terrible plot. Besides, thousands were arrested and twenty six 
were reportedly tortured to death. They were accused of planning to assassinate 
the President and sabotage all the government installations (Joesten, 1960:78). 
The bill of indictment was issued against them on the basis that: 
They have all taken part in an intended crime to alter the state 
constitution and the system of government through the use of force, 
which is the crime stipulated in article 87 of the Penal Code.... This 
they have sought to do by forming underground organizations, 
assassinating the President of the UJLR. and instigating rebellion.... 
(Arab Observer. No.287 December, 1965:9). 
After the purgings, many conferences were held by the Arab Socialist 
Union (A.S.U.) in many parts of Egypt to explain matters concerning the Muslim 
Brothers. The conferences tried to blame the Muslim Brothers as a political party 
under the guise of religion, which acted in every way against Islamic teachings. 
Shaykh Hasan Mam'un, the Great Imam of al-Azhar, also issued a statement 
explaining the negative view of Islam taken by the Muslim Brothers. In brief, he 
said that Islam was against such kind of violence and vengeance (Arab Observe, 
No.275 September 1965:11). 
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However, the execution of the Brothers caused many protest 
demonstrations in several countries such as Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. All this might be an evidence that the dissolution of 
the Muslim Brothers in Egypt did not, in fact, decrease its activities in other 
countries in the Arab World; there were, besides, other active bodies throughout 
the MusUm World who were sympathetic to the unfortunate fate of the Egyptian 
Brotherhood (Husayni, 1956:151). 
In fact, the Free Officers appeared to produce a sense of an Egyptian 
history that was made by Egypt, not by others, and that referred forward to a series 
of inevitable nationalist victories over colonialism and a reordering of the entire 
political map of the West Asia, not back to the time of an 'original' Islamic state. 
This ideological control exerted during the Nasser years depended for 
its efficacy not only on the state but on the conviction of the mass of the people 
that history was being autonomously realized by Egyptians (for the first time for 
many centuries), that the ruler did incarnate a capacity to resist external and 
internal forces identified with oppression and exploitation, and that the gain 
embodied in Egypt's new position in the world was worth the price paid. 
That price included the failure - or, as some would say, the refiisal -
to develop any genuine political party or movement from the base or to attempt 
seriously to politicize the Egyptian masses. It seems that in practice the state was, 
tiierefore, always seen as a separate entity acting on society from above, despite 
the identification of the person of the leader as an overarching symbol of the unity 
of society. Furthermore, a bureaucratic - managerial class control of major sectors 
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of the economy and the emergence of army officers as an elite and privileged 
stratum were very tangible evidence of a new kind of hierarchy in Egypt. 
The socialist measures introduced by Nasser - particularly in land 
reform - contributed to a substantial reduction in the profound socio-economic 
inequalities in Egypt. However, the unpopular by-products of socialist 
transformation were a massive growth in public bureaucracy, tight controls on 
political participation, and the suppression of political opposition. In addition, 
Nasser's heavy commitment to foreign policy issues placed a substantial burden 
on Egypt's Limited resources, hi spite of these limitations, however, Nasser's 
regime continued to enjoy the unqualified support of the masses (Ismail & Ismail, 
1985:105-106). 
After June 1967, largely as a result of Egypt's catastrophic defeat in 
the Six-day War against Israel, Nasser's 'messianic' aura, or the remnants of it, 
was even further tarnished. His evacuation of Yemen, where Egypt had for five 
years fought a losing and expensive battle without any benefits and with much 
bloodshed, in a way symbolized Nasser's end as the first and most dominant Arab-
Muslim leader and ideologue of the twentieth century. Hence, the first Islamic 
Summit Conference, in September 1969, was convened in Rabat and not in Cairo, 
and its headquarters were in Jedda, under the auspices of the hated 'reactionary' 
Saudis. Nasser opposed the convening of such a conference in 1966, labelling it 
an 'impo-ialist plot'. But in 1969 Nasser was no longer in a position to call the 
tune. The Islamic Summit's advocating the return to the pure values of Islam, as 
the only way of saving the Arabs from further humiliation, clearly implied a 
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condemnation and a challenge to Nasser's Arabism and Socialism (Warburg, 
1983:141). 
Indeed, Arab socialism under Nasser appeared as a new working 
ideology which could supersede tradition and push the Egyptian people forward to 
social progress and economic growth. But, the failure of the regime were too 
many to be simply by-passed: at home agrarian reforms, massive investments, the 
nationalization programme and the development of education and health services 
all contributed to a more equitable distribution of national wealth. Yet, poverty 
did not disappear, demographic problems became more pressing than ever, 
bureaucracy inhibited efficiency, corruption among the ruling elite (though not of 
Nasser personally) grew evident, and the oppressive nature of the poUce state 
consumed most of the thin air that had originally been left for the intellectual to 
breathe. Internationally, Nasser incited many Arabs against him, was at odds with 
the superpowers and with other European nations, was twice bitterly defeated in 
war and ultimately failed in his pan-Arab programme. 
When the pendulum swung back, some people wandering that what 
had happened to many years of revolution in Egypt. Islam had indeed turned out 
to be a much stronger force in domestic policies than many would have admitted 
two decades before; the national essence, local tradition and the religious 
commitment of the populace indeed survived ideological cosmetics thrust upon 
them. This was precisely the predicament that Sadat and his successor had to face 
and contend with. 
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Chapter Four 
Sadat and Contemporary Islamic Activism 
After Nasser's death in September 1970, Anwar al-Sadat was officially 
appointed president on 15 October 1970. As Sadat moved to consolidate his 
power, he was severely burdened by two handicaps. Not only did he come to 
power with an unheroic reputation, but he was also to take charge of a stalled 
revolution. However, the initial though short-lived smoothness of Sadat's 
assumption of power had been possible because key personalities such as Ali 
Sabri, former vice president and vice-premier of Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), 
regarded him as the man least likely to disturb their privileged positions. 
Furthermore, as a veteran Free Officer placed by Nasser in the formal, 
constitutional position to succeed him, he would be an effective symbol of 
continuity, Sadat's public demeanor at first had reinforced the impression that he 
would be an unthreatening successor to Nasser. Gradually the self-effacing Sadat 
began to signal strength and self-confidence by acting independently on key 
issues. He took new initiatives aimed at improving domestic economic condition 
and relations with the United States in order to bring American pressure to bear on 
Israel; and he gave the fiiU weight of his support to the Arab Federation with Syria 
and Libya. 
It was the issue of federation with Syria and Libya that the 
conspirators used as a pretext for their confrontation with Sadat. The major 
figures who coalesced in opposition to Sadat were Ali Sabri; Sami Shaiaf, 
Nasser's primary aide; Muhammad Fayek, minister of information; Muhsin Abul 
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Nur, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union; Labib 
Shukair, speaker of the National Assembly; General Muhammad Fawzi, minister 
of defense; and Sharawi Gomaa, minister of the interior. A first showdown came 
in the spring of 1971, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the A.S.U. 
Sadat found his federation proposal sharply attacked by Sabri, Abul Nur, Shukair, 
and Comma. There he was able to prevail only by referring the matter to the party 
central committee. 
In retrospect it was puzzling that, having fiilly alerted Sadat to their 
opposition, the conspirators failed to move against him immediately. Sadat seized 
the initiative. In his May Day speech the president openly and threateningly spoke 
of individuals and groups: 
Concealing themselves behind slogans and maneuvers in order to 
establish centers of power so as to impose their control over the 
people after the people acting with Gamal Abdel Nasser had 
overthrown all the centers of power in order that thepeopie 
themselves might remain the sole masters of their dratiny (Quoted in 
Baker, 1978:125). 
Responding to the scarcely veiled warning in the speech, Sabri and 
the others resigned en masse, most likely intending thereby to embarrass Sadat. 
Efforts were also made to organize mass demonstrations drawn from the A.S.U. 
and the police apparatus. But there was no strong unity among the powerful men 
who opposed Sadat. Entrenched in their respective centers of power, they were 
highly suspicious of one another and found it impossible to act together effectively 
to defeat the president. Sadat moved rapidly. On May 14*^  the entire group of 
conspirators was arrested. Their trial ended in December 1971 with ninety-one 
former officials and leaders were sentenced (Waterbury, 1973:2). Moreover, 
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Nasserites and other leftist elements (particularly those known to be sympathetic 
to Ali Sabri), within the government, the Arab Socialist Union and the official 
press, were demoted or removed from their posts. 
After ridding himself of Ali Sabri and his allies, Sadat conducted his 
presidency without the constraints that Nasser had faced. Furthermore, in order to 
destroy the myth of Egypt's cowardice and Israel's invincibility, Sadat launched 
his October 6, 1973 attack against Israel. The action started in the Sinai desert, the 
part of Egj^t overrun and occupied by Israel in the June 1967 War. The Egyptian 
forces were successfiil in pushing back the Israeli, and in destroying many tanks 
and planes. After sixteen days, the United State provided Israel with sophisticated 
new weapons for use against Egyptian missile launchers. Henry Kissinger, the 
Secretary of State, finally proposed a cease-fire. Sadat replied to Kissinger: 
Well, just as we embarked on a peace process, let us have a forces 
disengagement which woirid peacefully put an end to this counter-
attack. You know I am a man of peace. If you liad accepted the 
1971 initiative, no war would have broken out at aU. I care very 
much for human life, and am loathe to losing one soldier. But you 
did not take me seriously and this is the outcome. But I wanted my 
victory to be maintained because I regarded it as an avenue to the 
peace for which I bad worked unceasingly (Quoted in 
www.mincava.umn.edu/DaDers/Book/Anwar S.asp). 
Thus Arab nationalist challenges to Western interest and to Israel of Nasser were 
displaced by a stress on cooperation with the Western powers and on regional 
peace. Sadat insisted the attempts of the Arab rulers to ostracize Egypt were 
doomed because the Arab leaders had no practical alternative to Egypt's course 
and Egypt remain the heart of the Arab world. Egypt's role under Sadat was now 
to lead the Arabs to peace. 
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However, the October War healed the deep sense of humiliation felt 
by the Egyptian people and won Sadat tremendous popularity, enabling him to 
initiate major shifts of direction both domestically and on the regional and 
international fronts. 
Fresh from a good military performance, Sadat also accumulated 
enough pohtical legitimacy and acceptance to begin a programme of economic 
reforms. He pioneered this ideological transformation in the 'October Working 
Paper' of 1974, which he presented as his first programmatic statement. In this 
Paper, Sadat voiced his intention to build on Nasser's legacy in meeting the 
demands of the seventies: 'When we speak of new responsibilities in our lives 
after October, we should record that we are not starting from a void. We have a 
rich experience behind us': And the essential components of Nasser's vision were 
reaffirmed in the October Paper: the commitment to build a strong Egypt, the 
continuing task of confronting Israel, the call for Arab unity with Egypt as 'the 
heart of the Arab nation', and the insistence that Egypt play an important world 
role (UAR Ministry of Information. 1974:27). 
Sadat, in buildiag on the strength brougjit by the October War, 
promised to bring a new moderation to Egypt affairs. 'The burden of progress and 
construction', Sadat explained in the October Paper, 'must fall principally on the 
shoulders of the Egyptian people'. Yet, he realistically continued, 'we still have a 
great need for foreign resources'. Egypt's changed global and regional situation, 
Sadat added, 'would make it possible to obtain these resources in a way to 
strengthen our economy and speed up development. Hence the call for an 
outward-looking economic pohcy' (UAR Ministry of information. 1974:61). 
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Sadat's much trumpeted program of Economic Opening was to provide the 
foundations for Egypt's new progress. In the wake of October Paper the 
moderation of Sadat's strategy was to be the moderation of hope and not of despair. 
The basic formula was impressive in its simplicity: Arab (as well as 
Western) capital would be wed to Western technology and lured to an emerging 
market economy in Egypt. That formula contained great promise: an mflow of 
foreign capital, improved access to advanced technology, a role for indigenous 
capital in an expanded private sector, and vast new employment possibilities for 
Egyptian labor. The implications of the 'opening' strategy for Egypt and its place 
in the world were far-reaching, hi fact, Nasser had prepared the way. The origins 
of the policy can be traced to Nasser's economic retrenchment of the mid-sixties 
and his post-1967 moves (especially the acceptance of the Rogers Plan) to draw 
the United States back into the West Asian area. Sadat carried the logic of 
Nasser's strategy further when in 1971 he inaugurated discussion of an expanded 
liberalization of the Egyptian economy, which would eventually reintegrate Egypt 
into the Western world market. 
The private sector's sphere of legitimate activities was greatly 
expanded by Sadat. In April 1975, law 111 abolished the General Organizations, 
and replaced them with weaker 'Sectoral Supreme Councils'. In addition, publicly 
- owned industries were allowed to issue new stocks to provide buyers under law 
262. Law 111 gave worker's representatives in matters concerning partial 
privatization of public industries by making them members of the supreme sectoral 
councils. Sadat's policies gave the private sector tiie right to gradually expand its 
economic sphere. (Waterbury, 1978:297-299). 
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Thus the means of production were increasingly privatized and 
externalized, hence possibilities for generating and distributing patronage outside 
the arnbit of presidential authority were multiplied. The tremendous upsurge in 
foreign investment and aid provided innumerable opportunities for comprador 
activities, some of which could be undertaken in conjunction with President Sadat 
and/or his clients, but others of which were up for grabs. The real political impact 
of Infitah (Economic liberalization or open door policy), which paid lip service to 
political liberties, was in fact to generate the capital base upon which independent 
political initiatives (usually by wealthy managers, entrepreneurs, and 
professionals, but also by the more humble) could be contemplated and carried 
through. A paternalistic network of patronage and control was elected alongside 
the state bureaucracy, much in the way Khedive Ismail, the most profligate of 
Egypt's nineteenth century rulers had done (Springborg, 1989:74-78). 
In an attempt to continue strengthening the legitimacy of his regime, 
Sadat introduced and enacted several political reforms that had particular effect in 
regards to the common man's role in government. The Arab Socialist Union, the 
sole political party developed under the Nasser regime, controlled Egypt's political 
landscape, but was often charged with being the party of the elite and privileged. 
In an attempt to assuage popular pressure, in 1974 Sadat call for the reform of the 
union and the Egyptian political system. These reforms were geared to address 
various social forces in society as well as expanding the forum to new political 
parties (vyww.inidcastinfo.com/paper4.htm). In 1975 Sadat permitted the 
establishment of three groupings in {he Arab Socialist Union to express the 
opinions of the left, the right, and the center of the regime. By 1976 the three 
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platforms were permitted, within established guideline, to act as separate political 
entities, but each group needed to elect a minimum of twelve deputies to the 
people's Assembly to be recognized. The leftist group was originally known as 
the National Progressive Unionist Organization (NPUO) led by Khalid Muhi ad 
Din, a Free Officer and a Marxist. The right wing group was the Socialist Liberal 
Organization (SLO - later the Liberal or Ahrar Party) led by Mustafa Kamil 
Mural. The center group was known as the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization. 
The country's main political forces, the Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Nasserites, and the communists, however were not allowed to represent 
(www.memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:(g).field(DOCirH-cg0052). 
In the October 1976 election, not unexpectedly, the pro-government 
center platform of the Arab Socialist Union won an overwhelming majority, 280 
seats; the SLP won 12 and NPUO only 2. Independent candidates however could 
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secure forty-eight seats in all. When he opened the new assembly Sadat 
announced that the platforms would become political parties. Thus Sadat 
announced that he would establish his own party, the National Democratic Party 
(NDP), signaling the end of the Arab Socialist Union, which was emerged with the 
NDP. 
The conception of the proper nature of Egyptian society faced a 
considerable change under Sadat. Socialism was denounced as a vehicle of envy 
and extremism; instead, Sadat promoted a traditional conception to which society 
was seen as an extension of patriarchal family and characterized by harmony 
44. On September 11, 1971, a new constitution was presented by Sadat and approved by the electorate. This 
constitution provides that the National Assembly is to replace by the People's Assembly. 
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among classes and belief in religion. He promoted himself as the 'believing 
president' and was constantly seen at prayer, seeking wide media-coverage while 
performing 'namaz' often finishing speeches with a Qur'anic quotation, naming 
the October war as 'the battle of Badr', declaring himself to be the 'Muslim 
President of an Islamic State' and justifying his actions and his duty as a Muslim 
leader. The use of religious symbols was aimed at the creation of his own 
'separate identity' and to enhance his political legitimacy in the country. Thus, 
Islam was given a more prominent role to play during Sadat's regime what he 
called the 'State of Science and faith'. Sadat relaxed state control over the 
activities of organizations which were allowed to operate more freely than was the 
case during Nasser's era. The enhanced role of religion could be seen from the 
position accorded to Islam in the new constitution. While the Constitution of 1954 
and the National Charter of 1962 could not go beyond the recognition of Islam as 
the state source of legislation (Art.2) which was further amended and underlined 
as 'the major source' when Art.2 was amended in 1980. Also Art. 19 prescribed 
religious instruction in schools. 
Since al-Azhar was the most unportant institution connected with the 
rehgious life of Muslims in Egypt, Sadat appeared to have given considerable 
thought to using this institution, togetiier with the Sufi orders of the country, as an 
instrument to promote his religious pohcy, about which he always appeared to 
have held, even though vaguely, that it should emerge from Egypt's popular social 
and cultural Fabrics. Sadat appointed Shaykh Abdel Halim Mahmoud, a Sufi 
45. For the details of these and other related articles of the 1980 constitution, See Appendix pp. 186-194 
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theologian of considerable prestige in both Sufi circles and among theologians, 
Rector of al-Azhar (Shaykh al-Azhar). Shaykh Abdel Halim enjoyed popular 
support in rural areas also, on account of his subaltern Sufi connections. Under 
Shaykh Abdel Halim not only was the domain of administrative power of Shaykh 
al-Azhar expanded through new legislation - apparently in response to Shaykh 
Abdel Halim's efforts to check government interference in the affairs of al-Azhar 
- but a large number of new Azharite institutions of all levels were established in 
the provinces, and al-Azhar was asked to participate in the formulation of religious 
courses for Egyptian universities. In the wake of the discovery of the Takfir 
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group in July 1977, when some quarters blamed the lack of religious education in 
Egypt for the rise of such deviant religious ideologies as represented by this group, 
the government was quick to ask al-Azhar to provide the lead. Prime 
Minister Mamdouh Salem - rather thoughtlessly - called for what he described as 
the role of al-Azhar to 'do away with unbeUef and imported thought'. He further 
broadened this role by asking the Azharites 'to fhistrate the attempts of ideological 
onslaught of Egypt and the Islamic world' (Bari, 1995:83). 
The appointment of Shaykh Mahmoud, however, was not just a 
coincidence but a well calculated move on Sadat's part to secure the political and 
ideological support of the Saudi regime and the Islamic establishment to his open 
door economic policy. It was then claimed that the Egyptian ulama were again 
46. Jamaat al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah (the group that charges society with unbelief and advocates withdrawal 
from it). This group started in the early 1970s and in July 1977 the government charged it with the 
kidnapping of Shaykh Husayn al-Dhahabi (former Minister of Waqf) who was later fond dead. The 
group's confrontation with the government forces led to the killing of a number of security officers and 
more than 400 arrests of men and women belonging to the organization were made Some were charged 
with the kidnapping and executed on 19 March 1976 while others were given long prison sentences 
(Hussain, 1983:14). 
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endeavouring to take a more active role in keeping the country on the 'right path'. 
In fact, there was tremendous growth in the activities of 'official 
Islam' during Sadat era. A new campus of Al-Azhar University was buih in 
Nasser City whose budget, it is claimed, was underwritten by the Saudi 
Government (Contori, 1982:82). The state supported mosques more than doubled 
their number of religious education institutions and their student intake more than 
tripled. Publications issued by Al-Azhar, and the Supreme Council of Islamic 
Affairs (SCIA), which affirmed the officially approved version of Islam also 
increased four-fold. The number of radio and television hours of religious 
programmes quadrupled during this period (Ibrahim, 1988:637). This increase in 
the role of Al-Azhar and other Islamic institutions of 'official Islam' was aimed 
initially at curtailing the power and influence of Nasserists and communist 
opposition to the regime. 
Moreover, Sadat decided to free the Muslim Brothers as part of a 
plan to utilize Islam for legitimizing his campaign of 'de-Nasserization (Munson, 
1988:78). In fact Sadat had purged major pro-Nasser power blocks from the 
government sector, but Nasserists and Marxists however continued to oppose 
Sadat's policies. As a result, Sadat thought that by encouraging the Brotherhood 
would be an effective way to offset his leftist opposition. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, on the other hand, witii their bitter memories of Nasser and his 
clique were ideal partners in Sadat's search for mass support in universities, 
industry and the over-populated urban areas. The process of releasing the Muslim 
Brothers said to have been completed by March 1975. Each released batch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood was given wide media publicity including their torture in the 
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jail in order to project the brutal and negative face of Nasserite state (Bari, 
47 
1995:71). With the political support of Sadat's regime and the financial backing 
48 
of the Saudi government, the Brotherhood under the charismatic Supreme Guide, 
Omar Telmisani, soon re-emerged as a powerful political force in the mid 1970s. 
Sadat allowed the pro-Brotherhood students to group under the vague banner of 
Jama'at al al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Association) which swept the student's union 
election in most of the Egyptian Universities in 1977 and 1978. An important 
reason for the victory of Jamaa'at was the suppression of communists, Marxists 
and Nasserists on the campus (Waterbury, 1983:217). Sadat also allowed 
comparative freedom of action to the Muslim Brotherhood. Although, they were 
not allowed to become a legal organization, but they were allowed to operate 
openly and to pubhsh their magazine, Al-Awd (The Return) as long as they did not 
criticize the regime too sharply. 
In return for these political favours, the Brotherhood initially 
cooperated with the government. Not only did the Brotherhood oppose the anti-
regime violence of the militant Islamic groups but also provided Islamic 
47. The repressive side of Nasser's regime has now been acknowledged by even so loyal a Nasserite as 
M.H.Haikal, the journalist who was Nasser's closet confidant. Over the years reported on the brutality of 
Egypt's police and military intelligence networks had come from their victims in a steady stream. 
Outside observers, notably Amnesty International, called the world's attention to the fact that under 
Nasser 'the maltreatment and torture of political prisoners was said to have been almost a matter of 
routine'. Especially after the revolution began to lose momentum in the sixties, the numbers of political 
prisoners and detainees mounted sharply, with estimates ranging as high as twenty thousand. Political 
opponents received harsh treatment in Nasser's Egypt: a number of leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood 
were hanged, and communist militants beaten and tortured to death. After Nasser's death the veils were 
partially lifted: Nasser's Egypt, while far from a totalitarian state, was revealed as a repressive, 
authoritarian country (Baker, 1970:151). 
48. Following Nasser's crackdown on the organization in 1950s and 1960s the regime in Riyadh had 
provided refijge and financial assistance to them. Daniel Pipes has claimed that the Saudi gave Muslim 
Brothers $100,000 in early 1979, ostensibly for building mosques (Pipes, 1982:48). 
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justification for the regime's denudation of pan-Arabism and socialism. The 
Brotherhood claimed that history textbooks taught in Egyptian, Syrian and other 
49 
Arab schools were in fact a war against Islam. 
Apart from using religious symbolism, Sadat also sought to root 
legitimacy on constitutionalism and democracy. 'Egypt had moved', as Sadat 
declared, 'to a state of laws and institutions rather than to one of the people'. With 
this objective, Sadat launched his new programme with what he described as the 
'15 May Corrective Operation'. In a televised address to the nation, he stressed 
the need to draft the permanent constitution of the Republic, and invited public 
debate on the matter. Making his own suggestions, which he claimed he was 
doing as an ordinary citizen, he wanted the constitution to stipulate what he 
described as 'the dependable bond between collective freedom and poUtical 
freedom'. Apparently with a view to satisfy his still existing socialist support 
base, particularly inside the establishment, he emphasized that the new constitution 
should make 'the socialist legitimacy the basis of all relationship in society', and 
called for the protection of public and cooperative sectors. The foundation of the 
constitution, however, had to be the Egyptian ethos and tradition. He said: 'we 
should turn to the village which is our root', ... 'We have our tradition built up 
over thousand of years, and we have first and foremost our mission of faith' 
(Quoted in Ban, 1995:80-81). 
The ensuing public debate over the proposed constitution eventually 
turned into a debate on the place of religion in Egyptian polity. The Rector of al-
49. Arabism had replaced Mam in these textbooks, while the pre-lslamic jahihyya was being extolled 
because of its Arabism, despite its barbaric and anti-Muslim nature (Sivan, 1979:39-40) 
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Azhar, speaking on behalf of all the ulama and personnel of the institute demanded 
a clear statement in the constitution to the effect that Islam was the state religion. 
This demand was reiterated by many others, not necessarily Muslim leaders, and 
even received the fiill backing of the Coptic clergy. Indeed, of the nearly 7,000 
proposals from the public regarding the new constitution, which poured into the 
headquarters of the preparatory committee, a substantial portion dealt with Islam 
in the new constitution. Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, the ideologue of the 
Brotherhood and the then Director General of Islamic preaching (da'wa) in the 
Ministry of Awqaf, favoured complete Islamisation of the constitution. Some 
others favoured a modem secular constitution and suggested the application of 
modem method of research and criticism to the sources of Islamic jurispnidence 
(Figh) (O'Kane, 1972:137-148). 
In the final outcome, however, the new constitution adopted Islam as 
religion of the state. Parti, Article! of the new constitution read: ...Islam is the 
religion of the state, Arabic is its official language and the principles of ttie Islamic 
Shari'a are a major source of legislation. This was not the end of the controversy. 
Firstly, because the principles of the Shari'a rather than the Shari'a itself were 
stated to be a source of legislation and not the major source. Lastly, by stating in 
Articles that the people were the sole source of authority, the constitution in fact 
left ample scope for secular legislation. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the 
battle for the application of the Shari'a (tatbiq al-Shari'a) continued throughout the 
1970s with the Islamists in the lead. 
The MusUm Brethren though mildiVtheir approach towards the 
government continued to put pressures on the govemment in order to achieve more 
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prominence for Islamic principles both in the constitution and the legislative 
process. In line with Saudi Arabian practices, the Brethren demanded the 
implementation of the penalties (hudud), prescribed by Islamic law (Shari'a), for 
offenses such as assault, theft, consumption of alcoholic beverages, adultery, 
slander and apostasy. They believed that a prompt and strict implementation of 
these penalties on all Egyptians, regardless of religion, would have an immediate 
positive impact and would reverse the social and moral degradation from which 
Egypt had been suffering as a result of the Western-Christian invasion. As early 
as June 1977 al-Da'wa called upon Sadat to adopt an Islamic order, in order to 
combat communist-leftist atheism (Altman, 1979:87-94). Indeed, from the time of 
their reappearance in 1976, al-Da'wa and al-I'tisam the two major publication of 
Brotherhood openly stated their criticism of all the government's shortcomings. 
Despite the considerable tension between the Islamic establishment 
and the regime over the issue of implementation of the Shari'a, Sadat continued to 
use Islamic symbolism. In the realm of foreign policy, Islam served as a ready 
made instrument to justify Egypt's alignment with the U.S.A. and the conservative 
Muslim States (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco etc.) against the then 
communist Russia. Sadat employed Islam against the Soviet backed Ethiopians, 
denouncing their fighting the Erifrea and the Ogaden desert and propagated the 
50. Al-Da'wa under its editor Umar al-Tilmisani, was allowed to renew publication in June 1976 after 22 
years of suppression. It became an unofficial propagator of the Brethren's views and challenged many 
of the regime's internal and external policies. It would therefore seem to be justified to rely primarily on 
al-Da'wa in attempting to assess the political and ideological orientations of the Muslim Brethren as they 
emerged throughout the 1970s. 
51. Although al-I'tisam was officially published by the Shari'a Society (rather than the Muslim 
Brotherhood) and was initially concerned with theological matters, it gradually adopted a more political 
stance - mirrormg al-Da'wa's position and using many of the same writers (Ibrahim, 1982:181). 
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Afghanistan crisis as an 'Islamic-Soviet conflict' (Waterbury, 1985:209; 
Dessouki, 1983:91). He said that 'Egypt would play a focal role by providing the 
U.S. with military facilities to defend all Arab and Islamic states as far as 
Indonesia from the communist threat of the Soviet Union' (Alam, 1998:98). 
In fact, Sadat's long distrustful of the Soviet Union and faced with an 
ailing economy and an inconclusive struggle with Israel, sought relief through a 
realignment of his country's foreign policy, away from Nasser's emphasis on anti-
imperialism and Arab nationalism and towards the United States in Particular. 
Egypt's close ties with the Soviet Union were reduced in order to accommodate 
the establishment of close ties with the West, (particularly the United States). 
Furthermore, Egypt abandoned its commitment to unified Arab struggle against 
Israel and sought instead a separate peace under the auspices of the United States. 
The first stage of this - Egypt's move away from the Soviet Union 
was welcomed by Islamic movements, who opposed friendly relations with the 
USSR on religious grounds. Sadat's 'peace initiative' - beginning with his 1977 
trip to Jerusalem and culminating in the 1979 Camp David agreements - however 
met with sfrong disapproval by Islamic movements (and much of the Arab world) 
which left the holy city of Jerusalem unliberated and in their views benefited only 
to Zionist Israel. This view gained even more currency after 1979, when it became 
apparent that Israel was unwilling to return occupied territories other than the 
Smai. Sadat's willingness to perform the role of staunch US ally in the region - a 
willingness demonsfrated by military aid and co-operation - fiirther aggravated 
dissatisfaction with the direction of Egypt's foreign policy (Ismael & Ismael, 
1985:109). 
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The Peace Treaty with Israel ended the Brotherhood's voluntary 
cooperation with the government. Disenchanted with the government's non-
implementation of Shari'a, but more specifically, the government's refusal to 
allow them to form a political party, the Brotherhood came into increasingly open 
confrontation with Sadat regime in the pose-Camp David period. •'Omar al-
Telmisani, the Supreme Guide and editor of al-Da'wa denounced the agreement as 
it did not explicitly compel Israel to withdraw from Jerusalem as according to 
Islamic law, *it is a sin to leave any Muslim land in the hands of usurpers' 
(Waterbury, 1983:221). Al-Da'wa. openly accused Sadat of collaborating with the 
United States and Israel against all Muslim movements including first and 
foremost the Brotherhood itself, and alleged that Sadat had decided to implement a 
secret report, prepared by Dr. Richard Mitchell of C.I.A., which aimed at 
liquidation of leaders of the Muslim movement. The government vehemently 
denied the allegation, ordered the closure of al-Da'wa and accused the Muslim 
Brotherhood of creating 'a state within a state' (Kepel, 1985:118). 
Even the docile Azharite establishment also tried to assert its 
independence and criticized some of the policies of Sadat's regime in the 
aftermath of Camp David Treaty. It is important to note that the Fatwa ratifying 
the Camp David Treaty was issued eighteen months after the conclusion of the 
treaty. It was at the same time that the Shaykh Al-Azhar, Abdel Hamid Mahmud, 
vehemently opposed the government's measures relating to family planning and 
amendments in Muslim personal law. He also indirectly indicted the government 
for its failure to implement the Shari'a. 
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On the domestic front criticism was growing against the failure of 
Sadat's open door economic policy. His failing, however, was that he was 
indiscreet not only in his style of functioning but also in policy content. To the 
critics of the policy the infitah represented a liberalization that was speculative, 
mercantile open door policy rather than being production oriented. The major 
beneficiaries of this policy were those who imported foreign goods and acted as 
middlemen between foreign firms and govenmient; many had direct links to public 
sector officials and political elite. They also profited from "feeding the seemingly 
insatiable middle and lower middle class demand for imported consumer goods" 
(Wateibmy, 1983:172-175). 
The cultural consequences of Infitah caused immediate alarm to a 
large section of the Politically active and culturally conscious public. According 
to Hiimebusch: 
modernization is a function not just of capital and technology, but of 
motivation, which appears rooted in a sense of self-worth and 
confidence inseparable from strong religious, ideological and 
national identity. Infitah appears to have challenged this sense of 
self-worth among a considerable section of Egyptians, because of its 
dependency and consumerism, overlooking long-term national 
economic interest (Hinnebusch, 1985:285). 
During 1975 and 1976, Egypt found itself under pressure from Arab 
and Western creditors to fiirther improve the attractiveness of its economy to 
foreign capital by curtailing government spending and devaluing the Egyptian 
pound. When the Egyptian government eventually agreed to some such measures 
in January 1977 and reduced subsidies on over two dozen essential commodities 
(including rice, sugar, gasoline and cooking fuel), major riots erupted throughout 
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Egypt, in which seventy people died and over 1,200 were arrested (Desouki, 
1984:125-126). 
A final feature of infitah was the drain on Egyptian labour to the 
Arab oil producing states. By 1978 it was estimated that over 1.3 million 
Egyptians were working outside the country. Furthermore, Egypt had become 
increasingly dependent on the remittances from this migrant labour force. 
When the bulk of the Egyptian population saw few, if any, of the 
benefits of Sadat's economic policy, a privileged minority profited tremendously 
from infitah. There was a dramatic growth in the wealthy strata of Egyptian 
society - from 500 milhonaires in 1975 to a reported 17,000 in 1981 (Heikal, 
1983:185). This conspicuously wealthy and powerful Egyptian bourgeoisie, 
enriched by the proceeds of increased economic contact with the West, emerged a 
new force in Egyptian politics. With their growth, the level and extent of 
corruption apparent in Egyptian society also expanded. This contrasted sharply 
with the pauperization of the urban middle classes, particularly public sector 
employees, who found their standard of living eroded by inflation and who were 
rendered increasingly dependent upon government subsidies. It also contrasted 
with the vassalization of the peasant population as agricultural land distribution 
and production were deregulated. Furthermore, infitah brought with it an inrush of 
Western ideas and materialism which threatened to swamp the traditional values 
of the (Muslim) Egyptian masses. y^The Muslim Brotherhood described Sadat's 
policy of infitah as the policy of consumerism and opposed it specifically on moral 
and religious grounds. It pointed out that in order to popularize their produce, 
foreign companies were trying to change public thinking and their culture, which 
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sometimes contrasted with the teachings of their rehgion. Some Islamicits 
suggested that while economic openness in itself was not wrong, it developed 
problems trom the outset because Islamic values were ignored in its 
implementation (Bari, 1995:95). It was in response to such alienation, and in 
defence of traditional values, that a significant number of (primarily young and 
middle-class) Egyptian Muslims turned to neo-activist Islam. 
Thus, the stage of Sadat policies were set for the growth of political 
activism among Islamic groups in Egypt. It was therefore only natural that an 
Islamic critique of the status quo would emerge and win support in Egypt. 
The substance of this neo-activist Islamic critique owed much to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Although the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood as was 
criticized by Egyptian Islamic militants for its gradualist tactics (i.e. its rejection of 
violent confrontation and its willingness to seek partial compromise with the 
regime in the 1970s in exchange for quasi-legality), its analysis of Egyptian 
society was generally accepted. Indeed, two years of interviews with jailed 
militants led Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim to conclude: 
In terms of the religious component of their ideology, their reading 
of history, and their overall for the future, members of (Egypt's 
Islamic groups) expressed no differences with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In fact, they considered themselves as natural 
continuation of the Brotherhood, which was banned and persecuted 
by both the Royalist regime before 1952 and by Nasser's regime after 
1952. (The activist groups) revere the founder of the Brotherhood, 
Hasan al-Banna, and the pioneers who gave their lives as martyrs for 
Islam (Ibrahim, 1980:434). 
It is a fact indeed that despite its eventual conflict with Sadat, the 
Brotherhood of the seventies was never a revolutionary movjement. Many of its 
123 
most prominent supporters were wealthy businessmen and professionals who did 
not want an Islamic revolution. The Brotherhood magazines tended to stress the 
need for a strictly Islamic legal system and for the elimination of immorality in the 
mass media. They did not advocate the radical transformation of die social and 
political structures of Egypt or the use of violence to achieve their goals (Munson, 
1988:79). As a result, a number of underground neo-activist Islamic groups arose 
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within Egypt. Some of these, such as the group known as Jund Allah (the 
soldiers of God), had only a small membership and made little significant impact 
on Egyptian politics and society. Others, notably Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami 
(The Islamic Liberation Organization), Jama'at al-Muslimin (the Group of 
Muslims) and al-Jihad (Holy struggle) did represent a significant force within the 
country. It may be usefiil at this point to consider in some detail of certain features 
of these secretive underground Islamic groups. Most of them have had 
philosophical or organizational roots that at some point or other grew away from 
the older Islamic societies in their criticism of the regime, especially the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
The Group of Muslim (Jama'at al-Muslimin) 
It is believed by some that the early beginnings of the newer offshoot fi^om the 
older Islamic groups date back to around 1965, when young members of the 
52. The authorities estimate that there may be up to twenty such organizations, with fluid and 
interchangeable membership, including about half a dozen that are particularly significant. 
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Muslim Brothers, arrested that year in a conspiracy against President Nasser's 
government, were cruelly tortured; this provoked a mutiny in the detention camp 
in May 1967 which in turn led to the younger and more rebellious elements being 
isolated m special confined quarters. Presented thus with the opportunity for 
intensive discussion of rehgious and political matters, they started from the 
proposition that rulers who tortured people just because the latter believed 
sincerely in their own religion could not themselves be real Muslims even if they 
were nominally so. From this, there emerged the basic concept of 'Takfir' -
meaning to judge somebody as being infidel or 'excommunication' (Ayubi, 
1991:76-77). 
It was in these circumstances that the group, named by government 
agencies as al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra (Ex-communication and Holy Flight), but which 
called itself Jama'at al-Muslimin (the Group of Muslims), came into existence. 
^ Shukri Mustafa, its leader, was a student of agriculture science. He was a former 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood and had been arrested while distributing anti 
government pamphlets in 1965. He remained in prison for six years, before being 
released in 1971 following the take-over by Sadat. He had witnessed in prison 
some of the most brutal torture perpetrated on members of the Brotherhood. This 
led him to reject the political and organizational tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(though not its ideology), and to begin the organization of his own miUtant Islamic 
groupyThe first members of the Group of Muslims were recruited while Mustafa 
53. Al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah ('Excommunication and Holy Flight') is a name assigned to the group by the 
Egyptian media and authorities. The title refers to the organization's accusation of godlessness (al-
Takfir) against Egyptian society, aind its call for a separation fi-om that society akin to the Prophet's 
flight from Mecca (al-Hijrah). 
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was still in prison. He had also steeped himself in the literature of Sayyid Qutb 
and Maudoudi and got involved in debates in the prison with the elders over 
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ideological issues emanating from the writing of Qutb (Bari, 1995:69). 
Following his release, Mustafa set about expanding his organization. 
He moved to Asyut (a provincial capital in Upper Egypt), and recruited members 
in that area; later, he moved to Cairo. Kinship and friendship represented the 
primary recruitment mechanisms utilized by the Group. Those recruited were 
usually young (median age 24) students for recent graduates (professionals), and 
from middle or lower middle-class (often rural) backgrounds. The bulk of the 
group's members were from Upper Egypt, primarily because of Mustafa's initial 
residence was in Asyut, Although the vast majority of the group's members were 
male, some women were recruited (normally through kinship ties) (Ibrahim, 
1980:437-439). 
It would appear that al-Takfir wal-Hijra has borrowed heavily from 
the Brotherhood: organized on hierarchical lines in cells, each headed by an 'Amir 
al-Mu'minin' (Commander of the Faithfiil, the traditional title of the head of the 
Islamic community) (Aly and Wenner, 1982:333). The organization utilized a 
'dedicated cadre' of followers - that is the Group demanded full-time activism and 
total obedience, thus creating a situation wherein members were heavily dependent 
upon it. Deviation from duty or group doctrine could lead to expulsion, physical, 
and even assassination. 
54. For Sayyid Qutb's thought and writing. See Appendix pp. 193-202. 
55. In fact, it was the Muslim Group's punishment of deviant members in 1976-1977 that alerted the 
Egyptian autorities to its activities. 
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''Mustafa wrote a 206-page book, kitab al-Khilafa (the book of the 
Caliphate) in which he outlined his thinking, based primarily on the works of 
Sayyid Qutb, especially Ma'alim, with some extremist additions. This philosophy 
had two main axes: ideology and haraki (action). / 
The principles of Mustafa's ideology are as follows: 
1. The approach of Islam - Islam has become alienated. Existing 
societies will fall. Islam will undergo a renaissance brought about by an eUte 
which beheves in leaping from the hills of Yemen brandishing the sword, based on 
the Hadith, 'Stories from the End of Days'. 
2. The hijra - The need to abandon existing society in order to begin 
forming the nucleus of the hoped - for Islamic society through hijra to the 
mountains and the caves. 
3. The concept of stopping and studying - Refusing to accept that 
simply by fulfilling the five elements of Islam a person may become a complete 
Muslim. This is an obligation to distance oneself from acts forbidden by 
commandment, otherwise every Muslim wiU be considered an infidel. 
4. The only sources for the laws and the commandments are the 
Qur'an and the Hadith. 
The principles of the action are: 
1. Creating the organizational structure of the group, the election of 
Shukri Mustafa as Amir (head of the faithful). Therefore amirs were 
chosen for each region imder Mustafa, the chief amir. 
2. Rental of flats to be used as the local underground headquarters in 
Cairo, Alexandria, and other districts. 
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3. Migration of the group to the caves and clefts of the mountain 
region in order to implement the ideology. 
4. Recruitment of as many military men as possible for use in 
operations and for training members of the organization to use 
weapons. These military men were to seize the weapons in their 
military units (Sagiv, 1995:47-48). 
The group of Muslims made no distinction between state and society. 
The two were felt to be closely interrelated, and both were seen as godless and 
corrupt. Parallels were drawn between contemporary Egypt and the ignorance and 
paganism (Jahiliyah) of pre-Islamic Arabia. Because of this, the group eschewed 
as a goal the immediate seizure of state power, viewing their task instead as a 
long-term one. Following the example set by the Prophet Muhammad in his flight 
from Mecca to Medma and his subsequent conquest of Arabia, the group sought to 
establish an insulated community of behevers. This would then form the base 
fix)m which the re-Islamiflcation of Egyptian society could take place. The 
group's manifesto, al-khalafah. categorized the group's mission into three stages, 
beginning witii communications (balagh); followed by organization, emergence 
(tabaw'), and migration ; and culminating in holy war and its strategy (Ismael & 
Ismael, 1985:117). 
The group claimed that both the Sadat's regime and all of society 
were pagan, therefore the true Muslim must separate from them. They also 
included in this condemnation all four traditional schools of Islam (Madzhabs) and 
all traditional commentators. It labeled these schools as puppets of rulers who 
used them to monopolize Qur'anic interpretation to their own advantage. 
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Another characteristic of Takfir was their strong antagonism to 
Christians and Jews. Instead of seeing Jews and Christians as protected 
communities (dhimmis) and "People of the Book", Al-Takfir viewed them as 
infidels both because they had deliberatly rejected the truth and because of their 
connections to colonialism and Zionism (Esposito, 1988:171). Takfir also 
stressed an international Jewish conspiracy in Sadat and the need to fight it. 
Takfir believed that the world was nearing its end and Mustafa, 
Takfir's leader, was the Mahdi (Messianic). Among proofs of the world's coming 
end was the prevalent state of disbelief, oppression, immorality, famine, wars, 
earthquakes, and tycoons (Hopwood, 1991:118). Mustafa would be the Caliph 
who would found a new Muslim community, conquer the world, and usher in 
God's final reign on earth. 
However the group suffered serious arrest in May 1975, August and 
November 1976, and in January 1977. Members of the group subsequently 
claimed that it was such government suppression (more specifically, the detention 
without trial of several group members) that provoked it to take precipitate action 
against the regime in July 1977 (Ibrahim, 1980:442-443). Other claim that the 
group's violent acts were designed to show their strength vis-a-vis other militant 
Islamic organizations. 
Whatever the reason, on 3 July 1977 the group's members kidnapped 
former Egyptian Minister of Waqfs (Islamic endowments) Shaykh Muhammad al-
Dahabi, a noted Islamic scholar and strong opponent of religious extremism. A 
ransom of £F 200,000, the release of sixty prisoners, and an aircraft were 
demanded for al-Dahabi's release. The demands were not met, and three days 
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later Shaykh al-Dahabi's body was found in a deserted apartment in al-Haram 
district. A series of bombings were carried out over the next few days by the 
group. Intensive action by the Egyptian security forces, however, soon led to the 
arrest of Mustafa and 400 other members. Of these, 198 were tried in court, with 
36 eventually being found guilty. Five group leaders, including Shukri Mustafa, 
were ultimately executed for their activities (Arab report and Record, 1-15 July 
1977:531-532).^ '* 
The Islamic Liberation Organization 
(Munazzamat al-Tahrir aUIslami) 
The Islamic Liberation Organization - also known as Shabab 
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Muhammad (Muhammad's youths) - was formed by Dr. Salih Siriyya, a 
Palestinian - bom Iraqi citizen with a doctorate in Science Education. Siriyya was 
a former member of the Islamic Liberation party in Jordan. After 1967 he joined a 
number of Palestinian organizations, and attempted to co-operate with Iraq, Libya 
and other 'revolutionary' Arab regimes. In 1971 he moved to Cairo, and accepted 
a job with an Arab League agency (Ibrahim, 1980:435-436). 
^ In Cairo, Sirriya triedtomakecontact with the former leaders of the 
56. Following the arrest and executed of Group members in July 1977, a threat to bomb the Egyptian 
Embassy was reported in Kuwait. 
57. This group is also known as the 'Technical MiUtary Academy group' (Jam'at al-Fanniyya al-Askariyya); 
a name given to them by the Arab media following the group's attack on Cairo's Technical Military 
Academy in April 1974. 
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Muslim Brothers in Egypt, but he was rejected by them/ He decided to form his 
own organization, and in 1973 he began to recruit members from among his 
students at 'Ayn Shams University, as well as students in Alexandria and other 
universities (Sagive, 1995:50-51). He also approached to, young devout, 
worshippers at local mosques, represented the primary mechanisms of recruitment 
used. The proliferation of independent (Ahali) mosques, fi"ee from government 
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control, facilitated this recruitment. Members of the Islamic Liberation 
Organization were primarily young (medium age 22) students or recent graduates 
(professionals), from lower or lower middle-class (often rural) backgrounds. Most 
resided in Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta (Ibrahim, 1980:438-439). Women 
were not recruited. 
Decision-Making within the Islamic Liberation Organization was 
largely consensual, based on a twelve - member committee chaired by Dr. Siriyya. 
He was revered by Islamic Liberation Organization members and his advice was 
usually accepted during pohcy dehberations. The notable exception to this was 
the group's decision in 1974 to attack the Technical MiUtary Academy and carry 
out a coup against President Sadat; although Dr. Siriyya gave the scheme only a 
30 percent chance of success, it was adopted and attempted on 18 April 1974. On 
58. Hamuda relates that Siniyya met with al-Hudaibi, with Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, with Zainab al-
Ghazali (who was closely connected with Sayyid Qutb and was one of the few women in the movement 
of Muslim Brothers), and with others. They re&sed Sirriyyah as a member of the Brotherhood because 
of his abortive attempt to take over the building of the Technical College near Cairo. Zainab al-Ghazali 
wrote 'Zainab al-Ghazali would not agree to meet with a person known to her to be against Anwar al-
Sadat. I declare that Anwar al-Sadat is a believer and the son of a believer, and I know his father and his 
piety (Sagive, 1995:50,61). 
59. An estimated 20,000 Ahali mosques may have existed in Egypt in 1970, growing to over 40,000 by 
1970. In contrast, only 6,000 mosques (1980) were controlled by the Egyptian Ministry of Waqfs 
(Islamic endowments) (Ansari, 1984:125-126). 
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that date however the group, despite extensive planning and practice, failed to 
achieve its objectives and vi^ as subsequently broken up by the Egyptian security 
forces. 
The ideology of the Islamic Liberation Organization was heavily 
influenced by the writings of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, as well as those 
of Abu al-A'la al-Mawdoudi and Ali Shariati. That ideology had five core 
aspects: 
" 1. That Islam provides the only proper and required path to righteous 
hfe, and that man was created to follow this path. Since the way of Islam is 
exclusive, other religious are godless. In this view of the world the Islamic 
Liberation Organization, like many other militant Islamic groups, are significantly 
less tolerant of Judaism and Christianity (the 'people of the book') than is 
contemporary mainstream Islam. 
> 2. Righteousness must exist on both an individual and collective 
level. For the latter to occur, society must be governed by the Shari'a. 
> 3. The failure of existing 'Islamic' societies (such as Egypt) to 
genuinely and totally adopt the Shari'a as their legal - political basis has led to 
their weakness in the face of external enemies, notably the Christian West, Jewish 
Zionism and atheistic communism. 
4. The establishment ulama are condemned as propagandists, who 
prop up an immoral social-political order, corrupting Islam in the process 
. 5. The Islamic Liberation Organization, like similar groups, see 
themselves engaged in takfir (an accusation of godlessness) against the extant 
political and social structure and in a jihad (holy struggle) for the re-Islamification 
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of society. Dedication to this cause is reinforced by the acceptance of the concept 
of martyrdom, with paradise awaiting those who fall in the struggle against 
godlessness (Ismael & Ismael, 1985:114-115). 
Thus, the Islamic Liberation Organization advocated the 
reorganization of Egyptian society on the basis of the Shari'a, and the rejection of 
imported, non-Islamic institutions and ideas. Because the Islamic Liberation 
Organization differentiated between Egyptian state and society - the former 
godless and corrupt, the later victimized by the political system - the group 
advocated transformation from above. In this way it worked towards the seizure 
of state power, with the aim of establishing an Islamic political system through 
which the re-Islamification of society could take place 
It was in pursuit of this revolutionary aim that, in 1974, their action 
began. Members of Siriyya's organization grappled with those who resisted them 
at the college. The point of occupying the college was to seize the weapons there 
and to use them to gain control of key government facilities in Cairo and 
Alexandria, to capture or kill the President, take power, and declare the 
establishment of an Islamic state. They, however, might have succeeded, at the 
last minute balked at the enormity of the deed, informed the authorities. Siryya, 
confidoit of initial success, had prepared bayam raqm wahid (proclamation 
number one) to be broadcast over radio and television from the hall of the 
Coordinating Committee of the ruling party in Alexandria, where President Sadat 
and top government officials were gathered to address a student conference. 
Siriyya was planning to announce a.curfew and his own appointment as Amir of 
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Egypt. The contents of 'proclamation number one' give a clear objectives of the 
organization: 
On this day, we have been successful, praise God, in taking power 
and arresting all those responsible for the previous regime and we 
are about to embark upon a new era. We shall not lavish promises, 
however, we declare that the new government shall be founded upon 
the following principles: 
1. The principles of state shall rest upon new foundations which 
are not ambiguous of self-contradictory. 
2. The revolution shall not be limited to political or military 
directions. It shall include all parts of economic, cultural, and 
social life and others. 
3. The state shall be concerned in particular with faith, morality, 
and virtue. 
4. In its political activities, the state shall be concerned first and 
foremost with the interest of the nation, and thereafter with 
covenants and agreements. 
5. The state shall work to liberate all territories stolen from the 
homeland and to assist the downtrodden and the exploited in 
each and every place, and shall oppose imperialism in all forms 
in the world. 
6. The state shall apply all its power to bringing about unity, 
without regard to verbal attacks, and shall apply all its might 
to fostering development for raising the standard of living of 
the residents. 
7. Society shall be free to say whatever it wishes and to criticize 
the systems of state, with the exception of lies, falsehoods, and 
libelous statements. 
8. We shall rewrite all the principles (and replace) individuals and 
positions 
9. The state shall defend all the principles of justice known to 
everyone as part of our heritage 
And success in from Allah 
Signed: President of the Islamic Republic 
(Quoted in Sagive, 1995:51-52) 
Although the Technical Military Academy was successfully attacked, 
the second stage of the operation was never reached, in the face of government 
counter-measures. After the members of the organization were arrested, they were 
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tried^ Siriyya and the commander of the action at the Mihtary College were both 
condemned to death and executed. 
^Amidst this threat of growing clandestine Islamic extremism in the 
1970s, both the state machinery and the Brotherhood found a commonality of 
interests in curbing the trend. The militant groups were posing a challenge to the 
credibility of the Brotherhood, advocating ideologies in the name of political 
revival of Islam, which the Brotherhood had espoused through their mild stand 
towards the government. The mainstream Brotherhood however was being 
criticized by both the pro-establishment forces, who tried to expose its past record 
of violence, and the hard-line Islamicists who were unhappy over its soft-pedaling 
the government stand. Some pro-establishment elements on the other hand 
reminded the Brotherhood of its involvement in violent activities in the past, 
particularly the shooting at Nasser by an activist of the Brotherhood in Alexandria 
in 1954.^ 
Umar al-Tilmisani, the General Guide of the organization in late 
1977, refuted this allegation in an editorial in al-Da'wa. The day would come, he 
said, when it would be established beyond doubt who really engineered the 
incident. /Tilmisani was, however, more concerned with answering the accusation 
of the hard-line Islamicists about the Brotherhood's collaboration with the ruling 
establishment of the country, ignoring 'his mistakes and misdeeds'. He reminded 
his accusers that his organization was not concerned with individual rulers. The 
Brotherhood had criticized Nasser on principle even though it had to pay heavy 
price for it, and 'We deal with the present ruler (Sadat) in the same spirit'. He 
pointed to the Brotherhood's criticism of the government on its policy of restricted 
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freedom and its law of parties, which he described as unconstitutional, and the 
government's feilure to implement the Shari'a. 'We told the present ruler that we 
did not want a government which is Islamic only in appearance; we wanted a 
government which was established on Islamic principles', he revealed. He evaded 
the issue of his organization's rapprochement with Sadat, but defended Shukri's 
group against the treatment meted out to it by the government and the press. He 
conveyed to those 'who blamed us on our noble stand', that the Brotherhood 
'neither wanted to invite trouble nor instigated dissension'. This was the dividing 
line between the Brotherhood and the extremists. All the same, he reminded the 
extremists, the Brotherhood also was not recognized in law (Bari, 1995:75-76). 
In its approach to the militants, the Brotherhood took a persuasive 
tone. Hudaybi, anoHiCT active member of Brotherhood, himself wrote a 
monograph under the suggestive title "Du'at la Qudat" (Preachers, not Judges), to 
point out that Islam did not allow excommunication, whether of an individual or a 
society, as long as they pronounced the kalima al-shahada (acknowledging that 
there is no divinity but that of Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger) (Ansari, 
1984:38-41). 
Seeking to moderate extremist tendencies, al-Da'wa started a new 
column on this aspect, headlined 'Fiqh al-Da'wa' ("understanding of the call of 
Islam and its preaching"). Its refrain in these columns was that forbearance with 
steadfastness was the prophetic way in the preaching of Islam. While working for 
Islam one needed to have a broader perspective, and do this job cahnly. 
'Experiences and trials have shown us that undue enthusiasm is not a proof of the 
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Strength of a person's faith; most of the time it only shows the lack of forbearance" 
(Quoted in Bari, 1995:121). 
rfThe Brotherhood, however, did not hide its displeasure over the 
government's treatment of the problem.^ Writing in its organ al-Da'wa. 
Muhammad Abdel Quddous, one of its prominent members, suggested that the 
'youth of the groups were not criminal by nature, and they could not be cured by 
harsh treatment; they could rather be cured through objective debate and calm and 
scientific disciissions'. 'This youth was clean and honest, but had lost the way'. 
The first mistake of not only the press but also the State was pushing the youth to 
the road of destruction instead of trying to attempt to reform them (Quoted in 
Bari, 1995:76-77).^ In the eyes of the masses and many intellectuals, Sadat policies 
were depicted as a jumbled confusion: sociaUsm, liberalism, religious faith, 
economic laissez faire which benefited a few, while the masses sank into a morass 
of inflation and, poverty, oppression of liberals charged with left-wing views, 
subsequent repression of religious elements after exploiting them against liberals 
. 60 
and scorn for the clergy (Sagive, 1995:60). ^ 
/ If Nasser's regime was repressive of the Islamicists, Sadat's rule also 
lacked political participation. His government failed to check this politico-
religious extremism mainly due to wrong diagnosis.^ Thus amazingly, while 
extremism remained on the ascent throughout the 1970s, the government 
controlled media generally pointed accusing fingers in wrong directions: some 
blamed disturbed family life; others the poor educational standards both at school 
60. Sadat publicly mocked the important clergyman Shaikh al-Malawi whom he imprisoned with the words, 
'He's been thrown into prison like a dog'. He also publicly scorned the Isjamic dress of religious 
women. Both these incidents evoked great anger among both religious and non religious in Egypt. 
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and university levels; yet another section blamed al-Azhar and other religious 
establishments for their failure to provide suitable religious instruction and to 
create the right kind of understanding of Islam among the youth. Most asserted 
that the extremists were very few and that the phenomenon was mainly due to 
religious or cultural vacuum. Very few tried to fmd out the roots of the problem in 
Egypt's social and political life itself Hardly anyone in Egypt talked about the 
lack of political freedom and the absence of democratic participation as a major 
cause of violent tendency among a certain group of youth. This intensely sensitive 
youth would have been deeply disturbed over the amazing gap between their 
personal abilities and their educational and professional achievements on the one 
hand, and their share of wealth and authority in their society on the other. Since 
they remained at the margin of society their finstrating helplessness and lack of 
meaningful participation in a fast changing social and economic scenario, with no 
political outlet to freely express themselves, would have led them to resort to 
extremism and violence. 
/ Nevertheless at the same time, it is also important to recognize 
that many significant and varied ties exist between the Islamic militants on the one 
hand, and the quasi-legal Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jama'at on the other. 
While their prescriptions may have differed considerably, all of these groups 
advanced a broadly similar analysis and critique of Egyptian government and 
society. There was also some evidence that the government crackdown against 
opposition groups immediately before and after Sadat's assassination served 
to reinforce the ties 
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between the Muslim Brotherhood and underground Islamic forces in Egypt. 
61. Evidence of such a reconciliation was provided by the participation of militant leaders in the 1983 
funeral of prominent Muslim Brothers' member, Salih 'Ashmawi. 
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Chapter Five 
Religious Resurgence and Politics in Modern 
Egypt under Mubarak 
The development and evolution of Islamic political thought is a 
product of the assumption of spiritual and temporal unity. In its normative 
orientation, it is a search for that unity through the political sphere; and in its 
analytic orientation, a search for understanding of the failure of political 
institutions to realize that unity. Contemporary Islamic political activism 
emanates directly from this dialectic. The two interrelated themes running through 
Islamic political thought - political legitimacy and political accountability - are the 
themes of contemporary Islamic political activism. These themes are manifested 
on two levels: in the efforts of various regimes to legitimate their mle officially 
through Islam; and in the efforts of various popular activist groups to challenge 
the legitimacy of existing regimes on the grounds of accountability to Islamic 
codes. 
From the point of view of institutional building and legitimization of 
government the Islamic legitimization has been viewed as a cultural imperative 
and used as a political tool. But with the emergence of an Islamic activist 
movement, it has become a political imperative. ^However, from this angle, one of 
the government's problem in Egypt has been the fact that more than half a dozen 
small but Islamic groups (collectively known as al-Jama'at al Islamiyya) are 
operating in addition to the Brotherhood. And it is not at all clear which action 
should be attributed to which group, or how strong those other groups are, either in 
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number or resources.) What was clear by early 1980, however was that one of the 
strongest and perhaps the best organized of those other groupings was the one 
known as 'Jihad' organization. The group was organized in the 1977. 
Historically, Jihad has a complex organization which is not fully understood. 
Indeed, al-Jihad barely existed as a formal organizational entity; instead it usually 
took the form of loosely coordinated sub-groups. Indeed, there seemed to have 
been as many as five al-Jihad groups which believe in their demand that a pure 
Islamic State be set up in Egypt, with Shari'a as a state law. 
^ Although al-Jihad drew its members from the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the university - based Islamic Jama'at, and a variety of other sources, its 
genealogy can be traced back to the Islamic Liberation Organization of Dr. Salih 
Siriyya. During the suppression of the Islamic Liberation Organization by the 
government in 1974, two Islamic Liberation Organization members (Hasan al-
Halawi and Salim al-Rahhal) escaped arrest. They subsequently began setting up 
a new militant Islamic organization (the first Jihad), primarily in Alexandria. In 
August 1977 this organization was uncovered and broken up by the authorities, 
with some eighty members (including al-Halawi) being arrested (Ismael & Ismael, 
1985:119). 
62. The Jihad group became apparent with the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, an act for which 
they were held responsible as an organization. The group is still committed to armed struggle against the 
regime and the establishment of an Islamic system of government. The name 'Jihad' was given to the 
organization by the authorities; members merely refer to it as 'al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya'. This issue of the 
organization's name became more confusing, however, when, in the 1980s, the group splintered into two 
groups, the Tihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. Both espouse similar aims and tactics but seem to differ 
over the issue of leadership. Today's Jihad, and its military wing, Tal'a al fath, reject the leadership of 
Omar Abdel-Rahman, althou^ he was originally reputed to be the leading figure for the Jihad group, 
which turned to the fatwa (religious ruling and legitimization) for Sadat's assassination. 
63. Al-Rahhal was Palestinian by birth. 
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With the suppression of the first Jihad's top leadership, a new 
individual assumed a key role in the organization. Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam 
Faraj, a former member of the first Jihad, set about - reorganizing al-Jihad. Al-
64 
Faraj wrote a pamphlet entitled al-Farida al-Ghai'ba (The Neglected Imperative), 
which the authorities later described as the Jihad's constitution. 
Faraj, who assumed the role of Jihad's chief ideologue, was joined in 
the leadership by a colonel in Egyptian military intelligence, 'Abbud al-Zumur, 
who assumed charge of the organization's military planning and training along 
with Karem Zuhdi, who was in charge of organization and recruitment in upper 
Egypt. In 1980 a consultative council (Majlis al-Shura) was established for second 
Jihad group, with functional subcommittee being set up to co-ordinate and oversee 
military training, fiindraising, and recruitment. It was at this time that the 
chairmanship of the council was offered to Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman, a 43-
year-old blind religious instructor at al-Azhar's Asyut branch (Ansari, 1984:126). 
Faraj as Amir of this organization geared up the various institutions of his 
movement according to a structured division of labor. The Shura Council, with 11 
members, was the supreme council of the movement. He also organized three 
committees and detailed out their respective functions as follows: 
64. This pamphlet has been reprinted in many places, and has been widely circulated throughout the world 
among Muslim conununities. The pamphlet bears no publication data. It is generally prefaced by a 
quotation from Sayyid Qutb. 
65. Abbud al-Zumur, a young army officer, appears to have played an important organizational role. He 
actually believed that the group should delay political action for a few years until an Islamic revolution 
could count on the popular support that would give it the same kind of success that the Iranian revolution 
had enjoyed 
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Amir of the organization^ Muhammad *Abd al-Salam Faraj 
The Islamic Shura Council (11 members) 
Al-Da'wa and 
Preaching Committee 
1. Dissemination 
of Ideology 
2. Recruitment of 
new members 
3. Religious and 
Political education 
Action and Planing 
Committee 
1. Planning actions 
2. Organization of action 
and training 
3. Data-gathering 
(including intelligence) 
With the aim of a 
Sweeping domestic 
revolution 
Economic Committee 
1. Ensure ongoing flow 
of money 
2. Strengthen economic 
self-sufficiency (to 
avoid dependence on 
outsiders) 
3. Fund-raising 
4. Raids on Coptic shops 
To obtain ghanima 
(war spoils) 
Figure 2 : Organization of Islamic Shura Council 
Sagive, David (1995:57) Fundamentalism and intellectuals in Egypt 
1973-1993 , London: Frank Cass. 
Al-Jihad had two main branches, with the Cairo branch under the 
direct control of Amir Abdel Salam Faraj (apparently controlling the activities in 
other parts of the Delta as well) and the branch in upper Egypt, particularly 
covering Minya and Asyut, under the leadership of Karam Zuhdi (Kepel, 
1985:194). Its members working in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, provided 
143 
most of its financial resources. According to a confession of one of its members, 
the total sum received by the group was £ E 20,000. The group also robbed a 
leading jewelry shop in north Cairo (Ansari, 1984:126). 
In fact. Islamic militants in general had a relatively high literacy rate 
and higher mobility patterns, though they came predominantly from the lower 
middle class. The leadership of the Jihad group, however, was a 'curious mixture 
of people with different backgroimds and social origins'. Many came from 
families of better social standing and prestige than the leadership of the earlier 
militant groups. 
Faraj, like many others in the group, belonged to the lower middle 
class; his father was an employee of the health ministry. Abbud al-Zomur, 
another top leader of the group, came from a family of relatively high standing. 
His father was the Umda (chief) of the family village, Nahya in Giza district. 
Himself a colonel in the army intelligence, he had an uncle in the army of the rank 
of general; another uncle was a member of Majlis al-Shura, the upper house of the 
Egyptian parliament; three close relatives were majors in the army (Ansari, 
1984:134). 
Unlike Shukri Mustafa who cared little for the traditional Islamic 
authority, Faraj's Neglected Duty was fiill of quotations from the Qur'an, the 
Suima, and from other authoritative sources of the past. This in effect emphasising 
that his ideology was based on standard of Islamic sources (Kepel, 1985:194). 
The theme of the booklet was to justify the ex-communication of the 
rulers of the country and to invoke what it asserted was every Muslim's duty to 
revolt against such rulers and to go in for an armed struggle against them. It 
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focused on the failure of the rulers to respect the Islamic law and to implement it, 
which had taken them out of the Islamic fold. This had made the revolt against 
them obligatory on all Muslims. 
'The establishment of the caliphate - an Islamic State - was 
obligatory on Muslims', Faraj said. He quoted approvingly Abu Hanifa, the 
originator of one of the four schools of Islamic law, who had said that the House 
of Islam (meaning the area where Muslims Uve and rule themselves) would change 
into a House of unbelief if Muslims were ruled by laws other than those of Islam. 
In defence of his arguments, Faraj also used to frequently cite Ibn Taymiya, the 
14 century Islamic theologian and reformer. Ibn Taymiya had been bitterly 
opposed to Mongol rule over the lands of the Caliphate. When he was asked 
whether the city of Mardin in upper Mesopotamia, which was being ruled by a 
Muslim prince on behalf of the Mongols, was a House of Peace, Ibn Taymiya 
made it clear that he did not consider it as either the House of Peace or the House 
of War. It was not the House of Peace because it was not ruled by the law of 
Islam : the Mongols, though they had accepted Islam, introduced their own system 
of law called Yasiq, overlooking the Shari'a. Nor was it the House of War, 
because it was inhabited by Muslims, whereas the House of War should be 
inhabited by infidels. Ibn Taymiya therefore invented a third, vague category. He 
merely said that in the city of Mardin Muslims should be treated to what was due 
to them; and 'anyone who rebelled against the law of Islam should be treated 
according to what was due to him'. Ibn Taymiya also made it clear that 'anyone 
who facilitated the spread of any religion other than Islam or any law other than 
the law of Muhammad, was an infidel'. In Islam, belief in one part of it and 
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unbelief in another part was unacceptable and amounted to total unbelief (Bari, 
1995:134-135). 
From these theological formulations, Faraj extrapolated to 
contemporary Egypt. According to him although the majority of Egyptians were 
Muslims, the State was being ruled by the laws of unbelief, enacted by infidels 
(the western legal system). The present-day rulers were in apostasy from Islam. 
They were 'raised at the table of imperialism, be it Crusadism or Communism or 
Zionism'. Though they claimed to be Muslims and performed Islamic rites, they 
carried 'nothing from Islam except their names' (Jansen, 1986:165-169). 
In his view the restoration of Islam in its totality could not be 
accomplished through the establishment of benevolent societies. Also, the 
formation of a political party would be counter productive, being tantamount to 
collaborating with the pagan state. All 'Muslim doctors and Muslim engineers 
serving such a state were in fact instrumental in building of this pagan state. The 
propagation of religion became ineffective because the means of mass 
communication were under the control of the pagan and wicked (state) and in 
(control) of those who were at war with the religion of God' (Quoted in Jansen, 
1986:182-186). 
( The ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb compared 
his time with the Meccan period of the prophet to suggest that preaching, and not 
confrontation, was in^rative for a period of time in view of the weakness of 
Islamic groups.) Clearly, this went against Faraj's call for immediate jihad. Faraj 
reftited Qutb's argument by pointing out that reference to the Meccan period was 
irrelevant because Islam descended in its final form before the Prophet passed 
146 
away. 'We are not at the beginning of something as the Prophet was', he argued 
and asserted that 'it is clear that today jihad is an individual duty of every 
Muslim; it is fighting which means confrontation and blood, because the enemy is 
in the middle of them (Muslims) and has got hold of the reins of power. This 
enemy is (none other than) these rulers who have illegally seized the leadership of 
the Muslims' (Quoted in Jansen, 1986:199-200). 
Al-Jihad drew a distinction between state and society, and aimed at 
the seizure of state power: 'we proceed from the top to the bottom because we 
believe that a good ruler can create everything in society' (Quoted in Ismael & 
Ismael, 1985:121). Nevertheless as one of the functionary of al-Jihad group he 
maintained that mass support was not necessary or perhaps not even achievable: 
not only was mass propaganda difficuh to disseminate successfully in a society 
controlled by unbelievers but, in addition, the rigjiteousness of the militant's cause 
guaranteed them victory (Ansari, 1984:127). 
As one can make out that, most of the ideas he expressed in al-Farida 
al-Gha'iba bear resemblance to the ideas contained in several tracts and pamphlets 
written by Shukri Mustafa, the leader of the society of al-Takfir wa-al-Hijra. The 
only difference is that Faraj demanded of his followers to stand up and fight and 
not to take flight, for this was not a Meccan society - an allusion to the prophet's 
migration to Medina when the Meccan society rejected the new religion. 
The principles underlying the militant doctrine of Jihad group as 
pronounced in 1970s not only contradict, but also posed a challenge to the 
traditional views on Islam as advocated by religious authority. It is no surprise, 
therefore, to observe that the militant doctrine provoked the traditional 'Ulama to 
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give up a long-standing policy of ignoring the militants and respond critically to 
each one of the points raise^by them. The criticism of the militant doctrine by the 
Ulama thus offers a chance to observe the basic differences between the militant 
ideology and traditional Islam in Egypt. 
The position of traditional Islam on the militant views was stated in 
the official response to al-Farida al-GhaMba was particularly instructive. For it 
was/is used as an evidence against its authors. The main objection was that Faraj 
misinterpreted Ibn Taymiya and distorted the Qur'an by his selection of some 
verses while suppressing others that went against his militant stance. He found a 
close resemblance between the Jihad group and a heterodox movement which was 
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knovm in history as the Kharijites. The latter raised tiie slogan of la hukm ilia li-
lilah (there is no rule but that of God) in the struggle between Ali and Mu'awiya 
for the Caliphate. Like the Kharijites, the Jihad group raised the slogan of al-
hakimiyya and upheld the purity of their beliefs, while rejecting all outsiders as 
unbelievers (Ansari, 1984:138). 
After dismissing the interpretations of Faraj as too narrow and Uteral 
for a correct understanding of the deeper meanings of the traditional texts, the 
Grand Mufti of Egypt under the official patronage explained the status of faith, 
authority, and rebellion in Islam. According to his standing a person's faith 
remained intact as long as he continued to beheve in the existence of God and the 
66. The khariji movement was a legalistic puritan group that arose in the early years of Islam during the rule 
of Muhammad's son-in-law 'Ali as fourth Caliph (d.661). It was the first Muslim sect. The kharijis 
rejected all Muslims who did not accept their interpretation of Islam as infidels worthy of death. They 
developed an ideology of continuous jihad and rebelled against all rulers until finally suppressed after 
some two hundred years of bloodshed. Renmants of the original khariji movement survive today in the 
ibadis of Oman and in the mzabis of Algeria. 
148 
prophecy of Muhammad. There were no grounds in Islam to accuse such a person 
of unbelief even if a grave sin was committed by him. In a similar compromising 
vein, the Grand Mufti rejected the claim that a ruler would lose his legitimacy if he 
enforced only some parts of God's ruling as revealed in the Qur'an and the Sunna. 
Legitimacy was maintained so long as the ruler observed Islamic tenets 'even 
through the holding of prayers only'. As for the ideal form of government, the 
Grand Mufti asserted that there was nothing in the original texts which determined 
the legitimacy of one form of government or another. Thus the Caliphate and the 
succeeding forms of government which replaced it were conditioned by historical 
circumstances. Under present conditions, elections replaced the pledge which 
people traditionally offered to their rulers (Ansari, 1984:138-139). 
The liberal image of Islam was fiirther pointed out in the relation of 
Muslims with non-Muslims. Humanitarian values, compassion, forgiveness, and 
social tolerance were all underscored by the Divine injunction la ikrah fi al-din 
(there is no coercion in religion). Similarly, the religious authorities found ample 
evidence in the holy text and in the tradition of the prophet to support Sadat's 
peace initiative and the Camp David agreement, which were vehemently 
denounced by the various fundamentalist groups. 
It is interesting to note that the fatwa of Al-Azhar (religious 
authorities) nulhfied its own fatwa issued some twenty years ago stating that 
'recognition to and cooperation with the state of Israel is not Islamically 
permissible' (Quoted in Dessouki, 1983:138). Like wise, Sadat also secured the 
support of uleima when he visited Jerusalem in 1977. Those supporting this 
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historic act included the Rector of Al-Azhar, the Presidents of Egyptian university 
student unions and the Muslim Youth Association. 
While at the same time he himself continuously emphasized the 
religious aspects of his peace mission. While addressing the Knesset he stressed 
the historic ties between Islam and Judaism and stated that it was Prophet 
Muhammad who had ordered the people of Yathrab - Jews and Muslim - to form 
one nation and to practice their respective religion in peace and harmony 
(Waterbury, 1985:210). 
However, by 1981, Sadat's popularity was at its lowest ebb, for the 
country was beset with economic as well as political problems. Having 
encouraged the emergence and growth of Islamic political elements, Sadat found 
itself unable to control them. Lacking in political will to face Islamic opposition, 
he banned some fifteen Islamic societies, took control over some 40,000 private 
mosques and ordered that the sermons in them be cleared by the Ministry of Waqfs 
(Religious endowment). 
However one of Sadat's problems at this time was almost totally 
overlooked in the Western press and by Western analysts: the significant upsurge 
in the political consciousness and activity of the Coptic community - its 
determined effort to resurrect the Coptic language (at the expense of Arabic), its 
efforts to proselytize and to develop new churches, schools, and socio-political 
organization. Ironically, the United States encouraged this: the visit by the Coptic 
Patriarch Pope Senuda III to President Jimmy Carter in 1977 increased his 
visibility and prestige. In other words, although the activities of the Islamic 
groups help)ed to arouse the Copts, the latters' increased militancy in turn further 
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Stimulated the Muslim resurgence, and created the fear of a vastly increased social 
and political role for the Copts and the church. 
By 1981, Sadat had reneged on many of his earlier promises 
regarding political dissent and opposition - in the press, in the National Assembly, 
as well as other forms of political organization. In fact, the wide spectrum of 
viewpoints represented in the arrests in the summer of 1981 showed how seriously 
Sadat had eroded his bases of support: politicians of the right and the left. 
Members of the various Islamic associations, as well as leaders of the Coptic, 
elements of the business elite as well as journalists, professors, media 
personalities, and so forth. 
It was at that time that Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambuli, the member of 
al-Jihad contacted Faraj and said that he had been asked to participate in a military 
parade and that this would be an ideal opportunity to assassinate Sadat and senior 
government officials, Faraj agreed with al-Islambuli, but he did not give approval 
before consulting with the other members of the leadership. Only 'Abbud al-
Zumur objected to the plan, believing that the organization was not yet ready for 
this action. He thought there was a good chance that the plan would be discovered 
and the entire organization would also be exposed. After discussion, however, 
the plan was approved and 'Abbud al-Zumur withdrew his opposition. In 
retrospect, 'Abbud al-Zumur was right. On 2 September 1981, about one month 
before the parade, Sadat gave orders to arrest 1,536 people on suspicion of 
exploiting previous events in an attempt to bring down the government. Among 
those arrested were intellectuals, authors, journalists and nine of the eleven 
numbers of the Shura Council of the Jihad Organization. Al-Zumur beheved that 
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at least another two years should pass before any attempt to mount popular 
revolution to establish the caliphate should be made. Nevertheless, 'Abbud al-
Zumur gave his approval and began to carefully make plans, determined to 
succeed (Sagive, 1995:58). 
Thus, on 6 October 1981, during a military parade in the city of Nasr, 
near Cairo, Lieutenant Khalid al-lslambuli forced the driver of his vehicle to halt 
opposite the reviewing stand, lobbed in two hand grenades, only one of which 
exploded, returned to his car for a machine-gun, and emptied it into the 'who is 
who ' of the government and dignitaries in the stand. Two more officers who were 
members of the Jihad Organization joined al-lslambuli, opening fire, and throwing 
grenades. A fourth sniper set his sights on Sadat, still standing, who caught a 
bullet in his neck which proved to be fatal. After the chaos, which lasted no more 
than 40 seconds, security people who were not wounded began to return fire, 
capturing three at once and the fourth a few days later (Sagiv, 1995:58-59). Thus 
it was by the summer of 1981, Sadat had created the situation which inevitably 
produced the outcome which so shocked the world. 
In the case involving the conspiracy to assassinate the President, 
Khalid al-Islambouli and his associates directly involved in the deed were hanged. 
No one in the case of al-Jihad group was given capital punishment: only a few top 
leaders being given life terms. 'Umar Abdel Rahman, ideologue of the group and 
one of the prime accused in the case, was acquitted on the ground that he did not 
participate in estabhshing the organization of the jihad and did not hold any 
position in it, although the court recognized that the leaders of the organization in 
Upper Egypt remained in touch with him while it was being established, and that 
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he, as a salafite, entertained the concept of jihad. The court also recognized the 
validity of his position as an 'alim to issue tatwa, and viewed his assertions in the 
court (and also outside the court) on the obligation to rule and give judgement 
according to what God has revealed as correct, pointing out that there is no 
difference among the Muslims on this issue. While acquitting 'Umar, the court 
also denounced the brutal treatment meted out to him during interrogation (Bari, 
1995:145)." 
^ After the assassination of Sadat, the vice president Muhammad Husni 
Mubarak was confirmed as President at a referendum on 13 October 1981. With 
the ascendancy of Husni Mubarak as the president of Egypt, the nature of the 
relationship between the regime and the Islamic mass movement entered a new 
phase characterized by greater tolerance of Islamic criticism and Brotherhood's 
accommodation within the Egyptian political system.:) Though continuing Sadat's 
policy of infitah, peace with Israel and closer alliance with the United States, 
Mubarak adopted different political tactics from those employed during Sadat's 
presidency in his dealings with the various moderate and radical Islamic groups. 
Thus, whereas his predecessor, the believing president, had muzzled all political 
expressions while giving full rein to Islamic groups, especially in the universities, 
in order to confront the Nasserist left on the campus and elsewhere and to force it 
into silence, Mubarak encouraged political debate, gave free hand to opposition 
parties and the press which led one scholar to remark that by the Middle of the 
1980s Cairo could claim, that given the destruction of Beirut and excluding the 
67. It was generally held that the Chief Justice, Abdel Ghaffar Mohammad, showed considerable sympathy 
for the accused, and was particularly impressed by 'Umar's arguments. The softness of the court in the 
case, however, would not have come about without a reconsideration by the Government of the issue. 
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'offshore' Arab press produced in Europe, it had the Uveliest and most varied press 
in the Arab world (Mcdermott, 1988:76). It is because of these hmitedpohtical 
Uberalization measures that besides the semi-official organs Al-Ahram. Al-Akbar 
and Al-Gumhouriya. several oppositional press corps including Al-Liwa Al-
Islami ; Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami. Al-Itisam and Al-Nur resurfaced on the national 
scene. Al-Nur became a virulent champion of the Islamisation of practices and 
mores (However the ban on Al-Da'wa has not still been lifted). In fact, political 
freedom enjoyed by the press was confmed to free debate and discussion over the 
relevance of Islamic social custom, a policy which the regime hoped would lead to 
divisions within the Islamic ranks. 
Having set Islamic discourse in the midst of 'controlled pluralism', 
the regime of Mubarak in its initial years sfrove to divide the Islamic ranks by 
isolating the extremists from the moderates and by encouraging the expression of 
certain of its leaders in various organs of the press. In fact, the policy of isolating 
the radical militant Islamic organizations, which Mubarak dubbed as 'terrorist 
extremism', has been the hallmark of Mubarak's regime throughout the eighties 
and even in nineties. In his meeting with Khaled Mohammaddin, Head of the 
Marxist Nasserists Party (NPUP), Mubarak said, 'The fundamentalist will kill you 
before they kill me' stressing the common interest in combating the militant 
Islamic threat (Ahmad, 1987-1988:23). 
( However despite the heavy repression of the Islamic movement in 
the autumn of 1981 (due to the Sadat's assasination), the Mushm Brotherhood 
managed to emerge as the main opposition to Mubarak's regime. Encouraged by 
the initial conciliatory attitude of the ruling regime, the Brotherhood under the 
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leadership of Omer Telmisani increased its membership and opted for poHtical 
pluralism and parliamentary democracy as the road to achieve their ideals - goal of 
establishment of 'Islamic order', discarding the path of violence. The Brothers 
thus consistantly dismissed the argument that Islam and democracy are 
incompatible. Al-Hudaybi, in the wake of organization's opposition in the 1989, 
identified various attributes of democracy he deemed important, such as respect 
for the constitution, on independent judiciary, press freedom, part\' independence, 
and man's protection from torture (Kotob, 1995:325 V 
In their contemporary approach, however, there was an appreciative 
acknowledgment that despite some setbacks, Mubarak's regime had opened doors 
to democracy which previously were closed on them. 
C Thus in the elections for the People's Assembly held in May 1984 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which officially remained illegal, formed an alliance 
with the Wafd, a liberal and semi-secular party which President Mubarak had 
allowed to operate in 1983. This was seen as a purely opportunistic maneuver on 
the part of both the Wafd and the Brotherhood. The strategy paid off, to the extent 
that the New Wafd Party won 59 of the 448 contested seats, allowing the Muslim 
Brotherhood, with at least 8 known members and many more probable 
sympathizers, significant parliamentary representatives for the first time. It came 
second only to Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) and thus served as 
68. The ruling NDP was founded by the late President Anwar Sadat in 1978. The Party's name is drawn 
from the early 20* century anti-British National Party set up by Mustafa Kamel in 1907. President 
Husni Mubarak also serves as the party's chairman. The NDP's platform has remained practically the 
same since the party was established. The foreign policy of the NDP is heavily tied to Egyptian-US 
relations. Mubarak also play's an important role as a regional peace broke for the Palestinian/Israeli 
peace process (http://metimes.com/2k/issue2000-42/eg/rundown ofegvpts-htmy 
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the major opposition in the People's Assembly (Egyptian Parliament), for three 
years. In March 1986 the Brotherhood showed that they were not just a 
formidable minority when more than 100 members of People's Assembly defied 
party boundaries to sign a petition calling on the government to honor its pledge to 
pursue further the issue of making the Shari'a the sole and binding source of law 
for the country.; The growing pressure of pro-Islamic forces in the parliament 
resulted in the abolition of Women's Right law (also called Jinhan's law) of 1979, 
in May 1985 which declared that Polygamy was legally harmful to the first wife 
and automatically gave her the right to divorce her husband (Medermott, 
1988:200). Perhaps, this concession was a buildup to a calculated end to four 
years of relative benevolence by the government towards outspoken religious 
opposition. 
Though the government conceded the demand for the abolition of 
Jihan's law, essentially to placate the sentiments of moderate Islamic group, it 
refiised to commit itself on the implementation of Shari'a in May 1985. The 
government's postponement of the implementation of Shari'a provoked the 
strongest criticism from various individual preachers and Islamic groups. Among 
the individual preachers, the two most important figures were shaykh Ahmad al 
Mahallawi, the imam of Qaid Ibrahim mosque in Alexandria and Shaykh Hafiz 
Salamah. However, it was the latter who embodied the Islamicist confrontation 
with the regime during the mid eighties. Speaking from Al-Nur mosque in 
69. Shaykh Saiamah was the head of Jamiyyat al-Hidaya al-Islamiyya in Suez. He delivered sermons at 
both al-Shuhada mosque in Suez and al-Nur mosque in Cairo. Both were private mosques. The latter 
was a popular meeting place for the militant. Shaykh Salamah was one of the outspoken critics of the 
Peace Treaty with Israel during the end of Sadat regime. 
156 
Abbassiya Cairo, which had become the prime Islamic stronghold and a centre of 
pro-Islamic pronouncements and criticism of the government, Salamah announced 
in June 1985 the plan of "Green March" at the Presidential residence to make 
certain the implementation of Shari'a. However, the proposed march was called 
off m the face of strong security deployment. Salamah was arrested but was soon 
released on the occasion of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. 
It was against this background of rising Islamic opposition forces that 
the government issued a decree placing some 60,000 (almost all the private 
mosques in Egypt) under the supervision of the Ministry of Awqaf which was also 
to supply the imams to preach more orthodox Friday sermons than the politically 
inclined versions which had been purveyed hitherto (Kepel 1985:256, Mcdermott 
1988:93,210). 
fXhe mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, however, continued on its 
moderate course. In the 1987 parhamentary election, the Brotherhood shifted its 
alliance from Wafd to two small parties - the Socialist Labour Party (SLP) and the 
Liberal Party (LP), and formed a new coalition called Islamic Alliance (lA). Ln 
this "election, the Islamic Alliance won about 60 seats, ahead of the new Wafd 
Party which won a reduced total of 35 seats, and came second only to the pro-
government NDP. As a dominant partner in the Islamic Alliance thus the Muslim 
Brotherhood emerged as the single largest legal opposition to the Mubarak 
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regime. The coalitions forged by the Brotherhood with secular political parties 
were necessary to bypass the state's legislative restrictions on their participation in 
70. It is alleged that the power of Ddiwan lay in its support &om the flindamentalist financial sources and the 
Ikhwan's success in 1987 parliamentary election owes much to the rise of 'petro-lslam', i.e. the Saudi-
backed Islamic companies (Moench, Spring 1989:184-187). 
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the electoral system. The Egyptian law requiring individual parties to get at least 8 
percent of votes cast to gain representation in Parliament, coupled with the law 
preventing nonparty organizations from entering elections, meant that coalition 
was the only mechanism that could both allow the Brotherhood to enter the 
elections and give them a chance at gaining the necessary 8 percent. The situation 
changed in 1990, when, to counter the electoral gains made by Islamists, the 
election law was changed to allow only individuals, not parties, to participate. To 
protest what was perceived as the government's attempt to maintain political 
control of the assembly, most opposition groups, including the Brotherhood and 
coalition partners, boycotted the 1990 elections. 
There was also significant evidence that the Brotherhood had become 
even more inclined to use the political system. The most important indication of 
their proclivity to accommodate the system was their emphasis on elevating the 
organization to the status of a recognized political party. Ma mun al-Hudaybi 
noted that despite the boycott, 'the Brothers are the main political power in the 
state.... We are prepared to operate within the realm of political party pluralism 
and the declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood Party' (Al-Ahram. 1994:334). 
Mustafa Mashhur, deputy to former General Guide al-Tilmisani, argues that legal 
party status and removal of restrictions on the group's activities 'will help spread 
the spirit of good relations' among Egyptians and unite the nation (Al-Ahram, 
1994:334-335).^ 
For purposes of 'democratic' participation however it continued to 
express support for the path of moderation, gradualism and constitutionalism to 
realize their goals of 'apphcation of Shari'a and the creation of 'Islamic Order'. 
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The organization also distanced itself from the violence and Holy Flight (al-Takfir 
wal-Hijra) and Holy war (al-Jihad) groups. However, the organization never 
failed to point out that had the state allowed political rights to its own 
organizations, these fanatic groups would not have flourished underground. 
A polarized situation between the radical Islamist groups and the 
government however continued to develop. ^ The Muslim Brotherhood itself found 
little room to maneuver given the unwillingness on the part of the government to 
allow the democratic process to proceed unhindered. By functioning within the 
limited parameters the state had conceded to them, however (namely, the 
opportunity to participate in elections under the umbrella of another party), the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters were gradually questioning the 
government's legitimacy by their constant call for the application of the shari'a. 
The call to have the shari'a applied as the principal source of legislation in 
conformity with Article 2 of the constitution of 1971, as amended in 1979, 
unleashed a major debate on the Islamic credentials of the state (Altman, 
1979:209).y 
The government's attempt at 'national dialogue' during 1994 with 
some opposition figures, labour leaders, and Islamists had lacked credibility. The 
government under this situation emphasized more on economic issues as the core 
of the problem and sought acknowledgment that more time is needed in order to 
improve the economic situation, while barring discussion on constitutional reform. 
At the same time, part of the government's motive was to seek condemnation from 
the opposition and independent figures of the wave of militant Islamist activities. 
The government's attempt to develop a dialogue with its opponents did not 
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represent a retreat form its determination to eradicate the radical Islamist groups 
but was mainly an attempt to pursue a different policy of control and containment. 
/• Despite the obstacles confronted by the Mushm Brotherhood and the 
71 
Jama'at al-Islamiyya in their legitimate participation in the political arena, they 
hav€ nevertheless functioned through various secondary political channels, such as 
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professional syndicates and student unions. They continued to increase their 
popularity by combining, the adept use of some democratic procedures with the 
operation of a network of social services that includes schools, clinics, and banks 
and by the late 1980s, the Brotherhood had already gained control of the doctors', 
engineers', and pharmacists' professional associations and all significant 
indicators of political Participation at the grass-roots, or civil society, level. In 
1992, Brotherhood's control reached one of the oldest and most prominent of the 
syndicates - the Lawyers' Association - after winning two-thirds of the seats in 
the administrative assemble. Their victory allowed them to assume important 
71. The Jama'at al-Islamiyya (not to be confused with al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya) is a creation of the 1970s, 
when members first appeared on university campuses and began to gain control of student unions 
throughout the country. They contributed a great deal to the initial assertion of Islam among the young 
in post-Nasserist Egypt. By the 1980s, their influence had spread beyond the campuses and involved 
welfare work. Overall they became synonymous with Islamist political assertion, and both moderate and 
radical social and political activities were attributed to them. Although the activities of the Jama'at 
throughout the country generally followed a similar pattern, activists nevertheless tended to follow the 
instructions of their particular amir (leader). Thus in one context, for example, Assyut, they would 
pursue more violent activities than in other areas. 
72. There are 22 professional syndicates in Egypt with a total of 3.5 million members. The ascendancy of 
the Muslim Brothers as a controlling majority took place in the five most politically active syndicates, 
representing doctors, engineers, pharmacists, scientists, and lawyers. Some analysts have argued that the 
reason behind the Muslim Brothers' decision to exert political control over the syndicates was in reaction 
to the government's harassment in the 1980s of Islamists in Egypt, and its imposition of various 
restrictions on them both inside and outside parliament. Those restrictions had prevented the Muslim 
Brotherhood fi'om acting as an opposition party, and had caused a decline in its representation in 
parliament in the 1990s (Fahmy, Autumn 1998:552-553). 
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positions in the association, with Saif al-Islam al-Banna, a son of Hassan al-Banna, 
becoming the secretary general j(Kotob, 1995:329). 
Success in non-governmental organizations had given the 
Brotherhood a chance to be heard among the educated in Egypt. They were able 
to express their views at professional conferences held by associations and 
universities.[ At a 1991 conference organized in Zagazig by Engineer's Syndicate, 
for example, representatives of the Brotherhood decried the excesses of emergency 
law and the restrictions on civil liberties.;) 
(It was at that time that the government has introduced legislation 
aimed at diluting Brotherhood influence in the professional associations it used to 
command respect (Financial Times. 22 April 1993). The union law, officially 
known as 'The Democratic Guarantees of Professional Syndicates', issued on 17 
February 1993 deliberately to make it harder for the Muslim Brotherhood to 
maintain control of the professional unions. It required 50 percent of the 
syndicate's members to vote in the first round of council elections if they are to be 
valid (Civil Society. March 1996). ' The union law was designed to break the 
dominance of the Brotherhood. It assumed that the Brotherhood, a small but 
organized group whose supporters never failed to vote, won their majority because 
of a low voter turnout (Reuter. 13 January 1994).) The law was issued with 24 
hours without consultation with those concerned, i.e. the syndicates' boards of 
directors and general assemblies (Civil Society. March, 1995). The Eg>'ptian 
Organization for Human Right (EOHR), a non-governmental organization that 
investigated allegations of human rights abuses and other related matter, issued a 
press release calling the union law 'a violation of all that is claimed in its title, i.e. 
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'providing democratic guarantees'. The EOHR stated that the law was a violation 
of the rules of both the 'International Convention on Civil and Political rights' and 
the 'International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' to which 
Egypt is a party. EOHR went on to call the law 'legislative terrorism which 
cannot be separated from the rapid deterioration of the state of human rights in 
Egypt during the last few years' (Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, 
March 1993). 
A year after the passing of the union law, critics claimed that it has 
backfired. Islamist activists were confident that they could maintain their 
powerful position within the syndicates, fxhe Brotherhood-controlled Engineers 
Association saw its elections delayed three times because of problems related to 
the application of the new law./^ The Secretary-General of the Engineer 
Association, Mohammad Basher, said in an interview with Renter that, 'he 
believed the government had delayed the elections using various excuses to block 
an Islamist victory' (Renter. 13 January 1994).) 
^ Further, in 1992, to check the growing popularity of the Brotherhood, 
amendment to the law was passed which prohibited political activity by groups 
lacking legal status. It was at the same time that, the Mubarak Government 
refused to engage in any political dialogue with the Brotherhood.^ The NDP 
Deputy Secretary-General, Kamal al-Shazli, however, stated that political dialogue 
would only take part with 'officially recognized organizations' (Al-Ahram 
Weekly. 18-24 November 1993). 
( Despite the curbs on the political activities, the Brotherhood's dual 
call for the respect of basic liberties (hurriyat) and implementation of the Shari'a 
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throughout the 90s remained effective and powerful one that found a resonance in 
society. \ There was also a growing demand for the respect of civil liberties voiced 
by both secularist and Islamists with professional syndicates, student groups, 
lawyers, and writers speaking out about human rights abuses. For the Islamists, 
both radical and moderate, these abuses seemed to be mainly directed at them. 
^The main demands being made by the Muslim Brotherhood and moderate 
Islamists in general was for their rights to freedom of speech against the 
government, protection against torture, access to due process of law, an end to 
corruption, and the implementation of the Shari'a. They believed that political 
pluralism is a guarantee of these and a legitimate process through which the 
Shari'a could be implemented; therefore, at this stage their commitment to 
democratization is greater than that of the government. 
However, the state continued to bar the Brotherhood from official 
recognition and fiill cooperation with the regime. Saif al-Islam Hasan al-Banna, 
son of the founder of the Brotherhood, urged the government to 'open the doors to 
all to participate in decision-making.... (This) will therefore guarantee that all will 
execute it (democracy) and abide by it' (Quoted in Kotob, 1995:325). The call for 
greater democracy was also made by Dr. Muhammad Umara of the Brotherhood: ) 
II Mubarak opens the doors and windows to listen to thinkers and 
leaders of Islam and their struggle and views on the Islamic 
renaissance (Nahda), his picture of the Islamic solution would 
change.... This encourages us to ask President Mubarak, whom we 
recognize as having transferred the relationship between the state 
and Islam a clash with the Islamist movement to a period of truce 
(hudna).... If he opens the doors to the thinkers and leaders of the 
Islamist movement, he will find a new color of men who give without 
considering the cost (Quoted in Kotob, 1995:325-326). 
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/The Brotherhood considered it imperative that democratic freedoms be expanded 
and an open multiparty system established, such that their group will be able to 
operate independently and not necessarily in consort with an alliance of other 
political parties.) 
In the 1995 elections, government tried to maneuver situation in its 
favour in an unprecedented degree, hi the Cairo suburb of Madinat Nasr, for 
instance, the official NDP candidate got more than 10,000 nonexistent or non-
resident names added to the voters' register. ^Just before the beginning of the 
campaign, the regime referred to a military court several prominent members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood whom it accused of belonging to an illegal organization. 
Officially harmed, the Muslim Brotherhood was generally tolerated but also 
regularly harassed. This time the choice of the court was no less significant than 
the timing of the changes, as hitherto only alleged members of armed Islamist 
groups had been tried by military tribunals (Kienle, 1998:226). The trial was, on 
the one hand, a financial blow as well as a warning to the Muslim Brothers; on the 
other hand, it was meant to demonstrate to the voters that votes cast for the 
Brotheiiiood's candidates would probably be lost votes. 
On the eve of the first round of elections, more than 1,000 members 
and sympathizers of the Brotherhood were arrested. Most of them were campaign 
workers or representatives of candidates, who by law were entitled to obser\e the 
voting in polling stations, as well as the subsequent counting of the vote.") 
Representatives of other opposition candidates were also expelled or turned aw ay 
from polling stations, where ballot boxes arrived stuffed with voting papers or else 
disappeared prior to the count. Numerous polling stations were ransacked by paid 
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thugs, and several opposition candidates were prevented from voting while the 
police stood by. Finally, candidates were declared elected by the minister of the 
interior without any indication of the number or percentage of votes they had 
obtained. Following some 900 appeals, the court of cassation recommended that 
the election of more than 200 deputies out of a total of 444 be invalidated. The 
newly elected parliament that included the 200 deputies concerned, refused to 
73 
follow these recommendations (Kienle, 1998:226-227). 
Partly through direct interference and partly by condoning the 
activities of NDP candidates, the regime somehow managed to get a parliament 
elected in which its ovra party obtained 94 percent of the seats, and indeed its 
largest majority ever. It was true that the opposition parties suffered from 
numerous weakness, ranging from material shortages to leaders and programs that 
failed to appeal to the voters. None of these weaknesses, however, was as crucial 
as their lack of a special relationship with the regime. 
Following the 1995 election, the Ibn Khaldun Center, the Egyptian 
Organization of Human Rights (EOHR) and the Center for Human Rights Legal 
Aid (HRLA) reported that: 
Their (government) reports documented numerous irregularities 
prior to and during the elections, including the harassment, 
intimidation and often arrest of apposition candidates, the presence 
of security officials inside the polling stations, strong-arm tactics 
designed to influence voting and vote rigging 
(http;//www.hrw.org/back£rounder/mea/Egvpt-election-bck. htm) 
73. For detailed information on irregularities and interference in the 1995 elections, see. The Egyptian 
Organization of Human Rights (1996), 'Democracy Jeopardized: The Egyptian Organization of Human 
Rights' account of the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections of 1995', Cairo: The Egyptian Organization of 
Human Rights. 
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Ibn Khaldun Center also condemned acts of violence during the elections, which 
resulted in the death of over sixty people and injuries to many others. 
Desperate to save its image the government's response to the militant 
threat posed by the Gama'a al-Islamiyya and other militant groups at this time 
however was more swift. An all out war was declared against the militants. 
According to the Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi, 'police campaigns against the 
militants are being launched day and night and will not stop as long as there is a 
single terrorist in the republic, security forces will not rest until these elements are 
finished off (Al-Ahram Weekly. 3-9 February 1994). Methods used by the 
police clampdown hes resulted in widespread allegations of police brutality from 
communities caught in the crossfire. For example, in March 1993 an attack during 
the holy month of Ramadon on the Rahman mosque in Aswan, believed to be the 
local headquarters of the Gama'a al-Islamiyya, resulted in nine deaths and 40 
injured. According to a lawyer acting on behalf of 80 men arrested after the 
assault, police 'tried to kill as many people as they could' (Observer, 14 March 
1993). 
According to EHRO (1994), 'it appeared that the government policy 
at the moment was to imprison less and kill more'. The government consistently 
ordered the storming of militant hideouts. The incidents include the storming of 
an apartment building in the Cairo suburb of al-Zawya al-Hamra in February 1994; 
seven militants were shot dead apparently after little resistance. Eight militants 
were killed in the Southern town of Edfii, nearly a month later (Reuter. 28 
February 1994). 
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According to EHRO the government detained militant suspects by 
conducting arbitrary security sweeps, especially in areas of Upper Egypt. 
Anybody suspected of having anything to do with the militant organizations was 
arrested. The Secretary-General of EOHR had declared in 1994 that the 
government carried out a policy of 'precautionary arrest'. It considered it safer to 
detain an innocent who might be suspected of being associated with a militant 
group and subsequently release him, than to give the suspect the benefit of the 
doubt. In many cases those that had been detained and were subsequently released 
emerged more sjmipathetic to the militants'cause. The government also secretly 
organized a system of informers which it used to identify suspects. Finally 
confessions and information were extracted by torture (Al-Ahram. 3-9 February 
1994). 
In addition to the above, the government passed a new legislation in 
an effort to combat the militants. In 1992 the government passed a Law for 
Combating Terrorism (Law No.97). The legislation allowed the state to outlaw 
organizations deemed to advocate violating the constitution. Critics of the law 
have said that it would muzzle the press, inhibit freedom of association and 
confiscate freedom of expression. In the words of an independent legislator, 
Kamal Khaled: 'if somebody advocates the application of Shan'a, or views Islam 
as both state and religion they can be imprisoned and tortured for their views' 
(Mideast Mirror. 16 July 1992). 
The law also changed the penal code. The death penalty could now 
be imposed for membership of a terrorist organization, and for supplying money, 
weapons or information to any such group. Human Rights groups feared that this 
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law would permit political activities to be treated as acts of terrorism. 
Furthermore, in the absence of any internationally agreed definition of terrorism, 
the term could be widely interpreted, leading to more prisoners of conscience and 
a marked increase in the number of people executed for political reasons (Cairo 
Today. November: 1993). 
Repression, however, could not prevent the further increase of 
political violence in the country. Throughout the 1990s, the regime faced strong 
domestic challenges which undoubtedly led it to pursue more repressive policies at 
the level of both legislation and political practice, f In the political practice, the 
government banned the students activities organized by Jama'at al-Islamiyya in 
the universities, the appointment of goverrmient preachers (from the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and Endowments) to mosques, restrictions on the appointment of 
Muslim Brotherhood candidates to head professional syndicates, and the decision 
to appoint rather than elect the mayors Cumad) of Upper Egypt's 4,000 villages."^ 
In its campaign to eradicate the Islamic groups, the government believed it reached 
a turning point with the shooting of Talat Yasin Hamman, a key figure of al-
Jama'a, in April 1994 (and of his successor, Ahmad Hasan Abdel Galil, in 
November). By tracking them down, the security forces claimed to have gained a 
great deal of information about al-Jama'a and claimed to have penetrated the 
group. However it is believed that as the state continues to stifle all political 
dissent, these resistant groups are likely to feel more justified than ever in carrying 
out acts of violence against the state. 
^Today the government is targeting to check the gradual and moderate 
spread of Islam by the Muslim Brotherhood for what its claims is its ideological 
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inspiration of the militant groups; it points to the Brotherhood's 'fundamentahst 
74 
thought' (fikr usuli) in its use of the writings of Ibn Taymdyya and Sayyid Qutll) 
However from the point of view of the analysis the relationship 
between the government and the Islamists needs to be seen in relation to individual 
groups as well as in terms of the government's overall policy to\\ard the Islamist 
challenge. The government in the recent years has frequently pursued a policy of 
suppression over one of accommodation in its belief that it can suppress the 
problem over time through strict security measures and an improvement in the 
economic situation. This choice though seems to be effective, retlects a lack of 
commitment to political liberalization, a rejection of an alternative ideological 
trend in the political process (something of which the Islamists themselves are 
frequently accused), as well as the manifest inability of the Islamists to force 
change on the regime. 
In the economic field, Egypt has not been as successful as hoped for. 
The economic disintegration that has continued since 1985 is the primary reason 
behind Egypt's current domestic instability, arguably manifestations of severe 
economic dislocation such as inflation, unemployment, overpopulation, 
inadequacy of transportation, housing, education and health services. This is the 
problem that ftiels the rise in public imrest and eventually to the rise in anti-
government violence. Thus it is important for domestic security and regime 
74. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) was a medieval theologian of the Hanbali school who issued a fatwa ruling 
that the Muslim Mongol rulers in Marden (Modem Turkey) were not to be considered Muslims because 
they applied a mixture of Shari'a and Mongol laws (the Yasa). Islamists draw parallels with modrn 
governments that only partially apply the Shari'a. 
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Stability that the government pay urgent and greater attention to economic 
problems. 
The general economic context of relations between the state and the 
Islamists however also needs to be set against the background of economic 
liberalization (infitah) began during the Sadat period. Economic Liberalization is 
generally viewed, on a popular level, as responsible for the increased disparity 
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between rich and poor. This policy of Economic Liberalization however produced 
a class of entrepreneurs specially those benefited from the new economic climate 
and established rapidly expanding businesses. These included a category of 
"Islamic investment" specialists whose investment companies (Sharikat tawzif al-
amwal), developed in the 1980s, attracted the public by offering unusually high 
rates of return (typically 20 to 30 percent) while insisting that their funds were 
invested in accordance with Islamic principles. The early success of these 
companies benefited Islamists, mainly because they made financial contributions 
supporting Islamist candidates for parliament and helped fiind Islamic 
publications. However, their collapse (many appear to have been money 
pyramids) and the subsequent loss of investors' money, amidst allegations of 
corruption against some of the major companies, such as al-Rayyan, al-Saad, and 
al-Sharif, was exploited by the government to taint Islamists in general with 
75. According to one of the most comprehensive and methodologically sound studies of diachronic changes 
in private consumption, poverty increased significantly between the fiscal years 1981-1982 and 1990-
1991. In rural Egypt, the percentage of the poor rose from 16.1 to 28.6 percent of the total population 
over that period of time; while in urban areas it rose from 18.2 to 20.3 percent. Applying a higher 
poverty line, including those deemed moderately poor, the percentage rose from 26.9 in 1981-1982 to 
39.2 percent in rural areas and from 33.5 to 39 percent in urban ones. In terms of expenditure deciles, 
the bottom 80 percent of Egyptian society feared worse than previously, and only the top 20 percent 
feared better (Kienly, Spring 1988.232). 
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corruption. 
These investment companies flourished in an unregulated market, 
and the government's moves against them were partly motivated by the wish to 
protect private investors. The government is also motivated, however, by the 
desire to quell the growing contradiction, pointed out by U.S. commercial bankers, 
between the mounting debt of the Egyptian government and the vast sums 
deposited in the commercial banks as a result of profits accumulated by 
investors in these companies (Zubaida, 1990:156). Despite their eventual failure, 
the investment companies still reflect the appeal of combining Islam with finance 
primarily for profit but also for religious legitimization. 
The economic situation in Egypt however remains fragile and the 
government is under constant strain to please entrepreneurs who have supported 
the system as well as to improve the general Hving standards of Egyptians in the 
hope of stemming the appeal of the Islamists. But on the other hand despite their 
repeated criticism of the economic pohcies of the government along with others, 
one of flie main weakness of the Islamists is, however, their inability to place the 
economy at the top of their agenda and provide a clear economic programme of 
reform and development. Thus, the public lacks hope and confidence in those who 
are meant to provide an alternative. It is because of Egypt's overwhelming 
economic reliance on U.S. aid, and the fear that the assumption of power by 
Islamists would jeopardize existing U.S.-Egyptian relations, that the regime 
continues to have an advantage. Although an inqjrovement in the economic 
situation at present might temporarily strengthen the hand of the regime, it is 
unlikely to quell the demand for greater accountability and further Islamization not 
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only by the deprived or marginalized in society, but also by many urban middle-
class elements. Despite a degree of convergence between secularists and Islamist 
opposed to the government over certain political issues such as the rule of law, the 
Arab-Israeli peace process, the Gulf War, and Bosnia, Islamists nevertheless tend 
to interpret contemporary political challenges involving Muslims as being directed 
at them specifically because they are Muslims. Part of the ideological challenge 
facing the Egyptian state is the emergence in society of the search for an 
alternative identity based exclusively on Islam. This identity is- presented by 
Islamists as being better equipped to defend Muslims, as was the case, they argue, 
historically. 
However there has been no clear articulation by the Islamists of 
Egypt's role regionally and internationally, beyond a general notion about the need 
for unity between Muslim states in order to promote greater justice for Arabs and 
Muslims. Islamists and members of the public generdly bdieve that it is not the 
Muslims who are anti-Western, but the West, and at jaresent, -particularly, the 
United States, that is undermining the developm«it of Muslim states. The state, 
for its part, seeks to pursue growth and development through closer political and 
economic cooperation with the West as well as with Israel, i t is tiiis later vision 
that represents a regional trend that is being supported polModly and partly 
fmancially by the United States and the European Union. Tlie state has presented 
it as forming a new overarching economic and political reality;0iat will undermine 
Islamist trend. Although this view of an alternative had gained momentum with 
the peace process, it is greatly undermined by a legacy of economic failure and 
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corruption associated with the regime, disillusionment with the political process, 
and the ideological alternative being offered by the Islamists. 
There is growing polarization between the increasing number of 
Egyptians who are seeking a more 'Islamic friendly' society in which to live tiiat 
would not contradict their religious values and those who want to maintain and 
promote a less religiously oriented society. In today's Egypt, the moderate 
interpretation of Islam is what was once considered extreme, and there has been a 
shift in corresponding notions of what constitutes "moderate" and "extreme". 
Such classifications have different features at different times and therefore need to 
be constantly reviewed in order to assess what they represent at a particular period. 
This ideological and political debate poses a challenge in Mubarak's government 
and eventually brings with it two options: accommodation of its opponents or a 
continuation of its present policy of control and containment, both of which are 
unlikely to stem the demand for greater Islamization of state and society. 
173 
CHAPTER SIX 
Egypt in Search of Political Community 
Egypt is at the crossroads of divergent political interest, each seeking its own 
empowerment. Islamist movements seek to shift Egypt's political culture toward 
an Islamic solution. The various Islamist movements, however, each define that 
"solution" somewhat differently. Other segments within the population seek a 
greater voice in the affairs of state through democratization for Egypt's political 
fiiture. Although these two political interests share some views, belief concerning 
sectarian versus secular political leadership often separate them. The ruling elites 
of Egypt's multiparty autocracy seek to retain their own power and wealth in spite 
of the interests of these groups. They are content to use coercion, containment, or 
repression to ensure their position remain intact. The relationship between these 
coexistent and conflict interests form a political model, the dynamics of which 
illustrate how they not only counterbalance each other, but also make predicting 
the results of their interaction possible. 
Thus for Egypt, the twentieth century was ahnost a complete failure. 
Despite of the competing political interest, the country is still in the midst of a 
comprehensive crisis which has led to a confusion about its very identity, future 
choices and destiny. Its poor achievements in the economic and social fields 
forces Egypt to reflect on the causes of protracted failure and accordingly on the 
nature of the society that it aspires to create. The politics of fiaistration and the 
search for meaning and self-fulfillment are rooted in the nexus of interactions with 
the West since the beginning of the colonial age. Indeed, politics is another area 
of reversals and fundamental failures. The country started its long road to 
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democracy with the opening of a pseudo parhament in 1866. By 1923 it had a 
liberal democratic constitution. 
The Liberal period of government that followed in the twentieth 
century allowed many groups to be channeled through political parties to be 
debated within parliament or without parliament in the free press of the day. The 
function of the new politicians was to relay the discontent of the masses, or their 
needs, to the ruling institutions, of which they formed a basic element. Although 
the high ulama tried to play a role in that system of government, especially the 
rector of al-Azhar, the rest of the religious establishment had taken a back seat for 
over century and were no longer able to direct affairs of government. Their 
previous fluid roles as ubiquitous fillers of political, social and economic vacuums 
were now filled by bureaucrats, administrators and the new breed of politicians 
and journalists. This group only made the motions of appealing to the electorate; 
in fact, the electorate was most frequently manipulated and gulled by them. 
A decade of liberal experimentation in government, which was 
supposed to grant Egypt independence from the British presence, soon showed its 
inability to accomplish that goal. The emerging educated middle class Egyptians 
failed to see that tiie liberal period was an experiment that had been pre-judged 
from the beginning and had been so geared by the King and the British forces of 
occupation that it could only have a limited liberal approach. These Egyptian 
damned all liberal governments as ultimately doomed to failure. In their search for 
alternatives some of these groups adopted other western ideologies: communism, 
socialism, fascism. Others less kindly disposed towards western ideologies, or less 
knowledgeable, eschewed anything derived from outside their own indigenous 
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culture, and determined that the future salvation of the country and its people lay 
in an inward looking movement, in a return to Islamic principles of morality. Thus 
the failure of the liberal experiment in the 1930 gave rise to other ideological 
solutions and spurred a reawakening of public religious sentiments. These were in 
part channeled to non-formal, popular organization - most prominently the 
Muslim Brotherhood that offered its own set of total answers to realities. 
The founder, Hasan al-Banna was convinced that only negative 
currents could come from the West, that Europeans were bent on westernizing 
Egypt - the better to dominate the country. He saw around him a class of 
bureaucrats who were western trakied and educated, who imitated the manners and 
the customs of the West and allowed their women to do so, who spoke foreign 
tongues and adopted foreign laws. New laws based on western system had been 
introduced into Egypt with the British occupation; they had little to do with the 
Islamic law (Shari'a), although there was an attempt to claim that they were in 
conformity with the spirit of the Shari'a. Many of the new laws had caused 
hardship among the population, which could neither understand the letter of the 
law nor grasp its ramifications. 
Having lived in Ismailiyya, al-Baima experienced more closely the 
negative aspect of the European domination of Egypt than the rest of his 
con^atriots, for Ismailiyya was a European enclave next to an Egyptian slum 
whose inhabitants catered to the creature comforts of the enclave. 
Had the westernizing political currents improved the lot of the 
Egyptian, or economic depression not appeared on the steps of the liberal 
experiment, there may never have been such a movement of repudiation of the 
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West. But the two came together, and simple cause and effect attributed the sony 
economic condition of the country to its exploitation by the West. 
The Mushm Brothers, while not having a well planned political 
program - contenting themselves with vague generalities about Muslim 
government and a Muslim polity - had an effective social and economic program, 
one which won them numerous adherents in the late 1940s, the Brothers with their 
Islamic antecedent and ideas filled the need in a society which was going through 
a depression as well as a period of transition. That explains their membership, 
which grew rapidly, as did the group who sympathized with their aims and 
principles but did not become active members of the association. The 
membership, which came overwhelmingly from among the poorer classes, also cut 
across class lines and counted among its adherents many westernized folk who 
were dissatisfied with the government, and with what they saw as a palpable loss 
of identity in their society as a result of Westernization and foreign occupation. 
The search for roots, for authenticity led many to return to their past history, to the 
days when their rulers had been Muslims and acted according to Shari'a. 
The movement of the Muslim Brothers did achieve a limited political 
success. It mobilized large masses of people, carried out several successfiil 
economic enterprises and gained a standing and a following among the urban 
population. This success however came to an end when the association started 
dabbling in politics and advocated the used of violence. A series of assassinations 
ended in the death of al-Banna himself, after which the movement was proscribed 
for a number of years and went underground. The organizational apparatus of the 
movement however was to be emulated by later groups. These was a secret 
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system of cells which operated independently of each other and which received 
orders directly from al-Banna himself. These were the groups that were in charge 
of acts of violence. 
The military revolt of 1952 however supplied an option to Egyptian 
society and allowed for alternative means of protesting abuse on the part of the 
government. A wave of hope swept across the country that a new regime was in 
the offing and that radical reforms would be carried out. Nasser pitched his appeal 
to the dispossessed classes, the fallahin (farmers) and the industrial workers, and 
deliberately sought to gain them as adherents to his regime, and in this he was 
successful. Land reform and industrialization were the means used to change 
social structures. Much capital was, however, wasted on hasty schemes that 
failed; much was lost to corruption and inefficiency, and much was lost to 
armament. The outcome was an increased indebtedness to the Eastern bloc and 
dependence on them. The defeat of 1967 spelled the beginning of an end of 
Nasser's socialist approach, even though he continued to rule until his death in 
1970. 
The advent of Sadat heralded another new beginning, one that harked 
back to the liberal age and claimed to end repression, and institute freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press. So long as people are made to feel that there is a 
channel - recognized and attainable - for forwarding their voices, violent means 
are eschewed as unnecessary. Sadat's early days led people to believe they would 
be heard, and the government would be responsive. However, the new open-door 
economic policies, infitah, soon showed that the rich could be heard louder, and 
the riots of January 1977 occurred. These riots were dangerous signs and showed 
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that the body politic was weakening, but unfortunately they went unheeded and 
distorted. 
Having encouraged the emergence and growth of Islamic political 
elements, Sadat found himself unable to control them. The Islamic jama'at and 
the Muslim Brotherhood grew increasingly critical of Sadat's foreign 
(rapprochement with the United States, peace with Israel) and domestic (economic 
conditions, inadequate democratization, deviation from Islam) policy as the 1970s 
progressed. Further more, these groups expanded in size and popular support. 
The circulation of al-Da'wa, al-Ftisam and other religious publications increased 
steadily. After 1975, the university - based Islamic jama'at won massive victories 
in student union elections. In 1978, for example, its candidates won 210 out of 
218 seats in Alexandria University's Faculties of Medicine, Engineering, Law and 
Pharmacy. These criticisms and popular electoral gains were viewed with alarm 
by Sadat, particularly in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. 
The Camp David meeting and the resulting fiasco of the 'peace' talks 
brought further disillusionment, inflation, and repression as Sadat refiised to listen 
to internal criticism and geared himself to respond to international adulation rather 
than internal demands. To frustrate his political opposition, which he described as 
either Nasserite, communists, or paid agents of foreign governments (they were 
neither of the three but were normal responses to government actions, the 
opposition that arises in every society), he roused the Muslim Brotherhood to 
action. He turned them into the ioyal opposition', allowing their newspapers to 
flourish, consulting them on many matters, and using them as a foil to the rest of 
the political elements in the country to the extent of referring to them as political 
179 
groups. But the Muslim Brotherhood were not easily manipulated by Sadat or his 
government. They soon turned their criticism toward him, his policy of excessive 
Westernization, and his excessive reliance on the United States in foreign affairs. 
History repeated itself, and the same discontent with the West, its economics, and 
ideology that had existed in the 1930s surfaced again in the 1970s and 1980s for 
different reasons. Government policies the Brotherhood disapproved of were 
attributed to western pressures on the Egyptian regime, so that in rejecting the 
policies, they also rejected the regime for bowing to them. 
Religious activism was not created by the Sadat regime, although it 
grew during that period of time. It had first appeared under Nasser as a response 
to the War of 1967 revived the fortunes of militant Islamic groups. Reconstituting 
themselves out of the incarcerated remnants of the Muslim Brothers, these 
surfaced as extremist violent militants in the 1970s. Aided by circumstances of 
worsening economic and social conditions in the country and a wide-spread 
disaffection of a new generation with state discredited shibboleths of radical Arab 
nationalism and other 'secular' ideologies, they, in their bid were determined to 
seek power by openly embracing terrorism against the state. 
As political problems were exacerbated during Sadat's regime, 
solutions seemed farther off than ever, and as economic problems increased, more 
and more people began to despair of the ability of the regime to do much about 
anything. More people turned to religion, this time not only out of piety, but also 
hoping to find an answer to practical matters of politics and economics. The 
Brothers who had been encouraged by the government to speak out fi-eely began to 
discuss matters of public interest. Where other channels for communication were 
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closed off to the public, Muslim newspapers proliferated, attracting people who 
were not necessarily drawn to them by the religious content so much as by the fact 
that the paper was an open channel for communication. Where open discussion of 
public wrongs was met by government repression, discussion of the same wrongs 
when couched in religious symbolism, or using historical characters from the past, 
served to convey the message without the retaliation of the government forces. 
Further by encouraging the Brothers the Sadat regime probably issued a signal of 
which it was not aware of: that opposition would be permitted through the channel 
of religion. 
The traditional high ulama tried to lead the religious current but 
failed, for they had become government employees and their neutrality was 
suspect. The role of religious leader devolved on new, socially mobilized groups, 
on the leaders of the Brothers, but even more on the leaders of new militant groups 
that appeared overnight. These Islamic militant groups, the jama'at, had no 
connection with the Brothers except that they spoke in a Muslim idiom, and 
preached a return to the Shari'a and to social justice. The new groups varied in 
approach with each organization. Some regarded all those who had not joined 
them as heretics, kuffar, to be exterminated. Others, more moderate, believed that 
all government was composed of tyrants and oppressors so long as it did not 
follow the shari'a. 
Some of the groups believed in the use of violence and in the need to 
overthrow government and kill the originators of tyranny. Among the later group 
were the men who assassinated Sadat. Others believed in a gradual change of 
government as people came to learn mor^ ^bout their reUgion and shari'a as a 
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ways of doing things. Because these groups are disparate and loosely organized 
their numbers however can only be guessed at, and their influence is equally 
unknown. 
The social base of the state under Sadat was undoubtedly narrower 
than it had been under Nasser. In some ways, however, it was more solid. It 
rested on the hard-core support of the most strategic social force, the bourgeoisie, 
which had a major stake in its survival, and it at least partially incorporated 
elements of the opposition through the party/interest group structure created under 
limited liberalization. Yet, although the parties' articulated interests, they did not, 
as in strong party systems, incorporate a large mobilized public or the interests of 
the masses into the making of pubUc policies. There was still an institutional gap 
between public wishes and policy outcomes; decisions, still made in limited elite 
circles, therefore enjoyed too little societal support. Moreover, the regime also 
lacked the ideological legitimacy to win the loyalty of the masses. 
Under Mubarak, however, democratization became the main 
legitimacy formula. Nevertheless, it was limited. The masses were held not to be 
prepared for full-blown democracy, lacking sufficient responsibility and 
consciousness, they were susceptible to 'alien' (leftist) or 'Islamist' ideas. Strong 
presidential tutelage, the careful channeling of political discourse through regime-
managed institutions, and limits on overt attempts to incite the masses was needed 
for the sake of social peace. By the Mubarak era, this new conservative consensus 
seemed to bind the elite, affecting ideological divisions. 
By the middle of the 1980s, as economic expansion gave way to 
austerity, the challenge of mass control became ever more burdensome for the 
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regime. The limits of the regime's capacity to incorporate dissident factions left 
the door open to the rise of a counter-elite in the form of Islamic movement, and 
the regime had to continue to rely on coercion and repression to stave off dissent 
and rebellion. 
The Islamic mainstream, possessed of increasing cohesion, 
organization, and mobilizational capability, rapidly took advantage of the 
legitimate channels of activity opened by the regime under Mubarak. The 
mainstream Muslim Brotherhood and its conservative groups were incorporated 
into parliament; they infiltrated the parties, the judiciary, and the press; and 
generally put secular forces on the defensive. The more the secular opposition 
proved impotent to wrest a share of power from the regime, the more dissidents 
seemed to turn to political Islam as the only viable alternative. A dramatic 
indicator of this was the substantial representation Islamist won in the professional 
syndicates, especially the doctors' union, traditionally bastions of the liberal, 
upper-middle class; only the lawyers' and journalists' unions resisted tlieir way. 
Victories indicative of Islamic influence included by the reversal of Sadat's law of 
personal status tiiat gave women some modest right, a decision by certain state 
cwnpanies to cease hiring women so they could take their 'proper place in the 
home, and a constitutional amendment making Shari'a the sole basis of 
legislation'. 
Thus for the regime(s) when the extent control mechanisms are 
proved inadequate, the only role remains is coercion and repression in the political 
system. Under Nasser coercive controls were very tight although largely directed 
at the upper class and limited numbers of middle-class opposition activists. Sadat 
183 
initially relaxed controls, particularly over the bourgeoisie, but when opposition 
became too insistent, he did not hesitate to repress it. His massive 1981 purge 
showed how quickly the regime could change from conciliation to repression. 
Under the more tolerant Mubarak regime, political freedoms are still unequally 
enjoyed. Dissent within regime institutions is tolerated, but when it crossed the 
line into mass action - such as Islamic street demonstrations for implementation of 
Shari'a and anti-Tsraeli protests - it is regularly repressed. Strikes are also 
regularly smashed with the use of force. The regime continued to round up leftist 
and Islamic dissidents, charging them with belonging to illegal organizations or 
spreading anti-government propaganda, apparently part of a strategy to keep 
dissent with manageable bounds. 
Moreover, the government paralyed the working of the professional 
organizations and student unions. It got ride of the Brother's representation in 
parliament by arresting those most likely to stand in the 1995 elections. 
Thus in the present, critics of the government do not have many 
channels of expression. However, influential voices that sometimes differ from 
the government's position occasionally find an outlet in Egypt's government-
controlled press and more often in the Western press. Most critics and opposition 
parties agree that the use of violence by the militants must be confronted. 
However, many believe in a national dialogue which includes the Muslim 
Brotherhood. They argue that allowing the Brotherhood to play a role in the 
political process will more effectively isolate the Gama'a al-Islamiyya than a 
crude and all-embracing policy of confrontation. Mohamed Heikal, a former 
advisor to Anwar Sadat and a highly respected journalist writes about the 
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inadequacy of confronting violence with violence and calls for political action to 
counter the Islamist challenge (Al-Ahram Weekly. 3-9 February 1998). Salama 
Ahmed Salama, a columnist for Al-Ahram newspaper, urges the government to 
avoid all out war with the militants and talks of giving people 'fresh hope of 
change'. Even General Fouad Allam, a senior figure in the interior ministry, has 
spoken of the need to reconsider the belief that extremist thought should only be 
confronted with arms (Observer. 14 March 1998), 
Egypt has always been a deeply conservative and religious society. 
Islam has played a key role in molding modem Egyptian culture. However, 
militant Islam has not been able to attract mass support in Egypt. On several 
occasion, the militants have tried to exploit grievances to gain widespread popular 
support but to no avail. Although the mass arrests and blanket policing of militant 
sfrongholds have, for the moment, contained the militant threat. The strong 
government crackdown seems to have succeeded in taking most of the sting out of 
the Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Cairo, However, it is clear that the mUitants remain 
strong in their main power-base in and around Assuit. If the militants have, to a 
degree, been contained the Egyptian government should not assume that the 
broader fundamentalist challenge has been overcome. 
If most Egyptians feel aUenated by the militants campaign of 
violence there is no evidence to suggest genuine popular support for the regime of 
President Husni Mubarak. One can conclude however that Egypt is still, despite 
pretensions to democracy, a one-party state. The ruling National Democratic Party 
of Mubarak has no popular roots. Nor do the official opposition parties. The 
people feel they cannot influence their rulers, let alone change them. Popular 
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dissatisfaction with the political status quo is fuelled by the economic crisis. Mass 
unen^loyment, a population growing at an insupportable rate and desperately poor 
living conditions all help to inflame the tensions. The only party that can claim 
genuine popularity is the long-established Muslim Brotherhood which has 
successfully escaped identification with the militant violence in the eyes of the 
Egyptian public. The Brotherhood offers its supporters a form of political 
legitimacy. Their demand for an Islamic pohty based on strict interpretation of 
Islamic law has exposed the moral bankruptcy at the heart of the Mubarak regime. 
A series of corruption scandals imphcating senior government officials has added 
to the feeling that Egypt is controlled by a self-serving elite. To those already in 
power there is no difference between moderate and extreme Islamists. All of them 
want to establish an Islamic government with a specifically Islamic agenda - only 
the means to the end differ. The precise extent of support for the Brotherhood is 
difficult to measure. They have not attempted to spell out an economic or political 
alternative but, their simple message - 'Islam is the solution' - seems to be 
attractive to many. Given the extent of Egypt's social and economic problems the 
chances of undermining the appeal of the Brotherhood are shm. Egypt is in need 
of massive economic and structural reform and a genuine democratic experiment. 
Thiis in this present circumstances without rapid and wholesale reform Egypt's 
record of relative stability since indq)endence could be seriously threatened. 
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Appendix 
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
(Some important Articles) 
PART ONE 
THE STATE 
Article 1 
The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic, socialist State based on 
the alliance of the working forces of the people. 
The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and work for the 
realization of its comprehensive unity. 
Article 2 
Islam is tiie religion of the State and Arabic its official language. 
Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source legislation. 
Article 3 
Sovereignty is for the people alone and they are the source of 
authority. The people shall exercise and protect this sovereignty, and safeguard 
national unity in the manner specified in the Constitution. 
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Article 4 
The economic foundation of the Arab Republic of Egypt is a socialist 
democratic system based on sufficiency and justice in a manner preventing 
exploitation, conducive to liquidation of income differences, protecting legitimate 
earnings, and guaranteeing the equity of the distribution of public duties and 
responsibilities. 
Article 5 
The political system of the Arab Republic of Egypt is a multi-party 
one, witiiin the framework of the basic elements and principles of the Egyptian 
society as stipulated in the Constitution (Political parties are regulated by law). 
Article 6 
The Egyptian nationality is defined by the law. 
PART TWO 
BASIC CONSTITUENTS OF THE SOCIETY 
Social and Moral Constituents 
Article 7 
Social solidarity is the basis of the society. 
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Article 8 
The State shall guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens. 
Article 9 
The family is the basis of the society founded on religion, morality 
and patriotism. 
The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian 
family - with what it embodies of values and traditions while affirming and 
developing this character in the relations within the Egyptian society. 
Article 12 
The society shall be committed to safeguarding and protecting 
morals, promoting the genuine Egyptian traditions and abiding by the high 
standards of religious education, moral and national values, historical heritage of 
the people, scientific facts, socialist conduct and public morality within the limits 
of the law. 
The State is committed to abiding by these principles and promoting 
them. 
Article 13 
Work is a right, a duty and an honour ensured by the State. Workers 
who excel in their field of work shall receive the appreciation of the State and the 
society. 
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No work shall be imposed on the citizens, except by virtue of the 
law, for the performance of a public service and in return for a fair remuneration. 
Article 14 
Public offices are the right of all citizens and an assignment for their 
occupants in the service of the people. The State guarantees their (the occupants) 
protection and the performance of their duties in safeguarding the interests of the 
people. They may not be dismissed by other than disciplinary way, except in the 
cases specified by the law. 
Article 15 
The war veterans, those injured in war or because of it, and the wives 
and children of those killed shall have priority in work opportunities according to 
the law. 
Article 16 
The State shall guarantee cultural, social and health services, and 
work to ensure them for the villages in particular in an easy and regular manner in 
order to raise their standard. 
Article 17 
The State shall guarantee social and health insurance services and all 
the citizens have the right to pensions in cases of incapacity, unemployment and 
old-age, in accordance with the law. 
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Article 19 
Religious education shall be a principal subject in the course of 
general education. 
Economic Constituents 
Article 23 
The national economy shall be organized in accordance with a 
comprehensive development plan which ensures raising the national income, fair 
distribution, raising the standard of living, eliminating unemployment, increasing 
work opportunities, connecting wages with production, fixing a minimum and a 
maximum limit for wages in a manner which guarantees lessening the disparities 
between incomes. 
Article 24 
The people shall control all the means of production and direct their 
surplus in accordance with the development plan laid down by the State. 
Article 25 
Every citizen shaU have a share in the national revenue to be defined 
by the law in accordance with his work or his imexploiting ownership. 
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Article 26 
The workers shall have a share in the management and profits of the 
projects. They are committed to the development 
PART THREE 
PUBUC FREEDOMS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
Article 40 
All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights 
and duties without discrimination between them due to race, ethnic origin, 
language, religion or creed. 
Article 41 
Individual freedom is a natural right and shall not be touched. 
Except in case of flagrante delicto no person may be arrested, inspected, detained 
or his freedom restricted or prevented from free movement except by an order 
necessitated by investigations and preservation of the security of the society. This 
order shall be given by the competent judge or the Public Prosecution in 
accordance with the provisions of the law. The law shaU determine the period of 
custody. 
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Article 42 
Any person arrested, detained or his freedom restricted shall be 
treated in the manner concomitant with the preservation of his dignity. No 
physical or moral harm is to be inflicted upon him. He may not be detained or 
imprisoned except in places defined by laws organizing prisons. 
If a confession is proved to have been made by a person under any of 
the aforementioned forms of duress or coercion, it shall be considered invalid and 
futUe. 
Article 46 
The State shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of 
practice of religious rites. 
Article 47 
Freedom of opinion is guaranteed. Every individual has the right to 
express his opinion and to publicize it verbally or in writmg or by photography or 
by other means within the limits of the law. Self-criticism and constructive 
criticism is the guarantee for the safety of the national structure. 
Article 48 
Freedom of the press, printing, publication and mass media shall be 
guaranteed. Censorship on newspapers is forbidden as well as notifying, 
suspending or canceling them by administrative methods. In a state of emergency 
or in time of war a limited censorship may be imposed on the newspapers, 
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publications and mass media in matters related to public safety or purposes of 
national security in accordance with the law. 
Article 54 
Citizens shall have the right to peaceable and unarmed private 
assembly, without the need for prior notice. Security men should not attend these 
private meetings. 
Public meetings, processions and gatherings are allowed within the 
limits of the law. 
Article 55 
Citizens shall have tiie right to form societies as defined in the law. 
The establishment of societies whose activities are hostile to the social system, 
clandestine or have a military character is prohibited. 
Article 56 
The creation of syndicates and unions on a democratic basis is a right 
guaranteed by law, and should have a moral entity. 
The law regulates the participation of syndicates and unions in 
carrying out the social programmes and plans, raising the standard of efficiency, 
consolidating the socialist behaviour among their members, and safeguarding their 
funds. 
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They are responsible for questioning their members about their 
behaviour in exercising their activities according to certain codes of morals, and 
for defending the rights and liberties of their members as defined in the law. 
Article 57 
Any assault on individual freedom or on the inviolability of private 
life of citizens and any other public rights and liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution and the law shall be considered a crime, whose criminal and civil 
lawsuit is not liable to prescription. The State shall grant a fair compensation to 
the victim of such an assault. 
Article 62 
Citizens shall have the right to vote, nominate and express their 
opinions in referendums according to the provisions of the law. Their 
participation in public life is a national duty. 
Article 63 
Every individual has the right to address public authorities in writing 
and with his own signature. Addressing public authorites should not be in the 
name of groups, with the exception of disciplinary organs and moral personalities. 
Maddex, Robert L. (1995). Constitutions of the World. Washington DC: Congressional 
Quarterly.,Inc. 
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Sayyid Qutbb 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND THE 
CORRECT METHOD OF ITS FORMATION 
The message of Islam brought by the Messenger of God, Muhammad 
- peace be on him - was the last link in the long chain of invitations toward God 
by the noble Prophets. Throughout history, this message has remained the same: 
that human beings should recognize that their true Sustainer and Lord is One God, 
that they should submit to Him alone, and that the lordship of man be eliminated. 
Except for a few people here and there in history, mankind as a whole has never 
denied the existence of God and His sovereignty over the universe; it has rather 
erred in comprehending the real attributes of God, or in taking other gods besides 
God as His associates. This association with God has been either in belief and 
worship, or in accepting the sovereignty of others besides God. Both of these 
aspects are Shirk in the sense that they take human beings away from the religion 
of God, which was brought by the Prophets. After each Prophet, there was a 
period during which people understood this religion, but then gradually later 
generations forgot it and returned to Jahiliyyah. They started again on the way of 
Shirk, sometimes in tbeir belief and worship and sometimes in their submission to 
the authority of others, and sometimes in both. 
Jahiliyyah, on the other hand, is one man's lordship over another, and 
in this respect it is against the system of the universe and brings the involuntary 
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aspect of human life into conflict with its voluntary aspect. This was that 
Jahiliyyah which confronted every Prophet of God. Including the last Prophet -
peace be on him - in their call toward submission to One God. This Jahiliyyah is 
not an abstract theory; m fact, under certain circumstances it has no theory at all. 
It always takes the form of a living movement in a society which has its own 
leadership, its own concepts and values, and its own traditions, habits and feelings. 
It is an organized society and there is a close cooperation and loyalty between its 
individuals, and it is always ready and alive to defend its existence consciously or 
unconsciously. It crushes all elements which seem to be dangerous to its 
personality. 
When Jahiliyyah takes the form, not of a 'theory' but of an active 
movement in tihis fashion, then any attempt to abolish this Jahiliyyah and to bring 
people back to God which presents Islam merely as a 'theory' will be undesirable, 
rather useless. Jahiliyyah controls the practical world, and for its support there is a 
living and active organization. In this situation, mere theoretical efforts to fight it 
cannot even be equal, much less superior, to it. When the purpose is to abolish the 
existing system and to replace it with a new system which in its character, 
principles and all its general and particular aspects, is different from the 
controlling jahili system, then it stands to reason that this new system should also 
come into the battlefield as an organized movement and a viable group. It should 
come into the battlefield with a determination that its stratgy, its social 
organization, and the relationship between its individuals should be firmer and 
more powerful than the existing jahih system. 
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The theoretical foundation of Islam, m every period of history, has 
been to witness 'La ilaha ilia Allah' - 'There is no deity except God' - which 
means to bear witness that the only true deity is God, that He is the Sustainer, that 
He is the Ruler of the universe, and that He is real Sovereign; to believe in Him in 
the heart, to worship Him alone, and to put into practice His laws. Without this 
complete acceptance of 'La ilaha ilia Allah'. Which differentiates the one who 
says he is a Muslim from a non-Muslim, there cannot be any practical significance 
to this utterance, nor will it have any weight according to the Islamic law. 
Theoretically, to establish it means that people should devote then-
entire lives in submission to Allah and should not decide any affair on their own, 
but must refer to God's injunctions concerning it and follow tiiem. We know of 
Allah's guidance through only one source, that is, through the Messenger of Allah 
- peace be on hinL Thus, in the second part of the Islamic deed, we bear witness 
'Wa ashhadu anna Muhammadar Rasul Allah' - 'And I bear witness that 
Muhammad is the Messenger of God'. 
It is therefore necessary that Islam's theoretical foundation - the 
belief - materialize in the form of an organized and active group from the very 
beginning. It is necessary that this group separate itself from the jahili society, 
becoming independent and distinct fix)m the active and organized jahili society 
whose aim is to block Islam. The center of this new group should be a new 
leadership, the leadership which first came in the person of the Prophet - peace be 
on him - himself, and after him was delegated to those who strove for bringing 
people back to God's sovereignty. His authority and His laws. A p>erson who 
bears witness that there Is no deity except God and that Muhammad is God's 
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Messenger should cut off his relationship of loyalty from the jahili society, which 
he has forsaken, and from jahiU leadership, whether it be in the guise of priests, 
magicians or astrologers, or in the form of political, social or economic leadership, 
as was the case of the Quraish in the time of the Prophet - peace be on him. He 
will have to give his complete loyalty to the new Islamic movement and to the 
Muslim leadership. 
This decisive step must be taken at the very moment a person says, 
'La ilaha ilia Allah, Muhammadar Rasul Allah', with his tongue. The Muslim 
society cannot come into existence with out this. It cannot come into existence 
simply as a creed in the hearts of individual Muslims, however numerous they may 
be, unless they become an active, harmonious and cooperative group, distinct by 
itself, whose different elements, like the limbs of a human body, work together for 
its formation, its strengthening, its expansion, and for its defense against all those 
elements which attack its system, working under a leadership which is independent 
of the jahili leadership, which organizes its various efforts into one harmonious 
purpose, and which prepares for the strengthening and widening of their Islamic 
character and directs them to abolish the influences of their opponent, the jahili 
life. 
Islam was founded in this maimer. It was founded on a creed which, 
although concise, included the whole of life. This creed immediately brought into 
action a viable and dynamic group of people who became independent and 
separate from the jahili society, immediately challenging it; it never came as an 
abstract theory devoid of practical existence. Similarly, in the future it can be 
brought about only in this manner. There is no other way for the revival of Islam 
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in the shade of Jahihyyah, in whatever age or country it appears, except to follow 
its natural character and to develop it into a movement and an organic system. 
When Islam, according to the method described above, founds a 
Muslim community on this basis, forms it into an active group, and makes this 
faith the sole basis for the relationship between the individuals of this group, its 
ultimate aim is to awaken the 'humanity of man', to develop it, to make it 
powerful and strong, and to make it the most dominant factor among all the 
aspects found in man's being. Its seeks to implement this purpose through its 
teachings, its rules, its laws and injunctions. 
Some human characteristics are common with those of animals, even 
with those of inorganic matter. This has misled the exponents of 'scientific 
Jahiliyyah' to consider man to be nothing more than an animal, or even than 
inorganic matter! But in spite of the characteristics which man shares with 
animals and inorganic matter, man possesses certain other characteristics which 
distinguish him and make him a unique creation. Even the exponents of 'scientific 
Ignorance' were forced to admit this, the evidence of observational facts choking 
them; but even then, their admission of this fact is neither sincere nor unequivocal. 
In this respect the service rendered by Islam's pure way of life has 
produced concrete and valuable results. Islam based the Islamic society on the 
association of belief alone, instead of the low associations based on race and 
colour, language and country, regional and national mterests. Instead of stressing 
those traits which are common to both man and animal, it promoted man's human 
qualities, nurtured them and made them the dominant factor. Among the concrete 
and brilliant results of this attitude was that the Islamic society became an open 
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and all inclusive community in which people of various races, nations, languages 
and colours were members, ttiere remaining no trace of these low animalistic traits. 
The rivers of higher talents and various abilities of all races of mankind flowed 
into this vast ocean and mixed in it. Their intermingling gave rise to a high level 
of civilization in a very short span of time, dazzling the whole world, and 
compounding the essences of all the human capabilities, ideas and wisdom of that 
period, in spite of the fact that in those times travel was difficult and the means of 
communication were slow. 
In this great Islamic society Arabs, Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, 
Moroccans, Turks, Chinese, Indians, Romans, Greeks, Indonesians, Africans were 
gathered together - in short, peoples of all nations and all races. Their various 
characteristics were united, and with mutual cooperation, harmony and unity they 
took part in the construction of the Islamic community and Islamic culture. This 
marvelous civilization was not an 'Arabic civilization', even for a single day; it 
was pxirely an 'Islamic civilization'. It was never a 'nationality' but always a 
'community of belief. 
Thus they all came together on an equal footing in the relationship of 
love, with their minds set upon a single goal; thus they used their best abilities, 
developed the qualities of their race to the fullest, and brought the essence of their 
personal, national and historical experiences for the development of this one 
community, to which they all belonged on an equal footing and in which their 
common bond was through their relationship to their Sustainer. In this community 
their 'humanity' developed without any hindrance. These are characteristics 
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which were never achieved by any other group of people in the entire history of 
mankind! 
The most distinguished and well-known society in ancient history is 
considered to be the Roman Empire. Peoples of various races, languages and 
temperaments came together in this society, but all this was not based on 'human 
relationship' nor was any sublime faith the uniting factor among them; rather then-
society was ordered on a class system, the class of 'nobles' and the class of 
'slaves', throughout the Empire. Moreover, the Roman race - in general - had the 
leadership and the other races were considered its subjects. Hence this society 
could not achieve that height which was achieved by the Islamic society and did 
not bring those blessings which were brought by the Islamic society. 
Various societies have also appeared in modem times. For example, 
consider the British Empire. It is like the Roman society to which it is an heir. It 
is based on national greed, in which the British nation has the leadership and 
exploits those colonies annexed by the Empire. The same is true of other 
European empires. The Spanish and Portuguese Empires in their times, and the 
French Empire, all are equal with respect to oppression and exploitation. 
Communism also wanted to establish a new type of society, demolishing the walls 
of race and colour, nation and geographical region, but it is not based on 'human 
relationship' but on a 'class system'. Thus the communist society is like the 
Roman society with a reversal of emphasis; there nobles had distinction, while 
here the proletariat has distinction. The underlying emotion of this class is hatred 
and envy of other classes. Such a selfish and vengeful society cannot but excite 
base emotions in its individuals. The very basis of it is laid down in exciting 
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animalistic characteristics, and in developing and strengthening them. Thus, in its 
view, the most fundamental needs of a human being are those which are common 
with the animals, that is, 'food, shelter and sex'. From its point of view, the whole 
of human history is nothing but a struggle for food! 
Islam, then, is the only Divine way of life which brings out the 
noblest human characteristics, developing and using them for the construction of 
human society. Islam has remained unique in this respect to this day. Those who 
deviate from this system and want some other system, whether it be based on 
nationalism, colour and race, class struggle, or similar corrupt theories, are truly 
enemies of mankind! They do not want man to develop those noble characteristics 
which have been given to him by his Creator, nor do they wish to see a human 
society benefit from the harmonious blending of all those capabilities, experiences 
and characteristics which have been developed among the various races of 
mankind. 
God Most High says about such people: 'Say: Shall We tell you who 
will be the greatest losers in their deeds? Those whose effort goes astray in the 
present life, while tiiey think that they are doing good deeds. Those are they who 
disbelieve in the signs of their Lord and the encounter with Him. Their works 
have failed, and on ttie Day of Resurrection We shall not assign to them any value. 
That is their recompense - Hell - for that they were unbelievers and took My signs 
and My Messengers in mockery' (18:103-106). 
God Almighty speaks the truth. 
Qutb, Sayyid. (1981: 79-92). Milestones. (S. Badrul Hasan, Trans.). Karachi: 
International Islamic Publishers. 
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Nasser; Socialism 
The Charter of National Action 
(Mithaq Al-Amal Al-Watani) 
On the Inevitability of the Socialist Solution 
Socialism is the way to social freedom. Social freedom cannot 
be realised except through equal opportunity for every citizen to 
obtain a fair share of the national wealth. 
This is not confined to the mere re-distribution of the national 
wealth among the citizens but foremost and above all it requires 
expanding the base of this national wealth, so as to accede to the 
lawful rights of the working masses. This means that socialism, with 
its two supports, sufficiency and justice, is the way to social freedom. 
The socialist solution to the problem of economic and social 
underdevelopment in Egypt - with a view to achieving progress in a 
revolution was a historical inevitability imposed by reality, the broad 
aspirations of the masses and the changing nature of the world in the 
second part of the 20*** century. 
The capitalist experiments to achieve progress correlated 
closely with imperialism. The countries of the capitalist world 
reached the period of economic take-off on the basis of investments 
they made in their colonies. The wealth of India, of which British 
imperialism seized the largest share, was the beginning of the 
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formation of the British savings which were used in the development 
of agriculture and industry in Britain. If Britain has reached its take-
off stage thanks to the Lancashire textile industry, the transformation 
of Egypt into a large field for cotton growing pumped the blood 
through the artery of British economy leaving the Egyptian peasant 
starved. Gone are the ages of imperialist piracy, when the peoples' 
wealth was looted to serve the interests of others with neither legal 
nor moral control. We should stamp out the remaining traces of those 
ages, especially in Africa. 
Other experiments of progress realised their objectives at the 
expense of increasing the misery of the working people, either to 
serve the interests of capital or under pressure of ideological 
application which went to the extent of sacrificing whole living 
generations for the sake of others still unborn. The nature of the age 
no longer allows such things. Progress through looting or through the 
corvee system is no longer tolerable under the new human values. 
These human values put an end to colonialism and an end to the 
corvee system. Not only did they achieve this but they also expressed 
positively the spirit and the ideals of the age when, through science, 
those values introduced other methods of work for the sake of 
progress. 
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Scientific socialism is the suitable style for finding the right 
method leading to progress. No other method can definitely achieve 
the desired progress. Those who call for freedom of capital, imagining 
that to be the road to progress, are gravely mistaken. 
In the countries forced to remain underdeveloped, capital in its 
natural development is no longer able to lead the economic drive at a 
time when the great capitalist monopolies in the advanced countries 
grew thanks to the exploitation of the sources of wealth in the 
colonies. 
The huge development of world monopolies leaves only two 
ways for local capitalism in the countries aspiring to progress: 
First - Local capitalism is no longer capable of competition 
without the customs protection paid for by the masses. 
Second - The only hope left for local capitalism to develop is to 
relate itself to the movements of world monopolies, following in their 
footsteps, thus turning into a mere appendage and dragging the 
country to doom. 
Moreover, the wide gap of underdevelopment which separates 
the advanced states and those trying to catch up no longer allows the 
method of progress to be left to destroy individual efforts motivated 
by mere selfish profit. These individual efforts are no longej capable 
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of facing the challenge. Facing the challenge calls for three 
conditions: 
(1) Assembling the national savings. 
(2) Putting all the experiences of modern science at the 
disposal of the exploitation of national savings. 
(3) Drafting a complete plan for production. 
These are concerned with increasing the product. On the other 
hand, fair distribution calls for planning programmes for social 
action, programmes that enable the working masses to reap the 
benefits of economic action and create the welfare society to 
which they aspire and struggle to promote. Work aiming at 
expanding the base of national wealth can never be left to the 
haphazard ways of the exploiting private capital with its unruly 
tendencies. The redistribution of the surplus national work on 
the basis of justice can never be accomplished through voluntary 
efforts based on good intentions, however sincere they may be. 
This places a definite conclusion before the will of the 
National Revolution, without the acceptance of which it cannot 
realise its objectives. This conclusion is the necessity for the 
people's control over all the tools of production and over 
directing the surplus according to a definite plan. This socialist 
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solution is the only way out to economic and social progress. It 
is the way to democracy in all its social and political forms. 
The people's control over all the tools of production does 
not necessitate the nationalisation of al means of production or 
the abolition of private ownership - nor does it affect the 
legitimate right of inheritance based on it. Such control can be 
achieved in two ways: 
First - The creation of a capable public sector that would 
lead progress in all domains and bear the main responsibility of 
the development plan. 
Second - The existence of a private sector that would, 
without exploitation, participate in the development within the 
framework of the overall plan, provided that the people's 
control is exercised over both sectors. 
This socialist solution is the only path where all elements 
participating in the process of production can meet, according to 
scientific rules capable of supplying society with all the 
energies enabling it to rebuild its life on the basis of a carefully 
studied and comprehensive plan. 
* * * 
Efficient socialist planning is the sole method which 
guarantees the use of all national resources, be they material, natural 
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or human, in a practical, scientific and humane way aimed at realising 
the common good of the masses, and ensuring a life of prosperity for 
them. Efficient socialist planning is the guarantee for the sound 
exploitation of actually existing resources, or those which are latent 
or potential. At the same time, it is a guarantee for the continued 
distribution of fundamental services. It is also a guarantee for raising 
the standard of the services now offered. It is a guarantee for 
extending those services to the areas which had fallen victim to 
negligence and inefficiency which were the outcome of long 
deprivation imposed by the selfishness of the ruling classes who 
looked down upon the struggling people. 
It follows, then, that planning must be a scientifically organised 
creative process that would meet the challenges facing our society. It 
is not a mere process of working out the possible; it is a process of 
achieving hope. Hence planning in our society is required to find out 
a solution to the difficult formula. In the solution of that difficult 
formula lies the material and human success of national action: How 
can we increase production and , at the same time, increase the 
consumption of goods and use of services? And this besides the 
constant increase of saving for the sake of new investments? 
This difficult formula with its three vital branches requires the 
existence of a highly efficient organisation capable of mobilising 
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forces of production, raising their material and intellectual efficiency, 
and relating them to the production process. Such an organisation is 
required to be aware that the aim of production is to widen the scope 
of services and that services - in turn - are a driving force turning the 
wheels of production. The relation between services and production 
and their rapid, smooth running movement creates a sound national 
blood cycle vital to the life of the people wholly and individually. 
This organisation must depend on centralisation in planning and 
decentralisation in implementation, which ensures placing the plan's 
programmes in the hands of all the people. 
Consequently, the major part of the plan should be shouldered 
by the public sector owned by the people as a whole. This does not 
only ensure the sound development of the production process along 
the set path of productivity, but is also just, since the public sector 
belongs to the people as a whole. 
It was the national struggle of the masses that provided the 
nucleus of the public sector, through the people's determination to 
retrieve and nationalise the foreign monopolies , and restore them to 
their natural and legitimate place, namely to their ownership by the 
whole people. Even during the military fight against imperialism, that 
same national struggle added to the public sector all the British and 
French capital in Egypt - capital which was seized from the people at 
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the time of foreign privileges and at a time when national wealth was 
subjected to the looting of foreign adventures. 
Moreover, in seeking social freedom and penetrating into the 
strongholds of class exploitation that national struggle was able to 
add to the public sector the major part of production equipment 
through the July 1961 laws and their deep revolutionary impact 
reflecting the will for overall change in Egypt. 
Those gigantic steps which allowed the public sector to 
undertake the role of vanguard in the march towards progress drew 
clearcut lines imposed by national reality and a thorough study of the 
nation's circumstances, potentialities and aims. 
Those lines and principles can be summed up as follows: 
First - In the field of production in general: The major skeleton 
of the production operation such as the railways, roads, ports, 
airports, the sources of energy, the dams, means of sea, land and air 
transportation and other public services should be within the frame 
work of public ownership. 
Second - In the field of industry: The majority of the heavy, 
medium and mining industries should be part of public ownership. 
Although it is possible to allow private ownership in this domain, 
such private ownership should be controlled by the public sector 
owned by the people. Light industries must always be beyond 
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monopoly . Though this field is open to private ownership, the public 
sector must have a role enabling it to guide that industry to the 
people's interest. 
Third - In the field of trade: Foreign trade must be under the 
people's full control. Thus al import trade must be within the 
framework of the public sector. Though it is incumbent upon private 
capital to participate in export trade, the public sector must have the 
main share in that field to preclude all possible fraudulency. In so far 
as a percentage could be set in that field, the public sector must be in 
charge of three quarters of exports, while encouraging the private 
sector to shoulder the responsibility of the remaining share. 
The public sector must have a role in internal trade. The public 
sector should within the coming eight years - remaining period of the 
first overall development plan for doubling national income in ten 
years - be in charge of at least one quarter of the internal trade to 
prevent monopoly and expand the range of internal trade for private 
and cooperative activities. It should be understood, of course, that 
internal trade means service and distribution against reasonable profit 
which under no circumstances should reach the extent of exploitation. 
Fourth - In the field of finance: Banks should be within the 
framework of public ownership. The role of capital is a national one 
and should not be left to speculation and adventure. In addition. 
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insurance companies should be within the same framework of public 
ownership for the protection of a major part of national saving and to 
ensure its sound orientation. 
Fifth - In the domain of land: There should be a clear 
distinction between two kinds of private ownership - that which opens 
the gates to exploitation, and non-exploiting which does its share in 
the service of the national economy while serving the interests of the 
owners themselves. 
Progress through socialism is a consolidation of the bases of sound 
democracy, the democracy of all the people. Progress in the political domain 
under capitalism - even if we imagined it possible in the present 
international conditions - can only mean a confirmation of the rule of the 
class, possessing and monopolising all interest. In this event, the returns 
would go to a small minority of the people who have so much money in 
excess that they squander it on various forms of wasteful luxury defying the 
deprivation of the majority. This sharpens the edge of the class strife and 
wipes out every hope for democratic evolution. 
The political liberation of man cannot be achieved unless an end is 
put to every shackle of exploitation limiting his freedom. Socialism and 
democracy form the wings of freedom with which socialism can soar to the 
distant horizons aspired to by the masses. 
On 30 June 1962, the National Congress for Popular Forces, out of which the Arab 
Socialist Union was to emerge, approved the text of "The Charter of National Action" 
213 
Political Thought of Sayyid Jamal 
ad-Din al-Afghani 
With the political domination of Islamic countries by the West, the 
Muslims were faced witii a new political ideolo^ different fiom the medieval 
concepts of civilized govenmient. The new states of the Western world were 
national states. This meant that the governments of diese states were based not on 
the wiU of a single person and his advisers but upon the will of the majority of 
people living in a well-defined area. Naticmality and democracy went hand in 
hand. Muslim thinkers and reformers had to define their position vis a vis these 
two concepts which were unknown in medieval times. Medieval governments 
were autocratic govemmoits in which the pec^le in gmeral had no share. Their 
voice did not singly coimt. There was no organized public opinion. Freedom of 
expression and common interest in political matters was unknown in medieval 
times. All the new developments were welcomed by Muslim reformers and 
thinkers and no body thou^t of defending medieval autocracy. 'On die other 
hand, it was thought that the new system of political life was a resuscitation of the 
early Islamic way of life, when the community was ruled by elected caliphs, the 
people had the ri^t to criticize their rulers and the power of the rulers was 
restricted by the laws of the Sharl'ah. 
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Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) expresses the 
characteristic mood of the times when he condemns one man rule. He says that a 
nation which does not have people of Hall and 'Aqd (people who loose and bind), 
which is not consulted in mattes which affect its interests, whose will is incq>able 
of influencing the direction of its affairs, which submits to one man whose will is 
law, who commands what he wills and does what he wills—such a community 
does not remain in one state. There are altemating periods of happiness and misery 
for it, of knowledge and igncnance, of riches and poverty, of honour and 
dishonour. The fact is that such a community depends for its state on the state of 
its ruler. If the ruler is a man of knowledge, statesmanship, courage and h i ^ 
purpose, he rules his nation with justice and creates better living conditions for the 
masses. If not, the opposite happens. 
If the ruler is unjust and tyrannical, if disorder, misery and frustration 
prevail what is to be done? Afghan? says that if people in such a country have still 
some life in them, their leaders and representatives of public opmion will 
2 
overthrow the ruler. What means are to be employed for overthrowing a bad ruler, 
Afghani does not make clear. However, Hourani says that Afj^ani did not belong 
to tiie quietist majority of Muslim thinkers who believed that they should protest 
against injustice but submit to it; he accepted rather the view of the minority who 
believed in the right of revolt. 
In an article on the qualities necessary for the men of authority, 
Afghani makes a strong plea for the development of national patriotism. He says 
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that the defence, security and prosperity of a country does not depend upon the 
possession of stnmg forts, large armies, abundant gold and weapons of h i ^ 
quality. All these things are, no doubt, necessary but far more important are the 
qualities of men who are in authority. It is only experienced, wise and good men 
who can run the affairs of a country wifli justice, establish peace and ensure the 
prosperity of its pec^le. But even fhesc qualities are not enou^. The rulers and 
men in authority should love their countrymen and have compassion for them. 
Afghani fijrdier believes diat the salvaticm of the Muslim community 
could not come from virtuous rulers alone. There was no short cut to the 
regeiKration of IslaoL Newspapers by themselves could not do it; schools could 
not do it, although they could do something to raise the standard of public morality 
and spread the idea of unity. There could be no real reform of Islam unless the 
'ulama* returned to the truth of Islam, and the community as a whole accepted it 
and lived in accordance with it. But what is the truth of Islam? 
This is the question to which, m die last analysis, all al-Afghani's 
thought is directed. In his treatment of it we are aware of a new element in Islamic 
thougjht. He is addressing himself not only to his fellow Muslims to rescue them 
from the false ideas in which they have so long been sunk; he is also talking, 
beyond the umma, to the learned world of Eurc^. He wishes both to destroy false 
views of Islam held by Muslims and criticisms of Islam made by Europeans. 
When he maintains that only by a return to Islam can the strength and civilization 
of Muslims be restored, he does so the more emphatically because it had become a 
commonplace of European thou^t that religion in general, and Islam specifically, 
sapped the will and restricted reason, and progress was only possible by 
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abandoning it, or at least by making a sharp separation between religion and 
secular life. 
Siddiqi, Mazheruddin. (1993; 2-4). Modem Reformist Thought in The Muslim World. 
Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors. 
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Glossary 
Ahl al-hal wa al-'aqd: people who loose and bind; i.e. electors, the elite 
Allah: God 
Amir: ruler, prince, governor of province 
Badr: the first war in Islamic History between Muslims and the Meccan 
Bay'a: oath of allegiance to Khalife 
Bid'a: innovation 
Fatwa: an authoritative opinion issued by a mujtahid on a matter of law 
Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence 
Hadith: a saying attributed to the Prophet 
Hadras: 'Presence' used broadly by mystics as synonym of hudar, being in the presence of 
Allah. Derwishes call their refular Friday service 'hadra' 
Infitah: economic liberalization or open door pohcy 
Imam: there are three significant meanings for this title: (1) the leader of a group of 
praying Muslims, (2) a general title for any Muslim leader with some religious 
authority: (3) in Shi Islam, the title of the rightfiil, divinely guided ruler. In the Shii 
tradition there is a line of succession to the Imamat fi-om the Prophet Muhammad 
through his cousin and son-in-law, Ali 
Jamaa't: association or Islamic groups 
Jahilliya: ignorance, refers to the period of pre-Islamic civilization 
Jihad: sacred struggle 
Khalafah: the itwtitution of government legitimized by succession of the Ruler from the 
Prophet 
Khalife: successor of the Prophet; temporal leader of the umma in the Sunni doctrine 
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Khawarij: an early schismatic puritanical movement that rejected claims to inherent 
superiority by the members of the Prophet tribe 
Khedive: name given to the ruler of Egypt form 1867 to 1914. He governed as semi-
independent viceroy of the Sultan of Turkey 
Khutba: sermon delivered in a mosque at the Friday congregational prayer 
Mahdi: the title of the divinely guided figure who is expected to come in the last days and 
establish the rule of the God on earth 
Madrasah: the traditional theological college or seminary of the Islamic sciences 
Majlis al-Shura: consultative council 
Maktab: an elementary religious school 
Masjid: place of prostration, center for Muslim worship 
Mawlid: time, place and celebration of birth of any one, particularly of the Prophet 
Muhammad. The mawlid as the finest expression of reverence for Muhammad has 
found almost general recognition in Islam, as fulfilling a religious need of the people 
and as a result of strength of the Sufi movement 
Mufti: a religious official of the Sunni rite with the authority to issue authoritative 
opinions in matter of Islamic Law 
Mulla: a lower-ranking clergyman 
Namaz: religious prayer 
Qur'an: record of the revelation Muslims believe were sent to mankind through the 
messenger of God, Muhammad 
Ramadan: the Holy month of Islam 
Salaf: the pious anscestors who lived at the time of Muharrmaad and the Rashidun Caliphs 
are called the Salaf 
Salaffiyah: in the twentieth century, reformers in the tradition of Muhammad Abduh have 
been called Salaffiyah because they called for a return to the principles followed by the 
Salaf 
Shahada: Muslim declaration feith in God and the Prophethood of Muhammad 
Shari'a: religious law(s); the correct Islamic path for Muslims to follow 
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Shaykh: this term can apply to a tribal leader, a religious teacher, a ruler, or head of 
institution 
Shayhk-ul-Islam: an honorific title for important Muslim scholars. It is the title of the 
highest official in the government structure of Islamic schools and courts. 
Shura: a council 
Sufi(sm): this dimension of Islam stresses the immanence of God. It manifests itself as 
the Islamic form of mysticism 
Sultan: a secular ruler of the Islamic community 
Sunna: the tradition of the Prophet's behaviour and practice 
Ulama: the learned men of the religious law of Islam, Muslim scholar, jurist 
Umma: the Islamic commimity 
Wahhabism: the puritanical movement led by Abdul-al-Wahhab in IS**" century in the 
Arabia 
Waqf (plural: Awqaf): religious endowments 
